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BS| ABSTRACT
The  subject  of  this  thesis  is   the  historical-mindedness  of
Jefferson  Davis,   Alexander  H.   Stephens,   Judah  Benjamin,   and  Stephen  R.
Mallory  and  the  intention,   in  addition  to  demonstrating  its  mani-
festations,   is  to  show  how  their  historical  knowledge  and  interpretations
imf luenced  their  policies  and  thinking  during  the  American  Civil  War.
It  is  this  author's  contention  that  with  a  better  insight  into  the
historical  world-mindedness  of   these  Confederate  leaders,   one  can  more
ably  comprehend  the  course  of   the  Confederacy  and  the  history  of   the
American  Civil  War.     For  it  has  been  the  author's  finding  that  these
men  did  indeed  exhibit  clef inite  historical-mindedness  and  that  their
historical  views  did  indeed  imf luence  their  thoughts  and  actions
during  the  Civil  War.
Each  of  these  Conf ederate  leaders  had  taken  great  pride  in  the
United  States  government  prior  to  the  war.     While  none  of   these  men
were  leading  advocates  of  slavery,   each  went  along  with  his  state  and
section  in  upholding  its  validity.     The  history  of   the  United  States
played  a  major  role  in  the  arguments  in  support  of  secession,   especially
in  the  mind  of  Davis.     Benjamin  was  more  concerned  with  the  legal
history  of  secession,  while  Stephens  employed  a  more  universal  argument
to  support  his  thesis.     He  also  studied  other  revolutions  in  history
which  made  him  very  fearful  of  the  South  seceding.     During  the  secession




In  their  support  of  slavery,  Davis  and  Stephens  relied  on  a
strong  religious  historical  argument  while  Benjamin  turned  to  the
legal  history  of  slavery.     In  their  defense  of  slavery,   the  cosmo-
politan  mindedness  of   the  arguments  of  Stephens  and  Davis  is  very
evident.     In  their  arguments  for  slavery,  as  well  as  for  the  right  o£
secession,   these  Southern  leaders  employed  history  as  a  tool  to
support  their  own  ideas.     Even  in  their  attempts  to  gain  recognition
for  the  Confederacy,   these  men  seemed  to  view  history  as  an  argumentive
device  more  than  a  learning  device.     Mallory,   Benjamin,   and  Davis  each
accused  the  European  nations  of  ignoring  the  lessons  of  history  and
past  international  conf licts  as  well  as  of  being  very  ignorant  of  the
history  of  the  United  States.     While  these  Confederate  leaders
recognized  the  importance  of  Europe  to  the  Confederacy,   they  failed
to  win  support  of  the  European  nations.
In  regard  to  the  military  side  of  the  Civil  War,   the  lack  of
interest  o£  Stephens  and  Benjamin  paralleled  their  earlier  lack  of
interest  in  military  history.     However, the  mind  of  Mallory  was  shaped
by  his  historical  knowledge.     Through  history  he  realized  the
importance  of  proper  training  and  of  new  inventions  such  as  the
ironclad,  and  with  this  understanding  he  was  able  to  attain  great
achievements  for  the  navy  of   the  Conf ederacy.     Davis  was  also
inf luenced  by  an  historical  awareness  of  the  military  side  of  history,
and  his  strategy  and  most  of  his  policies  or  ideas  were  a  ref lection
of  this  historical  mindedness.
The  sources  for  this   study  are  abundant.     Chief  of   them  is  The
War  of the  Rebellion: Off icial  Records  of   the  Union  and  Confederate__                            ___ Armies®
iv
This  collection  contains  many  documents  and  letters  written  by  these
Confederate  leaders.     Other  important  sources  have  been  the  documentary
source  collections  on  Davis,   Stephens  and  the  Confederacy  of  Rowland,
Richardson,   and  Cleveland.     Rembert  W.
his
Patrick's  Jefferson Davis  and
Cabinet  and  Burton  J.   Hendrick's  Statesmen  of   the  Lost  Cause:
Jeff erson  Davis  and  his  Cabinet  are the  two  most  important  books  for
general  background  to  this  study.     In  good  part,  however,  neither  these
works  nor  standard  biographical  studies  of  Davis,   Stephens,   Benjamin,
and  Mallory  have  signif icant  direct  awareness  and  discussion  of  the
historical  dimension  in  the  thought  of  these  men.     It  is  hoped  that
this  work  will  help  to  f ill  this  gap  in  studies  of  the  Confederacy.
PREFACE
The  intellectual  history  of  the  Confederacy  has  until  recently
been  a  neglected  area  of  historical  research  in  the  United  States.
Today,  however,  more  attention  is  being  focused  on  the  significant
cultural  and  intellectual  developments  during  the  Civil  War  and
Reconstruction  era.     In  addition,  many  historians  are  interpreting
the  American  Civil  War  as  not  representing  a  unique  event  in  history;
thus  more  attention  is  also  being  focused  on  the  comparative  aspects
of   the  American  Civil  War.
This  thesis  represents  an  outgrowth  of  studies  begun  in  courses
in  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction  and  in  American  Intellectual  History
taken  while  at  Appalachian  State  University.     This  thesis  in  the
intellectual  history  of  the  South  during  the  Confederate  years  is
concerned  primarily  with  the  historical  mindedness  of  four  of  the
most  important  leaders  in  the  Confederate  goverrment.     My  purpose
has  been  to  investigate  the  minds  of  Jefferson  Davis,  Alexander  H.
Stephens,   Judah  P.   Benjamin,   and  Stephen  R.   Mallory  with  the  purpose
of  showing  and  understanding  how  their  historical  ideas  inf luenced  and
were  expressed  in  their  actions  and  thoughts  during  the  Civil  War  years.
In  addition,  I  have  tried  to  present  a  brief  background  of  how  their
historical  mindedness  imf luenced  their  thinking  prior  to  the  outbreak
of   the  war  and  how  their  ideas  developed  while  the  South  was  still  a
part  of  the  Union.
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By  better  understanding  the  historical  mindedness  of  these
chief  Confederate  leaders,  one  can  not  only  get  a  better  understanding
of  their  policies,   one  can  also  see  how  they  interpreted  the  develop-
ments  during  the  Civil  War.     By  this   type  of  study,  we  can  gain  a
deeper  and  more  meaningful  understanding  of   the  American  Civil  War
era  in  general  and  the  Confederacy  in  particular.     By  studying  the
signif icance  which  each  man  attached  to  history  and  the  study  of   the
past,  we  can  better  understand  how  each  man  thought  and  acted  while
serving  their  cause.     While  this  statement  is  especially  true  for
Vice  President  Alexander  H.   Stephens,  who  saw  history  as  consisting  of
the  operation  of  great  truths  and  principles  that  never  changed  through-
out  time  and  thus  seemed  more  interested  in  standing  for  principles
rather  than  winning  the  war,   it  also  holds  true  for  the  other
Confederate  leaders.     For  example,   Secretary  of   the  Navy  Stephen  R.
Mallory's  ideas  concerning  the  Confederate  navy  were  greatly  influenced
by  his  interest  in  past  naval  history.     Judah  P.   Benjamin's  concern
with  gaining  recognition  for  the  Confederacy,  while  serving  as
Secretary  of  State,  reflects  his  understanding  of  and  deep  interest
in  legal  aspects  of  history.     Jefferson  Davis'   preoccupation  with  the
military  was  due  to  an  abiding  interest  in  military  history.    With  a
better  understanding  of  the  historical  minds  of  these  Southern  leaders,
we  can  gain  a  new  and  deeper  insight  not  only  into  the  men  themselves
but  into  the  mentality  of  the  Confederacy  as  a  whole.
I  should  like  to  thank  my  family  for  their  constant  encouragement
and  Professor  Eugene  C.   Drozdowski  for  ideas  and  suggestions  which  made
this  thesis  possible.
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HISTORY   AND   CONFEDERATE   LEAI)ERSHIP :
A   STUDY   IN   THE   INTELLECTUAL   HISTORY   OF   THE   CIVIL  WAR
CENTER  I
HISTORICAL   THINKING   IN   PRE-WAR   CAREERS
Jefferson  Davis,   the  man  who  was  destined  to  become  the  only
president  of   the  Confederacy,  was  born  on  January  3,   1808.     Three  years
later  he  moved  to  Mississippi.     In  this  year,   1811,   Judah  P.   Benjamin
was  born  on  one  of   the  West  Indies  Islands.     Alexander  H.   Stephens  was
born  a  year  later  on  a  small  farm  in  Georgia  where  he  remained  until
the  death  of  his  parents  in  1827.     The  same  year  that  Stephen  R.
Mallory  was  born,   1813,   saw  Davis  beginning  school.     After  graduating
from  Transylvania  University  in  Kentucky,  Davis  entered  the  military
academy  at  West  Point.     From  1824   to   1828  Davis   stayed  at  West  Point
where  he  was  lastingly  inf luenced  by  the  strict  soldiery  regime.
Throughout  the  rest  of  his  life  he  felt  close  attachment  to  his  alma
mater  and  there  was  hardly  a  member  of  his  class  for  whom  he  did  not
later  render  some  service,   either  as  Secretary  of  War  or  President  of
the  Confederacy.     While  at  West  Point,  he  formed  a  trait  which  would
be  a  cause  `of  controversy  during  his  later  life.     This  trait  was  that
of  absolute  loyalty  to  all  whom  he  regarded  as  his  friends  even  though
this   loyalty  might  not  be  deserved.1    One  incident  which  happened  at
West  Point,  however,  had  an  adverse  effect  on  any  loyalty  Davis  might
]William  E.   Dodd,
1966),   p.    25.
Jefferson  Davis   (New  York:     Russell  &  Russell,
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have  felt   toward  one  member  of  his  class,   Sydney  Johnson.     Johnson  won
a  fight  that  he  and  Davis  were  involved  in  over  a  tavern  keeper's
daughter.     This,I  apparently  left  a  scar  which  stayed  with  Davis  and
even  imf luenced  him  in  his  relationship  with  Johnson  during  the
American  Civil  War.
In  1822,   Benjamin  moved   to  Charleston,   South  Carolina,   from
Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  where  he  had  lived  for  seven  years.     Two
years   later  he  began  his   studies  at  Yale  where  he  was  recognized  as
being  a  very  capable  student.3     In  1818  Mallory  left  school  at  the  age
of  f if teem  where  he  had  been  a  student  at  a  Moravian  school  in  Pennsyl-
vania.     Mallory  was  a  Roman  Catholic  and  was  half  Irish.     Mallory  along
with  Davis  and  Benjamin,   attended  school  in  the  North,   hence   they  were
able  to  have  a  more  nationalistic  attitude  than  Stephens  who  attended
school  in  the  South.     All   these  men  came  to  manhood  just  at  the  time
that  the  abolition  crusade  began  and  it  was  only  natural  that  each  was,
to  a  greater  or  lesser  degree,  affected  by  the  violent  attack  upon  his
section.4    In  1828,   Stephens  entered  Franklin  College  which  later  became
the  University  of  Georgia.     Here  he  passed  the  happiest  years  of  his
life,   graduating  in  1832  at  the  head  of  his  class.5    During  this   same
period  Mallory  was  engaged  in  private  studies  and  at  the  same  time  he
was  also  learning  law.     He  paid  close  attention  to  the  formation  of  good
2Burton  T.   Hendrick,
Davis  and  his
p.    19.
Statesman  and
Cabinet   (New  York
the  Lost  Cause Jefferson
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4Frank  L.   Owsley,   "Jefferson  Davis,"  The  Southern  Review
(New  York:     Kraus  Reprint  Corporation,1965),   p.   763.
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moral  habits  during  these  years  which  proved  to  be  of  lasting
importance.6    Most  of   the  administrative  leaders  of   the  new  Con-
federacy  seem  to  have  had  a  sound  moral  upbringing  and  most  took  such
matters  fairly  seriously.     Of   these  four  men,   Benjamin  seemed  to  be
the  least  interested  in  such  serious  ideas  as  he  always   tried  to  keep
a  sense  of  humor.     Mallory  was  also  on  the  lookout  for  a  good  time.
Stephens,   at  one  time,   took  life  more  seriously  and  planned  to  be  a
minister  and  the  Georgia  Presbyterian  Educational  Society  provided
funds  for  schooling  at  Franklin  College.7     Stephens,   as  Davis,   took
himself  quite  seriously.     Both  were  humorless,   self-conscious,   and
excessively  sensitive.     Davis  experienced  many  and  varied  inf luences
during  his  formative  years.     His   teachers  at  St.  Thomas  were  Englishmen;
at  Jefferson  College,   Scotsmen;   at  the  County  Academy,   a  Bostonian;
and  at  Transylvania  College,   Scotsmen,   French,  New  Englanders,   and
Irish.     His  religious  contacts  were  also  broad:   Baptist  at  home,
Catholic,   Presbyterian,   and  Christian  at  school  and  college.     This
education  helped  shape  his  mind  and  gave  him  a  cosmopolitan  view  or
a  world  view.     In  other  words,   even  in  his  earlier  years,  a  predis-
position  toward  international-mindedness  was  nurtured. 8
Another  important  date  which  deserves  mentioning  for  Davis  is  the
winter  of  1830.     While  stationed  at  Wisconsin  he  contracted  pneumonia
6]oseph  T.   Durkin,  £±£P±£± i.  !!±±±±E]£  - Confederate EEqu
(Chapel  Hill:     The  University  of  North  Carolina  Press,1954),   p.   4.
7von  Abele,   P.   5.
8Robert  MCElroyl Jefferson  Davis  -  the  Unreal
(New  York,   London:     Harper  &  Brothers,1937),   p.12.
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and  barely  survived  the  encounter.    Partly  as  a  result  of  this  illness,
he  experienced  health  problems   throughout  his  rema`ining  years.
Stephens  also  experienced  health  problems  throughout  his  life,  and
both  men  were  easily  fatigued  and  of ten  sick.
In  1833,   Benjamin  married  Marie  Augustine  Natalie.     He  remained
in  love  with  her  for  as  long  as  he  lived,  but  if  he  ever  failed  in  life,
he  surely  failed  in  his  selection  of  a  wife.     She  was  self  indulgent,
superficial,  and  wildly  extravagant.     Some  historians  have  even  said
she  was  a  nymphomaniac.     During  the  war  she  caused  him  many  trying
moments,  and  later,   she  completely  deserted  him  to  live  in  France,
although  Benjamin  still  visited  her  whenever  he  could.     Perhaps  her
residence  in  France  before  the  war  helped  Benjamin  gain  connections  in
France  and  enabled  him  to  better  understand  the  people  of  France.     If
so,   that  was  about  the  only  good  thing  to  come  out  of  their  marriage.10
By  1834,   Mallory  was  well  on  his  way  to   learning   law.     He  was
especially  interested  in  the  sphere  of  maritime  affairs.11    This
interest  would  remain  with  him  until  the  collapse  of  the  Confederacy.
This  same  year,   1834,  also  finds  Stephens  making  hi.s  first  political
stand  as  he  deplored  the  advent  of  rank  Federalism while  supporting  the
states  rights  party  candidate.12    From  Stephens'   journal  we  are  able  to
get  a  better  insight  of  his  mind  as  he  wrote
9Dodd,   p.   33.
N.¥.:103::::::a¥a:::::ni§::;?'p¥2=9±
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his    meeting      slaves  who  were  being  transported  to  New  Orleans  from
Virginia.     Here,   also,   Benjamin  became  involved  with  a  person  who  would
play  a  role  in  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  Confederacy,  John  Slidell,
who  would  serve  as  minister   to  France.17    0f   the  white  population  in
Louisiana,   almost  half  were  either  foreign  born,   chief ly  Irish,  German,
and  French,   or  natives  of  other  American  states.     Benjamin  fitted
easily  into   this  cosmopolitan  atmosphere.     He  was  an  outstanding
speaker  as  well  as   the  most  prominent  man  in  the  city  of  New  Orleans.
Thus,   in  1842,   he  was  elected  as  a  Whig  representative  to   the  Louisiana
legislature.18    Like  so  many  other  people  of  the  Jewish  faith,   Benjamin
had  a  cosmopolitan  outlook  and  although  he  gradually  separated  himself
from  Jewish  affairs,  he  never  renounced  his  ancient  faith.
In  1843,  Davis  ran  successfully  for  the  Mississippi  legislature.
Following    a    debate  with  his  opponent,   Sargent  S.   Prentiss,   Davis
became  a  man  of  mark  in  his  state  as   the  Democratic  leaders   looked  to
him  to  be  a  strong  leader  in  his  section  of  the  state.19    During  this
time  span,   Mallory  was  becoming  one  of   the   leading  Democrats   in
Florida.20    During  his  short  span  in'the  state  house,  Davis  attacked
the  protective  tariff  system  as  unconstitutional.     He  urged  the  govern-
ment  to  aid  all  classes  by  releasing  them  from  duties  or  other  taxes
not  absolutely  necessary  for  the  general  defense  of  the  country.
17Meade,   P.   40.
£8ERE.,   p.   85.
19Dodd,   p.    65.
2°Durkin,   p.   33.
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my  soul's  bent  upon  success   in  my  profession  (law)   and
the  most  trivial  circumstance  is  frequently  sufficient
to   dampen  my  whole  ardor  and  drive  me  into  despair   .   .   .
I  believe  I  shall  never  be  worth  anything,  and  the
thought  is   death]5o  my  soul   .   .   .   I  was  made   to  f igure
in  a  storm  .   .   .
Also  in  his  journal  he  expressed  a  contempt  for  the  whole  human  race
as  he  believed  sensuality  was  the  moving  principle  of  mankind  and  the
most  brutish  were  the  most  honored.     Perhaps   this  was  an  unconscious
protest  against  nature  having  cheated  him  from  engaging  in  most
Sensual  activity.14                                                                                                 `
The  same  year  that  Stephens  first  ran  for  public  office,   a  seat
in  the  Georgia  House  of  Representatives,   Davis  retired  to  his   large
estate  "Briarfierd".     During  his  stay  at  the  plantation,  Davis  did  much
reading,  and  although  his  favorite  field  was  English  history,  he  also
read  Latin  and  Greek.15    While  living  on  his  estate,  not  only  did  Davis
prove  himself  a  tried  and  experienced  executive,   but  also  he  got  to
observe  the  system  of  slavery  at  work.     Thus,   two  convictions  were
planted  in  his  mind  which  would  never  leave  him;   first,   that  emancipation
could  not  solve  the  Negro  problem;   and  second,   that  the  only  hope  for
improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  Negro  lay  in  the  slow  process  of
fitting  him  for  economic  competition  with  his  white  superiors.     Sudden
emancipation  would  destroy  the  Negro  race.     Davis  argued  for  slavery
from  a  historical-religious  viewpoint.16     In  1842,   Benjamin  gained
national  prominence  in  his  f irst  important  case  which  resulted  from
£3ERE.,   p.   51.
£4Equ.,   p.   52.
£5Hamilton  Jones  Eckenrode, Jefferson  Davis:     President  of  the
South   (New  York:     Macmillan  Co.,1923),   p.   37
L6Dodd,   pp.   40-41.
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He  held  to  the  view,   the  least  government  possible  at  the  least
possible  cost.21    For  Davis,   as  well  as  for  many  other  Southerners,
this  f ight  against  the  protective  tariff  would  continue  up  until  the
war.     However,   he  was  unlike  most  Southerners  who  attacked  the
protective  tariff  as  being  advantageous  to  the  North  while  hurting
the  South.     In  Davis'   argument  one  can  find  his  world  view  playing
an  important  part.     For  example,  while  serving  as  Secretary  of  War,
he  addressed  an  international  scientific  conference  on  July  19,   1853.
Through  this  speech  his  universal  mind  at  work  can  be  seen.
I  most  cordially  rejoice  in  the  manifestations  around
me,  which  seem  to  indicate  an  increase  of  the  fraternity  of
nations.    For  such  must  be  the  effect  of  bringing  together
men  from  every  quarter  of   the  civilized  globe  to  compare
with  each  other  what  each  has  been  doing  for  the  advance-
ment  of  science  .   .   .  These  are  contributions  to  that  bond
of  peace  which  will  hold  men  together  as  one  brotherhood  .   .   .
The  earth  was  given  to  man  for  his  domination.     It  has
been  perverted  from  the  great  object  of  the  creator  by
vice  and  ignorance  of  men  warring  one  with  another,  having
forced  nations  to  employ  their  industry  upon  things  not
adapted  to  their  condition,  climate,  or  soil,  at  the
sacrif ice  of  all--the  loss  of  time  and  productiveness  which
belong  to  the  want  of  adaptation.     Throw  open  the  ports  of
all  the  world.    Let  the  civilized  nation  represented  here
declare  that  we  are  one  brotherhood,  and  that  whatever
can  be  produced  more  cheaply  in  another  country  shall  be
::::h:o:h::ein :::Sp::e¥±::  ::::s: ::::I:fe:::C:ot:::ak. 22
In  1845,   Davis  joined  Stephens   in  Congress.     Stephens  had  been
a  member  of   the   lower  house  since  1843.     Two  very  serious  questions
concerning  war  were  debated  during  this   time.     One  question  arose  from
the  cliff iculty  of  both  England  and  America  claiming  the  same  territory.
2£Dodd,   p.    76.
22MCE|roy,   p.   154.
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This  argument  over  the  Oregon  territory  brought  the  two  countries  to
the  brink  of  war.     Stephens  recognized  England  as  having  rights  in
Oregon.     He  believed  that  the  United  States   should  admit  that  England
had  a  just  claim  and  thus  the  United  States  should  abandon  its
argument.23    Davis  also  strongly  emphasized  avoidance  of  war  with
England.     His  argument  appealed  to  historical  fact  as  he  spoke  of   the
visits  of  Spanish  navigators   to   the  port  of  Nootka  Sound  before  the
arrival  of  a  British  fur  trader  in  1788.     He  touched  on  the  Hudson
Bay  Company  and  the  Nootka  Convention  between  England  and  Spain  as  he
urged  caution.     He  further  said  "the  day  is  far  distant  when  measures
of  peace  or  war  will  be  prompted  by  sectional  or  class  interests.
War,   sis  is  a  dread  alternative  and  should  be  the  last  resort."24
So  in  1846  Davis  was  expressing  the  same  opinion  of  war  that  he  would
express  at  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War.     One  factor  which  probably
imf luenced  Davis  and  not  Stephens  was  military  consideration,  as
Davis  would  be  cautious  since  England  was  a  strong  military  power.
Stephens,   on  the  other  hand,   seemed  to  be  more  caught  up  in  the  moral
justice  of  it.    When  trouble  again  broke  out  with  Great  Britain  in  the
1850's  as   she  began  to  board  and  search  vessels  flying  an  American
flag,   Stephens  believed  that  war  with  Great  Britain  would  be  the  most
fortunate  thing  that  could  happen  to  the  United  States,   as  it  would
unite  the  hearts  of  the  people  and  put  down  all  sectional  parties.
23Louis  Pendleton, Alexander
Jacobs   and  Company,1908),   p.   75.
24Hudson   StrodeO
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Mallory,  however,  regarded  war  as   the  greatest  calamity  which  a
civilized  nation  could  suffer  with  the  exception  of  its  loss  of  honor.
After   the  United  States  had  dismissed  a  British  minister  in  1855,  many
people  expected  war,   but  Mallory  did  not  see  war  as  a  possibility  since
Great  Britain  had  not  gone  to  war  with  Spain  in  1847  when  she  had
dismissed  a  British  minister.26    Mallory's  historical  view  allowed  him
to  see  the  problem with  Great  Britain  in  a  more  objective  light  than
many  of  his  colleagues.
The  question  of  America's  claim  to  Mexico,  which  helped  to
bring  about  a  war  with  Mexico,   presented  the  second  serious  problem
during  this  time.     Both  Davis  and  Benjamin  were  in  favor  of  annexation
of  Texas  but  Stephens  opposed  it  as  being  unjust.     During  June  of  1846,
he  boldly  attacked  President  Polk  as  being  responsible  for  the  war. 27
Davis  argued  in  defense  of  the  Mexican  War  that  a  strong  and  efficient
nation  may  properly  seize  and  make  economically  productive  a  country
that  is  going  to  waste.28    However,   Stephens  rejected  any  such  argument.
He  went  back  to  ancient  history  where  he  saw  the  degradation  and
sudden  decadence  which  came  to  empire  af ter  empire  when  each  empire
had  swallowed  up  all  it  could  digest  and  had  grown  old  and  bloated  with
its  energies  clef lated.     He  feared  the  same  thing  would  happen  in
America  as  he  believed  that,   due  to  the  nature  of  man,   the  same  cause
would  necessarily  produce  the  same  result.     He  believed  that  America
26Congressiona|  g±g!±  (Washington,   D.   C.:     John  C.   Rivers,1855),
34th  Congress,   1st   Session,   1855-56,   pp.   175-76.      (From  now  on
abbreviated  as  C.G.)
27pend|eton,   p.   76.
28MCE|roy,   p.   99.
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was  destined  to  extend  from  ocean  to  ocean,   but  he  deprecated  a  destiny
realized  by  the  sword;   such  a  destiny  would  be  a  downward  progress
leading  only  to  violence  and  licentiousness.     "Fields  of  blood  and
carnage  may  make  men  brave  and  heroic  but  seldom  tend  to  make  nations
either  good,  virtuous  or  great."29    Here  again  one  sees   that  Stephens'
view  of  man  was  biased  by  his   intense  consciousness  of  man's   sin  and
imperfection  as  he  regarded  men  as   the  lowest  of  animals.30
Sometimes  I  almost  have  a  contempt  for   the  whole  human  race,
the  whole  appearing  like  a  degenerate  herd,   beneath  the
notice  of  a  national,   intellectual  being.     Sensuality  is
the  moving  principle  of  mankind,   and  the  most  brutish  are3£
the  most  honored.     I  long  for  a  less  polluted  atmosphere.
The  same  month  that  Stephens   lashed  out  at  Polk,   Davis  resigned
from  Congress  and  accepted  command  of   the  Mississippi  Rifles,   a
volunteer  regiment  from  Mississippi.32    In  this  war  with  Mexico,   Davis
gained  much  fame .in  the  battle  of  Monterey  and  in  the  battle  of  Buena
Vista.     In  the  latter  battle,   he  employed  his  famous  V  stand.     Davis
believed  that  this  formation  was  the  turning  point  at  Buena  Vista.     It
was  a  source  of  intense  gratif ication  when  his  exploits  were  praised
by  the  Duke  of  Wellington  and  other  European  experts.     Once  Davis
remarked  to  the  Mississippi   legislature  that  "the  most  marked  compli-
ment  ever  paid  by  one  general   to  another  was  that  o£  Napoleon  to  Caesar,
29£.i.,   29th  Congress,1st  Session,1846,   pp.   946-50.
3°von  Abele,   pp.   97-98.
3£Richard  M.   .ohnston  and  William  H.   Browne,  ±±±± 9± Alexander
Stephens   (Philadelphia:     J.   8.   Lippincott  &  Co.,1878),   p.   79,   May  23,
1834.
32varina  j.   Davis9 Jefferson  Davis: Memoir   (Ex-President  of
the  CSA),   Vol.   I   (New  York:      Belford  Company,1890),   p.   285.
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when  he  halted  in  his  encampment  without  a  previous  reconnaissance  and
explained  how  he  himself  had  formed  his   'V'."33     Here  a  point  can  be
made:     Davis  did  look -to  European  history  as  here  he  drew  a  parallel
of  American  history  to  the  history  of  Europe.     Some  historians  have
argued  that  af ter  Buena  Vista  Davis  regarded  himself  as  a  military
genius  and  this  view  later  caused  "great"  damage  to  the  hope  of  the
Confederates.     In  another  chapter  we  shall  deal  with  how  Davis  regarded
himself  as  president  and  as  corrmander-in-chief  of  the  Conf ederate
States  o£  America.     At  the  close  of  his  Mexican  career,   President  Polk
cormissioned  him  as  a  brigadier-general  of  volunteers.     Davis,  however,
returned  the  commission  with  the  remark  that  the  President  of  the
United  States  did  not  have  the  authority  to  make  such  an  appointment,
as  that  power  belonged  only  to  the  state.34
With  the  outbreak  of  the  Mexican  War,   Benjamin  was  particularly
concerned  over  the  effect  of  the  war  on  trade.     He  published  an  article
inDe Bow's  Review  on  "The  Law  of Blockade,"   explaining  some  of   the
problems  of  commercial  and  international  trade  that  the  war  had
brought  to  the  forefront.     With  the  outbreak  of   the  Civil  War,  Benjamin
journeyed  to  California  where  he  counseled  the  American  corrmissioners.
His  familiarity  with  Spanish  law  proved  a  valuable  asset.35    |n  1854,
he  even  argued  a  case  in  Ecuador  for  a  South  American  general.
Over   the  Clay  Compromise  in  1850,   Davis  and  Stephens  again
followed  different  roads.     0£  course,   they  actually  did  not  argue
33MCE|roy,   p.   97.
34Dodd,   p.   91-92.
35Meade,   p.   64.
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against  each  other  as  Davis  was  serving  in  the  Senate  while  Stephens
remained  in  the  House.     The  Clay  Compromise  represented  for  Davis  a
complete  surrender  of  the  most  vital  contentions  of  the  South,  hence
he  spoke  out  for  the  line  of  36°   30'   to  be  carried  to  the  Pacific.
Thus  Davis  availed  himself  of  every  opportunity  to  accomplish  the  defeat
of   the  Clay  Compromise.36    During  this  crisis  he  urged  his  Mississippi
followers  to  build  manufactories  and  to  learn  the  arts  and  trade.     In
short,  he  wanted  to  render  the  South  independent  of  the  outside  world.37
Stephens  supported  the  Clay  Compromise  as   "an  agreement  on  the  part  of
the  slaveholding  States  to  continue  in  the  Union  in  consideration  of
these  renewed  pledges  on  the  part  of  the  non-slaveholding  States,
through  their  members  and  senators,   to  abide  by  the  Constitution."38
However  in  a  letter  to  his  half  brother,  Linton,   Stephens  took  his
usual  pessimistic  view  and  saw  the  dismemberment  of   the  Union  as  almost
inevitable.39    He  was  afraid  that  the  North  was  going  to  stick  the
Wilmot  Amendment  to  every  appropriation  bill  and  that  the  South  would
be  forced  to  vote  against  any  measure  with  tliis  amendment  stuck  to  it,
thus  clogging  the  system  of  government  and  bringing  about  a  tremendous
struggle.     He  predicted  that  President  Polk,   in  starting  one  war,  might
find  half  a  dozen  wars  on  his  hands.40    Stephens  declared  that  he  would
treat  the  Wilmot  Proviso  as  Chatham  had  treated  a  similar  problem  in
36Dodd,   pp.   119-120.
37ERE.,   p.177.
38pend|eton,   p.   103.
39von  Abele,   p.   124.
4°Avery  o.  Craven,  ¥
(Baton  Rouge,   La.:     Louisiana
Growth  of  Southern  Nationalism  1848-1861
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the  British  Parliament,  when  the  question  of  power  to  tax  the  colonists
without  representation  was  being  discussed  in  Great  Britain.     That
question,   Chatham  would  not  discuss,   but  he   told  those  who  were  so
unjustly  exercising  their  power,   that  if  he  were  an  American,  he  would
resist  it.     For  Stephens,   as  for  Chatham,   the  question  was  whether  it
was  consistent  with  representative  republican  government  to  do  it.
Stephens  asked  where  the  new  latter  day  Whigs  from  the  North  stood  on
the  question.
Will  you  take  the  side  of  Lord  North  and  the  British  Tories,
with  its  superior  wisdom  to  legislate  for  the  freeman  of
::::ec;::::¥;c::o::e:nEo::efsn::u::::¥e:: ¥:: a:: :7¥2ur
Davis  feared  that  folly,   fanaticism,  pride,  and  hate  would  destroy  the
peace  and  prosperity  of  the  Union.     He  asked  for  the  sections  to  part
like  the  patriarchs  of  old  and  let  peace  and  good  will  exist  among
their  descendants.42    During  this  period,  Davis  was  urging  not  only
his  Mississippi  followers,   but  also  all  the  people  of  the  South,   to
build  factories  and  organize  industries  in  order  to  prepare  the  South
for  its  own  self  subsistence.43    After  1851,   Davis'   views  on  secession
became  much  more  moderate.     In  part,   he  seemed  to  be  shaken  by  his
loss   to  Henry  S.   Foote  for  the  governor's  seat  in  Mississippi.     A  year
after  the  Clay  Compromise,   Mallory,  who  also  had  been  in  favor  of   the
Compromise,   entered  the  United  States   Senate.44
4LHenry  Cleveland9
(Philadelphia,   Chicago:
Feb.   17,   1854.
42£.£. ,
Alexander  H Stephens i Public  and  Private
National  Publishing  Co.,1866),   p.   405
30th  Congress,   1st   Session,   1848,   p.   927.
43strode,   p.   262.
44Durkin,   p.   49.
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When  the  Kansas  questions  had  arisen,   Stephens  had  supported
Douglas'   idea  of  popular  sovereignty.    After  the  first  election  in
Kansas,   Stephens  questioned  the  right  of  Congress  to  interfere  with
the  territory.     He  asked  members  of  Congress  where  the  validity  of  a
law  in  any  court  of  justice  was  allowed  to  be  questioned  by  an  inquiry
into  the  legality  of  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  legislature
that  passed  the  law.     Stephens  understood  it  to  be  a  fundamental  maxim
of   the  English  law,   laid  down  by  Sir  Edward  Coke,   illustrated  by  Sir
William  Blackstone,   and  enforced  by  every  writer  on  the  subject,   both
English  and  American,   that  it  was  an  inherent  right  of  the  high  court
of  parliament  to  settle  for  itself  all  questions  concerning  its  own
organization;   and  when  such  questions  were  thus  settled  they  could  not
be  inquired  into  elsewhere.     In  1850,   Stephens  switched  parties,   from
the  whig  to  the  Democratic,  which  he  had  earlier  called  a  party  of
knaves  or  fools.45     Benjamin,  who  had  entered  the  Senate  in  1852  as  a
Whig,   also  changed  his  party  affiliation  to   the  Democratic  in  1856.46
So,   by  1856,   all  four  of   the  future  leaders  of   the  Confederacy  were
members  of   the  Democratic  Party.
In  March  of   1853,   Davis  became  Secretary  of  War  in  President
Pierce's  cabinet.     Davis,   incidentally,  was  not  satisfied  with  the
United  States'   modest  acquisition  of   land  from  Mexico  in  1848.     He
favored  annexation  of  new  lands   in  Cuba  or  Mexico.     However,   once  Davis
became  Secretary  of  War,   he  concentrated  much  of  his  energy  on  his  duties.
45]ames  Z.   Rabum,   "Alexander  H.   Stephens  and  Jefferson  Davis"
American  Historical  Revi
46Meade,   p.   loo.
ew,   Vol. 58,    1953,   p.    290.
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Davis  ordered  surveys  for  a  transcontinental  road  to  facilitate
assemblage  of  troops  on  the  Pacific  coast.     He  also  favored,   for
military  reasons,   a  transcontinental  railroad.     However,  he  saw  other
benef its  of  such  a  railroad  than  just  military,  as  he  realized  that
such  a  railway  system  would  permit  the  South  to   take  advantage  of  the
China  trade,   thus  bolstering  the  South's   sagging  economy.47    During
Pierce';  administration,   limited  trade  with  Japan  had  begun.     Davis
saw  this  opening  of  trade  to  be  a  benef it  for  the  South  if  the
transcontinental  railway  was  built.    Another  reason  Davis  favored  a
railroad  was  that  he  understood  that  between  the  two  great  natural
divisions  of  the  United  States,   extensive  tracts  of  both  sterile  and
mountainous  regions  intervened  such  as  in  the  past  had  formed  and
marked  the  diivision  of  Empires.     Davis  did  not  want  this  to  happen  as
it  had  happened  throughout  history.     He  believed  a  Pacif ic  railroad
would  virtually  destroy  these  two  great  obstacles   to  a  perpetual
•        48     Benjamin  also  desired  to  see  the  South  connected  withunion.
Califomia  by  rail  or  canal.     He  favored  having  private  capitalists
finance  this  scheme  rather  than  the  Federal  government.     Out  of  this,
arose  Benjamin  and  Davis'   first  conflict.     At  one  time  the  discussion
became  so  heated  that  the  two  men  almost  became  involved  in  a  duel.
Later,   they  quieted  doiin  and  soon  began  to  respect  each  other  much  more
than  they  had  previously.49    Benjamin  also  favored  a  national  railway
47Dunbar  Rowland,   ed. i
Letters
Jefferson  Davis  Constituticnalist _H_is
Papers,  ±±£  Speeches,11   (Jackson,  Miss.:     Mississippi
Department  o£  Archives  and  History,   1923),  p.   590.
48Hendrick,   p.   175.
49Dodd,   p.    72.
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system  cormecting   the   South,   the  West,   and  the  Southwest  with  the  New
England  and  Atlantic  seaboard  states.     He  saw  such  a  system  as  helping
to  bring  the  various  sections  together  and  aiding  the  growth  of
democracy.     Here  Benjamin  displayed  statesmanlike  vision. 50
While  Davis  was   serving  as   Secretary  of  War,   he  became  aware
that  Santa  Anna  was   in  sore  need  of  cash  to  keep  his   troops   loyal.
Thus  Davis  reasoned  that  the  United  States  would  be  able  to  buy  some
disputed  land  from  Mexico  at  a  fairly  low  cost,   enabling  the  railroad
to  lay  its  tracks  along  that  part  of  the  country  rather  than  having
to  go  through  the  Rockies.     In  this  conviction,  his  foresight  proved
accurate  as  he  and  Secretary  of  State,  William  Marcy,   through  his  agent
Gadsden,  were  able   to  buy  the   land  from  Mexico.51
Davis  gave  special  attention  to  the  betterment  of  officers'
quarters  at  West  Point.     He  called  for  a  Department  of  Ethics  with  a
view  to  extending  and  elevating  the  prof essional  education  into  the
f ields  of  philosophy,  history,  and  literature.     He  believed  these
intellectual  acquirements  should  be  f itting  to  an  off icer  as  he
represented  his  country.52    While  making  remarks  on  an  army  appropri-
ation  bill  Davis  touched  on  the  subject  of  reorganizing  the  academic
staff .     He  looked  to  those  schools  of  Europe,   France,   Prussia,   and
Austria  which  had  brought  the  greatest  degree  of  perfection  to  their
officers.     Their  academic  staffs  consisted  of  officers  of  the  army  and
Davis  was  determined  to  follow  this  example.
5°strode,   p.   262.
5£Morris   Schaff , Jefferson  Davis:     His  Life
(Boston:     John  W.   Luce   and  Company,   1922),  p.   80
52Row|and,   11,   p.   446.
53qu.,  p.  402-03.
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When  Davis  spoke  of  the  reorganization  of   the  United  States'
army  staff ,   he  based  his  report  on  his  knowledge  of  various  European
staffs.     The  French  staff,  Davis  wrote,  was  divided  into  two  branches,
a  military  and  a  civil  branch.     The  military  branch  had  charge  of
everything  that  related  to  orders  and  military  operations,  while  the
civil  branch  furnished  all  the  supplies  of  the  army.     Davis  conceived
of   this  system  as  being  practicable  only  in  a  large  army.     England,
instead  of  one  corps  to  which  all  the  military  staff  business  was
assigned,  had  two  principal  military  staff  departments,   the  Adjutant
General  and  the  Quartermaster  General.     This  system,  Davis  believed,
would  avoid  the  mischief  arising  from  corps  organization  like  that  of
the  United  States.     Davis  believed  that  the  English  system  of  handling
supplies  was  better  than  the  French  system.     To  separate  the  furnishings
of  army  supplies  from  other  staff  duties  of ten  destroyed  the  unity  of
the  military  administration,  where  it  was  always  useful  and  sometimes
necessary  to  preserve  it.     In  his  first  great  campaign  to  the  frontiers
of  Russia,   the  Emperor  Napoleon  found  it  useful  to  give  military
organization  not  only  to  his  artillery  trains  but  also  to  the  general
equipment  and  transportation  trains.     Davis  understood  that  the  civil
machinery  of   the  French  staff  was  being  censured  by  some  of  its  ablest
military  critics  as  b`eing  too  expensive  and  too  much  removed  from
military  control.     In  this  respect,   it  contrasted  sharply  with  the
Prussian  military  system  where  every  branch  of  army  administration  was
under  military  supervision.     It  was  Davis'   hope  that  the  United  States
could  secure  the  benef its  of  the  French  and  English  system  as  well  as
others  which  neither  of   these  two  systems  could  afford.54    One  can  see,
54ERE.,   p.   409.
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in  Davis'   calling  for  a  re-organization  of   the  army,  his  cosmopolitanism
at  work  and  the  imf luence  that  foreign  nations  and  their  history  had
on  him.     Another  example  of   this  universal  influence  was  Davis'
realization  that  recent  experiences  by  Europe  placed  beyond  a  doubt
the  wisdom  of  some  type  of  seacoast  defense. 55
Not  only  did  Davis  advocate  an  exchange  of  military  students,
he  also  sent  observers  to  visit  Europe  and  observe  the  war  between
England  and  Russia  which  was  at  its  height  in  the  Crimea.56    There,
those  off icers  were  to  obtain  useful  information  on  the  practical
working  of  the  changes  which  had  been  introduced  into  the  military
systems  of  Europe.     The  off icers  were  also  instructed  to  observe  the
`    military  establishments  of  Prussia,  Austria,  France,   and  England    and
to  examine  the  organization  of  the  armies  and  their  departments,
manner  of  dist'ributing  supplies,  medical  and  hospital  arrangement,
kind  of  arms  and  ammunition  used  and  their  advantages  and  disadvantages,
the  construction  of  permanent  fortification,  and  the  arrangement  of  a
new  system  of  seaco;ast  and  land  defense.57     Included  in  his  obser-
vations  of  European  military  policies,   Davis  studied  Napoleon'S  highly
successful  action  of  using  the  dromedary  in  subduing  the  Arabs.     Davis
believed  that  by  studying  Napoleon's  coup,   the  United  States  could
learn  how  to  handle  the  Indians  on  the  western  plains  whose  habits
and  country  were  very  similar  to  the  Arabs.     Davis  also  studied  and
experimented  with  the  use  of  the  camel  on  the  American  plains.
55ERE. ,   pp,  451-52.
56strode,   pp.   274-275.
57MCE|roy,   pp.    155-156.
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58
19
As  one  can  see,   Davis  looked  to  other  nations,   especially  the  European
nations,   for  lessons  the  United  States  could  learn.     Thus  one  can  see
his  world-mindedness  constantly  at  work  as  he  kept  one  eye  on  the
developments   in  Europe.
Stephens  was  in  favor  of  the  telegraph  and  looked  forward  to  the
day  when  the  whole  body  politic  would  be  knit  together  with  the  wires
communicating  intelligence  from  one  extremity  to  the  other,   thus
making  the  people  more  united.     In  his  speech  in  favor  of  a  meteoro-
logical  observation,  he  stated  that  he  believed  the  physical  world  was
governed  by  laws,  and  through  the  observation  of  these  laws,  great
good  would  result  for  the  United  States  as  well  as  for  all  mankind.59
Mallory  also  spoke  in  favor  of  the  telegraph;  he  too  expressed  pride
that  the  American  genius  had  been  responsible  for  this  gif t  to  man-
kind.60    In  addition,  he  favored  extending  the  telegraph  wires  to
Great  Britain.     In  this  way,  he  conceived  the  telegraph  as  being  a  way
to  send  the  principles  of  American  freedom,   in  the  language  of
Shakespeare,   around  the  globe.61    Benjamin  favored  the  development  of
the  telegraph.     He  saw  it  as  a  good  way  to  preserve  peace,   and  when
extended  to  Great  Britain,   it  would  repay  her  testimonial  of  good
feeling.62    The  United  States  would  also  reap  advantages  by  being  in
communication  with  the  whole  English  network  which  included  Asia  and
Africa.
59E±±±.,   34th  Congress,   2nd  Session,   2nd  pt.,1856,   p.1771.
6°±±±±.,   3rd  Session,1856-57,   p.   424.
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Around  the  same  time  that  Davis  was   serving  as  Secretary  of  War,
Mallory  was  making  a  name  for  himself  in  the  United  States  Senate.
While  serving  as  a  state  representative  in  Florida  he  had  become
interested  in  and  served  on  the  educational  and  naval  committee.
While  in  Florida,  Mallory's  interest  and  fame  remained  chiefly  on
the  local  level.     However  he  had  a  great  capacity  for  mental  and  moral
growth.63    Thus,   once  Mallory  got  to  the  United  States  Senate,   he  was
already  striving  for  a  rehabilitation  of  the  Navy.    Mallory  was  one
of   the  f ew  Senators  who  favored  corporal  punishment  in  the  Navy.     He
believed  that  the  rate  of  deterioration  in  the  Navy  and  its  personnel
was  due  to  the  lack  of  this  type  of  punishment  in  maintaining  discipline.
He  traced  it  back  to  the  beginning  of  naval  history,  especially
emphasizing  England's  navy.64    When  other  senators  attacked  the  navy's
large  expenditure  with  little  production,  Mallory  promptly  came  to  its
defense.     He  showed  that  the  shipyards  of  Great  Britain  were  usually
five  times  as  big  as  the  biggest  shipyard  in  the  United  States,  and
that  France  and  Great  Britain  paid  much  less   (around  on.e  third)   to
their  workers  than  did  the  United  States.    Mallory  also  desired  that
midshipmen  be  chosen  from  the  ranks  of  existing  experienced  personnel.
Later  while  serving  as  Secretary  o£  Navy  for  the  Confederacy,  Mallory
was  able  to  get  many  of  his  reforms  carried  out,  although  some  did
necessitate  a  fight.     As  early  as  1853,  he  spoke  in  favor  of  ironclads
and  stressed  the  importance  of  continuing  the  experiments  on  new  types
of  warships.     In  a  speech  on  the  Senate  I loor  in  1854,   he  spoke  of
63Durkin,   p.   35.
64Equ.,   pp.   53-54.
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naval  strength  and  weaknesses  as  being  relative,  as  it  forever  had  to
be  measured  by  the  strength  of  its  probably  adversaries.     Therefore,
he  urged,   if  England  built  frigates,   the  United  States  had  to  do  the
same,  making  sure  that  United  States'   ships  were  no  smaller  than
England's,   and  if  England  built  gunboats,  again,   the  United  States
had  to  follow.65     He  also   looked  to   the  English  method  of  promoting
off icers  as  being  the  one  the  United  States  Navy  had  to  undertake.
Thus  he  favored  merit  rather  than  the  seniority  rule  as  being  the
guideline  for  promotion  in  the  navy.66    This  pr6blem  would  reappear
once  the  Confederacy  was  formed  and  her  navy  established.     In  the
thirty  fifty  Congress,  Mallory  served  as  chairman  of  the  Senate
Committee  on  Naval  affairs.     This  position  gave  him  experience  as  his
mind  continued  to  grow  in  such  a  way  which  would  enable  him  to  meet
the  crisis  of  the  Civil  War.
Mallory's  world-wide  interest  grew  as  is  evidenced  by  the  fact
that  he  became  interested  in,   and  was  desirous  of  promoting  trade  with
Paraguay.     In  an  incident  when  Paraguay  fired  upon  a  streamer,  Mallory
did  not  want  Paraguay  punished,   as  any  recriminatory  act  would  injure
the  efforts  of  the  United  States  to  establish  trade  agreements  with
that  country.     He  would  have  been  in  favor  of  punishing  Spain  if  she
had  fired  on  an  American  streamer  since  she  had  caused  many  grievances,
but  he  saw  no  reason  to  make  Paraguay  an  exception  to  the  general  rule
pursued  toward  other  countries.
65ERE.,   pp.   63-64.
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The  passage  of   the  Kansas-Nebraska  Act  in  1854  again  raised
feelings  to  a  high  pitch  concerning  the  issue  of  slavery.     Mallory  is
labeled  by  Robert  Meade,   the  biographer  of  Benjamin,   as  being  one  of
the  more  radical  Southerners  who  was  willing  to  embroil  the  United
States  in  a  war  with  Spain  in  order  to  acquire  Cuba  as  a  slave
territory.68    0n  May  17  of   that  same  year,  Mallory  introduced  a  Senate
resolution  stating  that  there  was  a  plan  to  throw  Cuba  into  the  hands
of  its  Negro  population,   thus  reviving  the  scenes  of  Sam  Domingo
revolution.69     However,   both  Davis  and  Benjamin  were  also  interested
in  attaining  Cuba.     Davis  was  also  convinced  that  a  Spanish  possession
so  close  to   the  United  States  was  a  continual  menace  to   the  United
States.70    Mallory  insisted  that  Cuba  was  at  the  mercy  of  any  power
and  was  quite  severe  on  the  diplomatic  policies  of  France  and  Britain.
He  wanted  to  proclaim  to   the  world  that  the  Cuban  question  was  an
American  question.     He  looked  forward  to  a  time  when  the  Gulf  of
Mexico  would  be  a  closed  sea,   as  much  under  the  control  of   the  United
States  as  the  Irish  Channel  was  under  the  control  of  En`gland.     In
addition,  he  argued  that  the  safest  way  to  abolish  the  African  slave
trade  was   to  annex  Cuba.     President  Buchanan  had  even  offered  Mallory
the  opportunity  to  serve  as  Minister  to  Spain,   as  President  Fillmore
had  offered  the  same  post  to  Benjamin  in  1852,   but  Mallory,   like
Benjamin,   declined  the  offer.
68Meade,   p.   92.
69Durkin,   p.   68.
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Due  to  his  historical  knowledge,   Stephens  was  opposed  to  the
formation    of  any  secret  party  including  the  Know-Nothing  party.
Distrustful  of  all  parties,  he  was  convinced  that  if  any  secret  party
should  ever  be  successful  in  bringing  the  goverrment,   in  all  its
departments  and  functions,  under  the  baneful  influence  of  its  control,
political  ruin  would  inevitably  follow.     For  him,   there  could  be  no
truth  in  politics  so  easily  and  firmly  established,  either  by  reason
or  from  history,   than  this   truth.     He  compared  the  Know-Nothings  to
the  Jacobin  Club  in  France  where  all  legislation  was  settled  in  the
Club  and  the  members  went  next  day  to  the  nominal  halls  of  legislation,
nothing  but  trembling  automatons,   to  register  the  edicts  of   the  Club
though  it  were  to  behead  a  monarch  or  a  member  of   their  own  society.
He  could  not  understand  why  people  would  join  such  a  party  and  he
asked,   "Is  history  of  no  use?     Or  do  our  people  vainly  imagine  that
Americans  would  not  do  as   the  French  did  under  like  circumstances?"72
Davis,   as  the  years  went  on,   seemed  to  become  a  little  more
conservative  in  his  unionist  stand.     So,  by  the  time  of   the  secession
crisis,  not  a  one  of   these  .four  men  would  step  out  and  support
secession  from  the  Union.     However,   in  1850,  while  still  holding  rank
in  the  army,   Davis  was  first  confronted  with  the  problem  of  state
versus  national   loyalty.     There  was  a  rumor  that  his  regiment  would  be
sent  to  Charleston.     He  replied  that,   "Much  as   I  valued  my  commission,
much  as  I  desired  to  remain  in  the  Army  and  disapproving  as  much  as  I
did  the  reined.y  resorted  to,   that  commission  would  have  been  torn  to
72c|eve|and,   p.   461.
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tatters  before  it  would  have  been  used  in  Civil  War  with  the  state  o.f
South  Carolina."73    From  that  time  on  he  became  an  ardent  defender  of
slavery  and  states'   rights.     Stephens,   also,   during  the  1850's  was  an
ardent  defender  of  the  constitution  and  states'   rights.     But  when  the
crisis  came,  neither  man  wanted  to  leave  the  Union.
Between  1857  and  1860  the  Democratic  .party  was   involved  in
furious  quarrels  within  its  own  ranks,  with  Davis  and  Stephens  'taking
opposite  sides.     Stephens  defended  Stephen  A.   Douglas  on  "popular
sovereign..ty ,"  while  Davis  heatedly  attacked  both.74    Benjamin  joined
Davis   in  his  attack  on  Douglas.     Benjamin  could  not  stomach  Douglas  as
a  person,  nor  did  he  agree  with  his  political  stands.75    Benjamin
foresaw  the  danger  of   the  breakdown  of   the  Democratic  Party  and  was
saddened  by  it.     In  a  speech  on  May  8  to  the  Senate,   he  declared  that
he  had  "never  felt  such  an  utter  shrinking  of  my  whole  being.     I  do  not
know whether  I  ever  felt  my  heart  sink  within  me  as  it  did  at  the  news
that  the  Democratic  Party  was  about  to  break  into  two  sectional
divisions."76    The  description  of  the  Democratic  party  is  perhaps
indicative  of  the  breakdown  of  the  political  system  and  the  disruption
of  the  country.     Stephens  retired  from  Congress  in  1859.     In  the
election  of  1860,   Davis,   Benjamin,   and  Mallory  were  re-elected  to  the
Senate.     Soon  af ter  their  election,   the  country  became  disrupted  and
this  disruption  was  followed  by  four  years  of  f ierce  f ighting  in  which
all  four  men  were  destined  to  play  major  roles.
73Dodd,   p.    38.
74Rabun,   p.   291.
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CHAPTER   11
HISTORY,    SECESSION,AND   THE   FORRATION   OF   THE   CONFEDERACY
How  did  the  future  leaders  of   the  Conf ederacy  see  the  approach-
ing  storm?    For  Jefferson  Davis,   secession  was  never  desired,  never
plotted,   only  accepted  in  the  end  as  the  alternate  to  what  he  con-
sidered  majority  exploitation  of  the  minority.1    But  the  truth  was  that
Davis  did  not  desire  to  see  the  South  secede  except  as   the  last  resort.
Thus  Davis  would  not  desire  to  see  the  Union  dissolved  if  it  could  be
held  together  by  any  sort  of  arrangement  which  lef t  the  South
unencumbered  by  restrictions  on  slavery  or  on  its  states  rights
policies.2    At  the  last  moment,   Davis   tried  only  lamely  to  delay
disunion  and  in  December  1860,   he  joined  other  Southern  congressmen
in  a  declaration  in  favor  of  secession.     He  fully  justified  it  in  a
speech  made  in  the  Senate  on  January  21,   1861,   before  Mississippi
voted  to  leave  the  Union.3    He  labored  to  convince  the  public  that
the  aim  of   the  Southern  states  was  what  the  Founding  Fathers'   aim
had  been  in  the  Revolution--to  defend  the  Constitution  and  the  right
of  sovereign  states  to  enjoy  the  kind  of  government  desired  by  their
inhabitants.4    He  spoke  of  a  time  when  there  was  a  higher  and  holier
£MCElroy,   p.   137.
2Dodd,   p.    205.
3Rabun,   p.   291.
4MCE|roy,   p.   230.
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sentiment  among  the  men  who  represented  the  people  of   the  country.
Declaring  that  no  narrow,  miserable    prejudice  governed  the  actions
of  earlier  leaders,  he  spoke  of  an  incident  which  occurred  when  the
government  functioned  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation.     A  committee
which  consisted  of   three  men,   two  from  the  North  and  one  from  the
South,   unanimously  proposed  that  negotiations  should  be  instituted  to
require  Spain  to  surrender  some  fugitive  slaves  hiding  in  Florida.
For  Davis,   these  men  exhibited  the  most  lofty  purpose  and  genius.     He
wished  to  see  the  United  States  again  governed  by  men  with  such  high
Principles,  he  declared.5
0n  his  part,  Alexander  Stephens  consistently  decried  secession,
and  though  he  was  spiritless  and  fatalistic  in  resisting  the  tide  that
swept  Georgia  out  of   the  Union,   he  nevertheless  did  oppose  it.6     He
warned  the  country  not  to  rashly  try  the  experiment  of  changing  their
government  and  destroying  it,   "For  as  in  Greece  and  Italy  and  the  South
American  republics,   and  in  every  other  place,  whenever  liberty  is  once
lost,   it  may  never  be  restored  to  us  again."7    Davis  did  not  see
liberty  as  being  so  elusive  as  he  believed  that  "liberty  is  always
won  where  there  exists  the  unconquerable  will  to  be  free."8    Stephens'
fundamental  doctrine  was  that  revolution  was  right  whenever  it  is  right
to  revolt.     But  he  believed  it  was  no  longer  right,  at  least  for  that
particular  time.9    Revolt  led  to  secession,   and  although  a  state  had
5£.g.,   35th  Congress,1st   Session,   2nd  pt.,1857-58,   p.   618:
6Rabun,   p.   294.
7von  Abele,   p.   138.
8C|eveland,   p.   703.
9E.   Ramsey  Richardson, Little  Aleck: A  Lif e  of Alexander  H.
Stephens   (Indianapolis,   Ind.:     Bobbs  Merrill  Company,1932),   p'   1Z4
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the  right  to  secede,   revolt  and  secession  should  not  be  resorted  to
until  everything  else  had  failed.     In  1850,   and  later  in  1860,  when
he  opposed  secession,   it  was  as  a  question  o'f  policy,  not  as  a  matter
of  right.     He  went  back  to  earlier  American  history  to  prove  this
right  as  being  an  inalienable  right.     He  reviewed  the  Declaration  of
Independence,   the  Federal  Constitution,   and  the  teachings  of  the
Kentucky  and  Virginia  Resolutions  of   1798  and  1799.     On  these
principles  he  was  reared  and  they  governed  his  political  acts.     He
was  not  for  nullification  as  it  claimed  the  right  of  any  State,   in
effect,   to  render  null  and  void,  or  inoperative  within  her  limits,
any  law  of  Congress,   and  still  remain  within  the  Union.     Only  by
secession,   Stephens  believed,   could  the  state  resort  to  its  own
sovereign  powers. 10
Stephens  wanted  equality  for  Georgia  but  he  believed  equality
was  possible  within  the  Union.     He  thought  that,   as  Georgia  had
prospered  before  seceding,  while  within  the  Union,   it  should  wait  for
an  act  of  aggression  before  resorting  to  secession.     He  declared  that
although  there  were  defects  in  the  goverrment,   it  was  still  the  best
in  the  world.11     Stephens   showed  his  historical  mind  at  work  in  a
letter  he  wrote  to  a  friend  at  the  end  of  1860.
Revolutions  are  much  easier  started  than  controlled  and  the
men  that  begin  them  seldom  end  them.     Human  passions  are
like  the  wind--when  aroused  they  sweep  everything  before
them  in  their  fury.     The  wise  and  the  good  who  attempt  to
control  them  will   themselves  most  likely  become   the  victims.
When  the  moderate  men,  who  are  patriotic,   have  gone  as  far
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as  they  think  right  and  proper,   and  propose  to  reconstruct,
there  will  be  found  a  class  below  them  governed  by  no
principle,   but  by  personal  object,  who  will  be  for  pushing
matters  further,   until  those  who  sowed  the  wind  will  .find
that  they  have  reaped  the  whirlwind  .   .   .   Before  tearing
::I;:p:::nf:rb:db::¥::?T2nt.  We  Should  first  see  a  good
Stephens  asked  representatives   to  the  Georgia  State  Convention  to
resort  to  every  other  remedy  before  seceding,   however,   he  agreed  to
follow  the  people  of  his  state  if  the  convention  did  vote  to  secede.
Perhaps  it  was  not  so  surprising  that  Stephens   took  up  such  a
position.     His  adoration  of  the  twin  concepts  of  justice  and  law
amounted  to  a  religion.     Lincoln  had  been  legally  elected;   there
could  therefore  be  no..possible  ground  for  secession.     In  his  very
first  term  in  Congress,   Stephens  had  questioned  his  own  right  to  hold
a  seat.     His  opposition  to  Polk's  conduct  of   the  Mexican  War,  whatever
its  root  causes,  had  always  been  expressed  in  terms  of  justice  and
constitutional  power.     His  support  of  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri
Compromise  had  been  based,   as  had  his  point  of  view  in  relation  to
Texas,  upon  the  strict  rationale  of  an  equal  and  equitable  division  of
public  territory  between  the  two  great  sections.     Law was  for  him  the
written  and  procedural  expression  of  a  concept  of  justice,   according  to
the  terms  of  which  human  society,   to  be  civilized,  must  operate.
Justice  is  every  man  having  and  doing  what  is  his  own.     For  Stephens,
the  radicals  who  called  for  secession  af ter  the  election  of  Lincoln
exhibited  irresponsibility.     Secession  was  lawlessness,   therefore  he
opposed  it;  however,  he  made  it  clear  he  would  fight  for  the  South  if
an  overt  attack  came. 13
£2Equ.,   pp.   504-05.
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Stephens  believed  that  the  United  States  goverrmient  was  founded
on  and  based  upon  the  political  axiom  that  all  states  and  people  have
the  inalienable  right  to  change  their  forms  of  government  at  will.
This  principle  was  acted  on  in  the  recognition  by  the  United  States
of   the  South  America  republics   including  Mexico.     This  principle  was
recognized  in  the  struggle  of  Greece  to  overthrow  the  Ottoman  rule.
On  this  question,  Daniel  Webster  f irst  gained  his  laurels  as  an
American  statesman.     This  principle  was  endorsed  in  the  recognition
of  the  Lamartine  goverrment  on  the  overthrow  of  Louis  Phillippe  in
1848.     Again  this  principle  was  acted  upon  in  recognition  of  the
government  of  Louis  Napoleon  and  even  in  the  recognition  of  an  inde-
pendent  Texas  when  she  seceded  or  withdrew  from  Mexico.
14
Stephens  interpreted  the  meaning  of  state  sovereignty  not  as  the
sovereignty  of  any  goverrment  but  as   the  sovereignty  of  the  people  of
each  state.15    |n  his  judgment,   the  United  States  was  clothed  with
certain  sovereign  powers  given  to  it  by  the  separate  states.     In  the
legitimate  and  proper  exercise  of  these  powers,   the  United  States'
powers  were  as  sovereign  or  supreme  as  that  of  any  other  goverrment,
"just  as  sovereign  as  the  autocrat  of  Russia  in  whom  is  concentrated
all  powers."16     In  Stephens'  mind  the  state  could  rightfully  reassume
her  own  sovereign  powers,  which,   according  to  the   language  of  Thomas
Jefferson  and  George  Washington  she  had  acceded  to   the  United  States
government.-    The  action  of  each  state  was  subject  to  the  authority  of
£4Equ.,   p.   754.
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that  great  moral  law which  regulated  intercourse  between  independent
sovereign  nations.     When  there  had  been  a  breach  of   the  compact  by
the  other  party,   the  state  had  the  right  to  disregard  the  obligation
of  the  compacts  by  declaring  itself  no  longer  bound  to  it.     It  was  on
this  principle,   Stephens  pointed  out,   that  the  United  States  had
abrogated  their  treaty  with  France  in  1798.     Self -preservation,   Stephens
declared,  was  the  first  law  of  nature,  not  only  with  individuals  but
with  states  or  nations.17    According  to  Stephens   there  was  nothing
new  or  novel  in  this  principle  as  it  was  incident  to  all  Federal
Republics. 18
Stephens  entertained  but  one  idea  of  the  basic  or  f inal  settle-
ment;   that  was  the  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  states  and  of
each  state  in  its  sovereign  capacity  to  determine  its  own  destiny.     He
saw  this  principle  as   lying  at  the  foundation  of  the  American  system  as
it  was  what  was  achieved  in  the  first  war  of  Independence,  and  was
what  must  be  vindicated  in  a  second  war  for  Independence. 19
Stephen  Mallory  also  dreaded  the  dangers  of   sece.ssion.     He  also
believed  that  ample  remedies  for  all  political  wrongs  could  be  more
wisely  and  more  advantageously  secured  within  the  Union  than  out  of  it.
He  regarded  secession  as  revolution,  justif led  only  as  a  last  resort
from  intolerable  oppression.     Mallory  was  called  a  Unioni§t  by  some
of  his  critics  and  while  he  was  in  prison  af ter  the  war  he  stated  that
he  had  never  uttered  a  word  of  disloyalty  to  the  Union.
£7stephens,I,   p.   495.
18EnI.,   p.   500.
£9Richardson,   p.   340.
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Nevertheless,   perhaps  due  to  pressure  or  changing  convictions,  Mallory
served  with  Davis  on  a  committee  appointed  by  the   `Southern  senators
from  the  Southern  states   that  had  not  seceded.     This  corrmittee  passed
a  resolution  that  stated  that  the  remaining  Southern  states  that  had
not  yet  seceded  should  leave  the  Union  as  soon  as  possible.21
Mallory,   as  Davis,  went  on  to  defend  secession.     He  warned  the  North
against  an  attempt  to  conquer,  utilizing  a  historical  analogy.     He
said:
Our  willingness  to  shed  our  blood  for  this  cause  is  the
highest  proof  we  can  offer  of  the  sincerity  of  our
conviction,  and  I  warn,  nay  I  implore  you,  not  to  repeat
the  fatal  folly  of  the  Bourbons,  and  mistake  a  nation
for  a  faction,  for  the  people  of  the  South,  as  one  man,
declare  that,   sink  or  swim,   live  or  die,   they  will  not
::i::::::nu::::i: ::o:::efe:::g:::::i::. 22Constrained
Judah  Benjamin  advocated  an  aggressive  stand  to  be  made  within
the  Union,  not  outside  the  Union.     He  too  saw  secession  only  as  a
last  resort.     However  on  December  8,   he  wrote  a  letter  in  which  he
asserted  that  the  time  had  come  when  it  was  necessary  for  the  Southern
states  to  secede  through  separate  state  action.     He  saw  no  hope  that
the  North  would  let  the  South  live  in  peace  and  security  within  the
Union.23    For  Benjamin,   the  real  motive  of   the  North  was   to  secure
political  power  so  that  she  could  subvert  the  equality  of  the  States.
When  the  North  had  secured  predominant  political  power  and  reduced
the  South  to  a  feeble  minority,   she  would  then  reveal  her  real
21Eng.,   pp.   i2O-21.
22£.£.,   36th  Congress,   2nd  Session,1st  pt.,1860-61,   P.   486.
23Meade,   p.    145.
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abolitionist  sentiment  and  ruin  and  destruction  would  spread  all  over
the  South.24    Thus,   the  only  thing  left  to  do  was  for  the  Southern
states   to  secede  promptly.
Benjamin  believed  that  every  state  had  the  right  to  leave  the
Union.     He  saw  even  Daniel  Webster  as  a  believer  in  this  doctrine  as
Webster  had  said  that  a  compact  broken  by  one  party  could  be  repudiated
by  the  other.     The  United  States  had  already  broken  the  contract,
Benjamin  believed,   by  sending  troops  into  South  Carolina  without  the
permission  of  the  civilian  government  and  by  closing  the  Southern
ports.     If  a  state  chose  to  secede  from  the  Union  neither  the  Senate
nor  the  President  could  veto  the  decision.25    From  the  time  that  the
people  had  declared  their  independence  from  Great  Britain,   the  right
of  the  people  to  self -government  in  its  fullest  and  broadest  extent
had  been  a  cardinal  principle  of  American  liberty.     The  entire  list
of  grievances  in  the  Declaration  o£  Independence,   Benjamin  declared,
dealt  with  the  abuses  of  an  admitted  constitutional  power.     He  compared
the  usurpation  of  powers  by  the  President  and  the  north`ern  majority  to
an  attempt  made  by  the  Queen  to  appoint  to  the  House  of  Lords  a  single
peer  with  a  peerage  for  life.     While  the  power  of   the  Crown  to  appoint
peers  was  undoubted,   it  could  not  appoint  them  for  life.     Eventually
the  Crown  was  forced  to  yield  to  the  opposition  which  maintained  that
the  creation  of  a  life's  peerage  was  an  abuse  of  power  and  contrary  to
the  fundamentals  of  the  constitution  of  the  Kingdom. 26
34th  Congress,1st  and   2nd  Session,   1st  pt.   1855-56,   p.   1094.
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He  warned  the  North  not  to  use  force  against  the  South  in  order
to  control  the  Southern  states.     By  use  of  an  historical  example,  he
showed  the  mistake  of  a  country  trying  to  control  her  states  or
colonies  by  force.     Benjamin  spoke  of   the  time  when  Lord  North,   speak-
ing  on  the  destruction  of  tea  in  the  Boston  harbor,   stated  that,
"We  must  punish,   control  or  yield  to   them."    The  statesmen  of  Great
Britain  answered  "yield  to  them"  while  the  courtiers  and  politicians
said  "punish"  them.     The  result  of   this  action  was  known,   Benjamin
warned  the  Senate.     "History  gives  you  a  lesson.     Prof it  by  its
teachings.n27
Eiren  as   late  as  January  1861,  however,   Benjamin  still  had
misgivings  about  secession  and  appeared  to  have  felt  privately  that  the
new  movement  was  unwise,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  he  had  written
a  letter  in  December  favoring  secession.     The  December  letter  was  a
political  letter.     Benjamin  thought  it  would  be  wise  to  fall  in  line
with  the  movement  and  even  when  possible  try  to  lead  the  new  movement.
If  he  failed  to  conform  to  the  current  movement,  he  feared  that  his
off ice  holding  future  and  reputation  as  a  loyal  Southerner  would  be
seriously  impaired.     In  affairs  preceding  the  Civil  War  Benjamin
proved  himself  to  be  one  of   those  politicians  who  follow  rather  the
direct  public  opinions  and  events.    At  the  same  time,  his  ability  to
foresee  political  change  enabled  him  to  appear  to  lead  when  he  was
really  drifting  with  the  current.     Robert  D.  Meade,   Benjanin's
biographer,   suggests  that  this  is  not  too  surprising  in  the  light  of
Benjamin's  devotion  to  classical  literature,   especially  the  Roman
27Meade,   p.    138.
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psychoanalytical  poet,   Horace,   as  both  Horace  and  Benjamin  seemed  to
share  the  same  general  attitude  toward  life.
As   the  Southern  states   seceded,  most  men  from  the  South  joined
their  states  in  leaving  the  Union.     Davis,   Stephens,   Benjamin,  and
Mallory  were  no  exceptions.     It  is  interesting  to  note  that  none  of
these  future  leaders  of   the  Conf ederacy  were  leaders  of  the  secession
movement.     Even  before   the  South  had  formed  a  government,   Stephens
recognized  that  the  men  who  begin  revolrition,  no  matter  what  their
purposes  and  objects,   seldom  end  them.     He  realized  that  revolutions
are  much  easier  started  than  controlled.
Human  passions  are  like  the  winds,  when  aroused  they  sweep
everything  before  them  in  their  fringe.     The  wise  and  the
good  who  attempt  to  control  them  will   themselves  most
likely  become  the  victims.     This  has  been  the  history  of
the  downfall  of  all  Republics.     The  selfish,   the  ambitious,
the  bad  will  generally  take  the  lead.     When  the  moderate
men  who  are  patriotic  have  gone  as  far  as  they  think  right
and  proper,  and  propose  to  reconstruct,   then  will  be  found
a  class  below  them  who  will  be  for  pushing  matters  further
and  further  until  those  who  sowed  the  wind  will  f ind  that
they  have  reaped  the  whirlwind.     These  are  my  serious
apprehensions.     They  are  founded  upon  the  experience  of
::: ¥::::  :::d:::  :::::28Phy  Of  human nature,  and  no  wise
Stephens  viewed  the  American  Revolution  of  1776  as  being  one  of   the
rare  exceptions  to  ideas  and  examples  which  the  history  of  the  world
furnished. 29
Stephens  believed  that  the  current  cliff iculties  of  1860  sprang
not  from  the  government,  not  from  its  framework,  nor  from  its  adminis-
tration  so  much  as  they  did  from  the  people,  mainly  the  leaders.
28phi||ips,   pp.   5o4-05,   November   25,   1860.
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Stephens  was  very  cautious  of   the  Southern  leaders  as  well  as   the
Northern  leaders.     Through  his  historical  worldview,   he  had  a  broad
comprehension  of  revolutions.     The  illustrations  of  previous  revolutions
that  he  reviewed  were  exceedingly  unfortunate.     For  example,  John
Hampden,   John  Pym,   and  Denzil  Holles  were  leading  spirits  of   the
English  Revolution  in  1840.     Hampden  fell  in  battle;   Pym  died  before
the  wars  ended;   Holles  alone  of  the  three  survived  the  civil  conf lict.
But  Holles  was  swept  away  by  the  current  and  was  one  of  the  f irst  to
call  for  a  restoration  of  the  monarchy  under  Charles  11  without  one
word  of  guarantee  against  the  preorgative  of  the  Crown  which  was  the
cause  of  the  Revolution.     Oliver  Cromwell  had  nothing  to  do  with  this
first  movement  as  an  active  agent  and  was  still  unknown.     He  was
simply  a  child  of  the  Revolution  who  grasped  all  honor  and  ruled
England  with  more  rigor  than  any  king  ever  did  before  or  has  since.
This  reign  he  carried  on  in  the  name  of  liberty.30
Another  example  Stephens  gave  was   that  of  Louis  Napoleon.
Napoleon  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  French  Revolution  in  1848  by  which
Louis  Philippe  was  dethroned.     This  overthrow  was   started  by  Alphonse
de  Lamartine  and  a  few  other  patriots  with  Louis  Napoleon  springing
up  af terwards.     He  then  overthrew  the  Republic  and  put  himself  at  the
head  of  an  empire  with  more  despotic  power  than  Louis  Philippe  ever
undertook  to  exercise.31    Through  his  historical  perspective,   Stephens
understood  the  dangers  involved,and  was  afraid  for  the  South  to  secede
and  set  up  her  own  government  as  he  did  not  see  any  great  leaders  in
the  South.     One  of   the  reasons  he  went  to   the  Southern  convention  which
3°Equ.,   p.   527.
3tEqu.,  p.   526.
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was  going  to  establish  the  new  government  was  because  he  considered
himself  one  of  the  very  few  Southerners  with  enough  "high  integrity,
loyalty  to  principles,  and  pure  disinterested  patriotism"  to  guide
the  new  goverrment  through  its  first  crisis.32    |n  writing  to  I.   Henly
Smith,   Stephens  expressed  his  concern  thusly:
The  times  are  all  sadly  out  of  joint.     Men  have  no  regard
for  past  principle  or  profession.     Consistency  is  wholly
disregarded.     Passion  and  prejudice  rule  the  hour,   reason
has  lost  its  saw.     The  truth  and  the  right  are  not  sought
af ter.     Public  virtue  is  no  longer  held  in  its  proper
estimation,  and  all  our  discussion  reminds  me  more  of  the
wranglings  of  the  Jacobins  in  France  than  anything  else  .   .   .
as  I  look  out  upon  the  country  and  contemplate  the  probable
future  I  f eel  as  Jesus  did  when  he  came  near  the  city  of
Jerusalem  and  wept  over  it,   saying  if  thou  hadst  known
even  thou  at  least  in  this  thy  day  the  things  that  belong
unto  thy  peace,  but  now  th3¥  are  hid  from  thine  eyes.
Such  are  my  feelings   .   .   .
Stephens  believed  that  there  was  little  public  virtue  or  patriotism
among  public  men.     Republics,   he  was  convinced,   could  only  be  maintained
by  virtue,   intelligence,  and  patriotism, but  the  leaders  were  generally
self ish  men  who  looked  not  to   the  country  but  to  individual  aggrandise-
ment.     He  expressed  the  opinion  that  most  members  of  Congress   considered
only  those  things  which  affected  them  at  home.     If   the  Union  should
break  up,  he  said,   and  the  South  should  form  its  own  goverrment,  all
those  public  leaders  would  be  striving  to  take  the  lead  of  all  the
rest.     Thus  Stephens  foresaw  a  race  between  demagogues   to   see  who
could  pander  most  to  the  passions,   prejudices,   and  ignorance  of   the
people  so  that  they,   the  so  called  public  leaders,  might  profit
32]ohnston  and  Brorme,   p.   387.
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thereby--just  as  he  considered  had  occurred  in  France  in  1792  and  was
occurring  in  Mexico  in  the  |85o's.34
Later,   Stephens  declared  that  intelligence,  virtue,  patriotism,
and  all  that  was  necessary  to  cultivate  and  perpetuate  these  things
could  be  found  in  the  South  and  in  the  Conf ederacy.     He  realized  that
intelligence  was  of  little  value  without  virtue.     He  saw  France  as  once
being  a  great  nation  of  philosophers  but  when  these  philosophers
became  Jacobins,   they  began  to  lack  that  virtue,   that  devotion  to  moral
principle,  and  that  patriotism which  was  essential  to  all  good  govern-
ment.35    Furthermore,   Stephens  could  not  foresee  only  logical
objections  to  the  ultimate  restoration  of  the  Union.     He  realized,
however,   that  the  action  of  the  men  in  the  aggregate  of  states  or
nations  was  seldom  governed  or  controlled  by  logic.     If  the  action
of   these  men  had  been  controlled  by  logic,   Stephens   said,  many  of  the
bloody  wars  which  f illed  the  history  of  mankind  would  never  have
occurred.     "What,"  he  asked,   "was  more  illogical  than  the  influences
that  produced  the  crusade  for  the  recovery  of  the  Holy  Sepulchre,   or
the  passions  that  incited  deadly  strife  on  so  many  f ields  of  carnage
upon  such  a  question  as  the   'real  presence."36    Through  his  historical
insight,   Stephens  thought  that  only  a  war  could  reunite  the  two
sections.
Stephens  believed  that  the  development  of  the  country,   in  all
areas  of  life,  was   the  result  of  the  enterprise  of  the  American  people
34Eiig.,   p.   458.
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under  the  operation  of   the  government  and  institutiorrsunder  which
they  lived.     Even  the  American  nation  without  these  governmental
institutions  would  never  have  developed  the  society  that  then  existed.
The  organization  of  society  had  much  to  do  with  the  development  of
natural  resources  of  any  country.     He  recognized  this  fact  but  felt
that  more  importantly  the  institutions  of  a  people  or  nation,  political,
and  moral,  were  the  matrix  in  which  the  germ  of  their  organic  structure
quickened  into  life,   took  roots,  and  developed  in  form,  nature,   and
character.     Stephens  contended  that  it  was  only  by  her  institutions
that  this  country  had  developed  and  become  great.     The  development  of
the  people  was  the  result  of  their  enterprise  under  the  operation  of
the  government  and  institutions  under  which  they  lived.     Even  the
American  people,   Stephens  maintained,  would  never  have  developed  such
a  high  society  without  the  government  and  institutions.     He  realized
that  the  organization  of  society  has  much  to  do  with  the  development
of  the  natural  resources  of  any  country  or  any  land.     Using  his
historical  perspective,   Stephens  examined  Greece  in  his`  speech  before
the  Georgia  Legislature,   November  14,   1860.     In  Greece  he  saw  the  same
fertile  soil  and  blue  skies  and  the  same  land  where  Homer  sang  and
where  Pericles  spoke.     Physically,   it  was  the  sane  old  Greece  but  for
Stephens  it  was  no  longer  a  living  Greece,   although  descendants  of  the
same  people  inhabited  the  country.     To  Stephens,   there  was  but  one
reason  for  this  mighty  difference.     In  the  midst  of  the  then  existing
degradation,   one  could  see  the  glorious  fragments  of  ancient  works  of
art,  and  the  remains  of  a  once  high  order  of  civilization.    Why,  he
questioned,   had  this  glory  departed.     His  answer  would  be,   because
their  institutions  had  been  destroyed.     These  achievements  were  but
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the  fruit  of  their  form  of  goverriment  and
when  once  the  institutions  of  our  people  shall  have  been
destroyed  there  will  be  no  earthly  power  that  can  bring
back  the  Prometheus  spark  to  kindle  the  f lame  here  again
any  more  than  it  could  in  that  ancient  land  of  eloquence,
poetry,   and  song.     The  same  may  be  said  of  Italy.     Where
is  Rome,   once  the  mistress  of   the  world?     There  are  the
same  seven  hills   .   .   .   but  what  a  ruin  of  human  greatness
meets  the  eyes  of  the  traveller  throughout  the  length  and
breadth  of   this  downtrodden  land.     Why  have  not  the  people
of  that  Heaven  favored  clime  (sic)   the  spirit  that  animated
their  fathers?    Why  this  said  difference?    It  is  the
destruction  of  her  institutions  that  has  caused  it.    And
my  countrymen,   if  we  shall  in  an  evil  hour  rashly  pull
down  and  destroy  those  institutions  which  the  patriotic
hands  of  our  fathers  labored  so  long  and  so  hard  to
build  up,   and  which  have  done  so  much  for  us  and  for
the  world,  who  can  venture  the  prediction  that  similar
results  will  not  ensue.     Let  us  avoid  them  if  we  can.
I  trust  the  spirit  is  among  us  that  will  enable  us  to
do  it,   for  as  in  Greece  and  Italy  and  the  South  American
::p::::cio::: :: ::;I:e:::e:ep:::::I::e::v:: :::i::89rty
Throughout  Stephens'   arguments,   there  runs   this  historical
thread.     His  historical  cosmopolitan  mind  worked  with  and  afforded  the
constitutional  arguments  or  discussions  for  which  he  is  so  famous.
It  would  be  fair  to  say  that  without  his  historical  mindedness
Alexander  Stephens,   the  constitutionalist,   could  never  have  existed
or  at  least  could  never  have  been  effective  nor  convincing.
Stephens  believed  Georgia  should  treat  the  United  States  like
any  other  foreign  country.     It  should  follow  the  example  set  by  the
colonies  before  the  Revolution,  he  said,   and  make  out  a  list  of
grievances  and  send  it  to  the  United  States.38    Even  in  his  praise  of
the  people  in  the  South  for  their  devotion  to  the  Constitution,  his
reasoning  was  shaped  by  his  historical  knowledge.     In  one  speech,  for
37]ohnston  and  Browne,   p.   572.
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example,  he  saw  a  parallel  between  the  defenders  of  constitutional
liberty  in  the  Con.federacy  and  the  old  barons  who  extorted  the  Magna
Carta  .from  their  oppressors  by  a  resort  to  arms  as   the  barons  went
forth  to  do  their  work,   thoroughly  imbued  with  a  sense  of  what  was
right  for  rights'   sake.     Not  even  these  people  could  present  a  grander
spectacle  for  the  admiration  of  the  world  than  this  gallant  band  of
patriots   (meaning  the  Confederates)  as  they  went  forth  to  war,
ifispired  with  no  motive  but  a  thorough  devotion  to,   and  an  ardent
attachment  for,   constitutional  liberty.39
Stephens  was  not  concerned  with  the  constitutionality  of
secession  as  he  believed  any  state  could  secede  from  the  Union;   he  was
concerned  with  the  wisdom  of  secession  and  of   the  formation  of  a  new
government.     The  right  of  secession,   for  Stephens,  was  a  cause  of
all  states  and  the  cause  of  constitutional  liberty  everywhere.     It
was  the  cause  of  the  federative  principle  of  government  against  the
principle  of  empire,   the  cause  of  the  Grecian  type  of  civilization  of
Greek  liberty,  against  the  Asiatic  type  of  civilization, of  depotism
and  autocracy.40    In  Stephens'  mind  the  cause  of  the  Southern  state
took  on  an  historical  and  world  importance.
Davis  also  put  the  secession  problem  in  an  historical
perspective.     Here,   though,   Davis'   mind  does  not  seem  to  have  quite
the  cosmopolitan-historical  touch  which  Stephens'  mind  shows.     Davis
compared  the  position  which  the  South  occupied  to  that  which  the
American  colonists  had  occupied.     Stephens  had  also  declared  that
39c|eve|and,   p.   784.
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the  Confederate  government  was  very  similar  to  the  goverrment  during
the  American  Revolution  as  "each  sought  release  from  tyranny."41
In  this  comparison  Davis  saw  many  similarities.     The  result  of  Lord
North's  trying  to  force  collection  of  revenue  from  the  colonies
resulted  in  a  collision  of  two  forces.     Out  of  this  collision  came
the  separation  of  the  colonies.     He  warned  the  people  of  the  North
that  they  were  reenacting  the  blunders  which  the  statesmen  in  Great
Britain  had  once  committed.42    Davis  interpreted  the  American
Revolution  of  1776  as  centering  about  one  great  idea,   "corrmunity
independence."    Speaking  in  the  state  of  Massachusetts  before
secession  of  his  native  state,  he  attempted  to  use  historical  argu-
ments  to  persuade  the  people  of  the  right  of  each  state  to  secede.
Like  Stephens,  Mallory,   and  Benjamin,   Davis  saw  the  Federal  government
as  being  a  government  formed  out  of  and  with  the  consent  of  each  State
goverrment,  with  each  state  having  the  right  to  leave  this  union  of
states  when  it  so  desired.     He  viewed  the  United  States  not  as  a
central  consolidated  government  but  instead  as  a  union  of  sovereign
states.     If  it  were  a  central  consolidated  government,   its  fate,  he
believed,  might  be  learned  from  the  history  of  other  nations  but  since
it  was  not,   its  fate  could  not  be  learned  from  the  lessons  of  history.
In  his  trip  to  Massachusetts  he  urged  the  people  to  look  into  the
collection  of  their  historical  association  where  they  would  f ind  a
4LE.   Merton  Coulter, The  Conf ederate  States  of  America  1861-
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bounteous   store  of  knowledge  which  upheld  that  sacred  doctrine  of
states'   rights  which  many  people  in  the  North  had  called  the  extreme
opinion  of  the  South.43    To  the  argument  that  in  the  end  the  majority,
which  was  with  the  North,  must  rule,   Davis  answered,   "I  am  not  so
sure  of  that.    Neither  current  events  nor  history  shows  that  the
majority  rules  or  ever  did  rule.    The  contrary  I  think  is  true  .   .   . „44
Using  this  historical  perspective,   Davis  was  able  to  see  the  possibility
of  the  South  ruling  the  country.     Later  on,  while  serving  as  President
of   the  Confederacy,Davis'   view  of  sta`tes'   rights  changed  somewhat  as
he  tried  to  meet  the  emergencies  of  the  war  situation.
Davis  believed  that  revolution  was  an  inalienable  right  of  the
people  to  abrogate  and  modify  their  forms  of  government  whenever  it
failed  to  answer  the  ends  to  which  it  was  established.     Davis
interpreted  this  as  having  an  historical  meaning;   the  forefathers
meant  revolution  was  a  right,   and  force  could  only  be  invoked  when
that  right  was  wrongfully  denied.     Davis  argued  that  if  Great  Britain
had  admitted  this  great  American  doctrine,   there  would  have  been  no
bloodsh`ed;   yet  he  saw  that  descendants  of  this  great  principle  were
proclaiming  that  i.f  revolution  was  a  right  it  was  one  "which  you  can
only  get  as  the  subjects  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria  may  get  these
rights,  by  force  overcoming  force."    Davis  then  asked,
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Are  we  in  the  age  of  civilization  and  political  progress,
when  political  philosophy  has  advanced  to  the  point  which
seems   to  render  it  possible  that  the  milleniun  should  now
be  seen  by  prophetic  eyes,  and  again  to  return  to  the  mere
brute  force  which  prevails  between  beasts  of4grey  as  the
only  method  of   settling  questions  among  men.
Even  while  serving  as   Secretary  of  War  Davis  had  warned  that  "we  shall
be  untrue  to  the  great  principles  which  our  forefathers  bequeathed  as
a  legacy  to  us  if  we  should  attempt  to  bind  our  Union  together  by  other
(measures)   than  the  bonds  of  fraternity."46    Davis  believed  that  the
only  alternative  to  secession  was  coercion.     He  pointed  out  that
Madison,   Hamilton,   and  Edmund  Randolph  had  all  spoken  against   the
central  government  having  the  power  of  coercion  and  that  it  was  never
granted  to   the  Congress.47     Davis'  mind  seemed  to  be  struggling  with
this  problem  of  advancements  in  history  although  he  seemed  to  believe
in  a  gradual  improvement  of  history  and  civilization.     Davis'  mind,
like  Stephens'   mind,   did  exhibit  a  more  cosmopolitan  comprehension  or
broad-mindedness   than  did  the  minds  of  most  Southern  leaders.
Yet  none  of   these  four  Conf ederate  leaders  viewed  secession  as
revolution.     One  example  which  shows   that  Stephens  did  not  view  the
Confederacy  as  being  a  revolutionary  goverrment  was  the  fact  that  he
felt  her  goverrment  should  be  open  and  responsible  to  the  people.
At  the  same  time,   he  believed  that  when  any  people  have  cause  for
revolution  in  their  government,   secrecy  and  even  conspiracy  may  be
justif led,  but  not  until  then.
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David  and  his  men  kept  secrets  from  Saul--that  Moses
was  at  the  head  of  a  secret  movement  when  he  delivered
Israel  from  Egypt--that  Alfred  the  Great  rescued  his
country  in  a  similar  manner  from  the  domination  of
the  Danes--that  Samuel  Adams  and  others,   habited  like
Indians  in  17Z3  struck  the  f irst  blow  for  American
independence.
Considering  this  historical  interpretation  for  the  necessity  of  secrecy
and  even  conspiracy,  many  of  Stephens'   later  actions  involving  secrecy
and  bordering  on  conspiracy  and  treason  should  not  be  so  surprising
or  hastily  condemned.     With  a  better  understanding  of   Stephens'
historical  mind,  one  can  realize  that  his  actions  were  logical  and
were  not  marked  by  great  personal  hatred  or  by  an  unbalanced  mentality.
Benjamin  did  not  see  the  secession  crisis  as  being  a  rebellion
on  the  part  of  the  South.     When,  he  asked,   did  millions  of  people  as
a  single  man,   rise  in  organized,   deliberate  unimpassioned  rebellion
against  justice,   truth  and  honor?    He  agreed  with  a  great  Englishman
who  exclaimed  on  a  similar  occasion  "You  may  as  well   tell  me  that  they
rebelled  against  the  light  of  heaven  .   .   .   I  pronounce  fearlessly  that
no  intelligent  people  ever  rose  or  will  ever  rise  against  a  sincere,
rational,   and  benevolent  authority."49    If  the  people  of  the  South  were
traitorsand  treasoners,   Benjamin  contended,
the  people  of  the  South  imitate  and  glory  in  just  such
treasons  as  glowed  in  the  souls  of  Hampden;   just  such
treason  as  leaped  in  living  frame  from  the  impassioned
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The  southern  convention,  which  met  at  Montgomery  in  February,
1861,   elected  Jefferson  Davis  as  president  and  Alexander  H.   Stephens
as  vice  president,   thus  showing  to  the  watching  world  that  the  South
was  now  united  and  that  there  were  no  factions  whatever  to  disturb
the  perfect  harmony  of  the  new  government.     These  choices  were  ironic
as  Davis  desired  a  military  corrmission  and  glory  while  Stephens  had
been  an  outspoken  opponent  of  secession.     Stephens  had  barely  missed
the  opportunity  to  become  president  and  throughout  the  war  he  found  it
hard,   if  not  impossible,   to  play  second  fiddle  to  anybody.     In
choosing  his  cabinet,   according   to  William  E.   Dodd,   "Davis  was
concerned  with  the  composing  of  differences  and  disagreements,  not  the
securing  o£`  harmony  in  administration  or  the  ablest  talent  for  the
work  in  hand."51    Opponents  of  Davis  criticized  him  for  choosing  a
cabinet  in  line  with  his  own  ideas  with  the  exception  of  Robert  Toombs.
However,   Dodd's   statement  seems   to  have  much  more  validity.     Another
•factor  imf luencing  Davis'   choice  of  cabinet  members  was   the  need  to
appease  the  various  state  and  other  political  factions.   Benjamin  was
chosen  as  Attorney  General  although  his  abilities  far  outdistanced
this  cabinet  position.     Later  in  November  1861  he  became  Secretary  of
War  but  his  stay  here  was  relatively  short.     Then  he  became  Secretary
of  State  in  March  of  1862  and  remained  in  this  off ice  till  the  war
ended.     Mallory,   due  to  his  naval  background  in  the  Senate,  was
appointed  Secretary  of   the  Navy,  a  position  he  held  throughout  the
long  struggle.     Davis  was  deeply  interested  in  finding  capable  men
and  placing  them  in  the  available  positions.     Although  Davis  hoped
5LDodd,   p.    227.
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for  cooperation  from  these  men  in  leadership  positions,   he  demanded
patriotism.52    In  the  organization  of  the  army,  particularly  in
appointment  of  officers,  Davis  steadfastly  pursued  the  policy  of
employing  experts  rather  than  popular  political  leaders  or  orators.
Here  again  Robert  Toombs  was  an  exception.     Davis  met  much  opposition
to   this  employment  of  West  Pointers   to  so  many  of   the  responsible
positions.
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For  years  Davis  had  been  a  student  of  Great  Britain's  system  of
goverrment,   and  he  brought  this  interest  into  play  when  he  compared
the  Confederate  government  with  the  goverrment  of  Great  Britain..     He
found  the  two  cases  as  distinct  as  to  be  opposite,  rather  than  parallel
to  each  other.     In  a  letter  in  February,   1865,   to  J.  A.   Seddon,
Secretary  of  War  who  had  just  resigned  from  his  position,   Davis   seemed
to  lament  the  fact  that  the  Southern  government  could  not  be  more
nearly  like  that  of  the  British.     In  Great  Britain,  he  wrote,  a  vote
of   the  House  of  Corrmons  expressing  a  want  of  confidence  in  the  Ministry
had  a  controlling  imf luence  because  the  Parliament  governed.     In  the
Confederacy,  he  said,   the  reverse  was   true.     In  Great  Britain,   the
Ministry  was  the  Executive  Goverrment  and  the  Sovereign  ruled  but  did
not  govern.     In  the  Confederacy,   the  head  of  departments-neither  ruled
nor  governed.     In  Great  Britain,   the  Sovereign  was  irresponsible  and
could  do  no  wrong  with  the  Ministry  alone  being  responsible.     In  the
Confederacy,   the  President  could  do  wrong  and  he  was  responsible.
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In  Great  Britain,   the  Ministry  were  members  of  the  Legislature  which
originated  laws,  guided  administrations,  exercised  the  appointing
power  to  all  offices   (the  Sovereign  being  in  practice  purely  nominal)
and  were  apprised  in  advance  of   the  grounds  of  a  proposed  vote  of
want  of  confidence  and  had  the  power  and  means  of  defending   themse.1ves.
In  the  Confederacy  the  exact  opposite  of  all  of  this  was  true.     In
Great  Britain,   even  after  a  vote  of  censure,   the  Ministry  might
dissolve  Parliament  and  appeal  to  the  country  which  had  not  infre-
quently  reversed  the  role  of  decision.     Not  so  in  thi`s  country.
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The  experiences  of  the  war  and  of  all  the  Confederate's   tragedies,  as
well  as  his  own  personal   tragedy,   thus  had  changed  Davis'   perspective.
Nevertheless  he  remained  a  f irm  believer  in  the  American  form  of
government  and  democracy.     Stephens  had  earlier  wanted  the  President
to  appoint  his  cabinet  ministers  from members  of  one  or  the  other
houses  of  Congress  as  he  regarded  this  feature  in  the  British  consti-
tution  as  being  one  of  the  most  salutary  principles. 55
Davis  and  Stephens  both  revered  the  Constitution.     They  rejoiced
that  the  proposed  Confederate  Constitution  used  the  United  States
Constitution  as  a  basis  for  their  new  government.     Davis  even  saw  it
as  the  "duty  of  the  South  in  this  last  hour  to  seize  the  pillars  of
our  government  (United  States)   and  uphold  them,   though  we  be  crushed
in  the  fall."56    Mallory  and  Benjamin  also  expressed  keen  satisfaction
with  the  Confederate  Constitution.57    They  interpreted  the  Confederate
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Constitution  as  being  that  framed  by  the  forefathers  of  America.
This  devotion  to  the  Constitution  went  hand  in  hand  with  their  ideas
on  nationalism.
Stephens  was  very  imf luential  in  the  formation  of  the  Confederate
government.     Through  some  of  his  speeches  on  certain  aspects  of  govern-
ment,   one  can  get  a  clearer  picture  of  his  historical  world-mindedness
at  work.     Stephens  believed  that  one  of  the  chief  liberties  guaranteed
by  the  United  States  government  as  well  as  by  the  Confederate  States
government  was  the  liberty  of  any  man  in  the  country  to  sit  down  and
worship  as  he  pleased.     He  saw  this  principle  as  being  established  by
Baldwin,   the  Pinckneys,   Madison,   Hamilton,   and  Washington.     He  warned
the  people  not  to  be  tempted  to  give  up  this  great  liberty  in  this
American  Eden  as  Eve  was   tempted  by  the  great  arch-enemy  of   the  moral
goverrment  of   the  universe.58     Stephens  was  aware  that  any  movement
which  sought  to  do  away  with  religious  freedom  had  its  roots  in  older
movements.     He  saw  that  there  was   such  a  movement  in  England  once
with  Jack  Cade  at  the  head  of  it.     Rome,   as  well  as  France,  was  also
the   theatre  of  many  such  movements.     Stephens  was  especially  concerned
with  Greece.     It  was  true,  he  believed,   that  when  one  cas\t  his  eyes
upon  the  home  of  Homer  and  Plato  one  would  see  "tis  Greece  but  living
Greece  no  more."    He  recollected  that  it  was  there  that  liberty  once
flourished,   that  heavens  fought  and  poets  sang,   and  philosophy  reared
her  temples  of  arts  and  science,  while  statesmen  directed  public
affairs.     In  the  eyes  of  Stephens,   the  fall  of  Greece  was  preceded  by
a  movement  to  do  away  with  religious   toleration  and  freedom;   this
58c|eve|and,   p.   482.
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movement,  unfortunately,   succeeded  in  persuading  the  people  to  get
rid  of  their  ablest  and  best  men  in  order  to  use  other  less  capable
men.     It  was  then  that  political  ruin  and  moral  desolation  came  upon
Greece.     The  same  results,   he  said,  might  be  expected  to  occur  in  any
country  when  a  similar  policy  was  pursued.59     Stephens  feared  that
when  the  words  of  wisdom  were  no   longer  listened  to,   "we  may  well
explain  as  once  did  Greece:     Shrine  of  the  mighty  can  it  be--that
this  is  au  that  remains  of  thee."60
Stephens,   in  a  letter  to  A.  J.  Marshall,  wrote  that  it  was  a
"lamentable  fact  that  there  had  been  less  improvement  in  the  progress
of  civilization  in  the  light  of  experience  in  the  science  of  govern-
ment,   than  in  any  other  branch  of  human  knowledge."61    He  warned  those
who  doubted  the  eff icient  practical  working  of  any  new  checks  upon
legislation  to  study  the  annals  of  Poland  and  the  kingdom  of  Aragon,
a  province  o'f  Spain.     Calhoun,   Stephens   stated,   had  clearly  shown  the
admirable  working  of  the  unanimity  principle  of  Poland,  even  in  their
election  of  their  chief  magistrate.     In  Aragon,   Stephens  continued,
history  had  taught  that  for  several  hundred  years  the  Cortes,   the
legislative  body  of  the  kingdom,   could  pass  no  law  without  the  vote
of  every  member  in  each  house.     Under  this   system,   Spain  reached  a
higher  degree  of  civilization  than  any  of  her  neighboring  western
states.     The  liberties  of  Aragon  were  not  lost  until  the  ambitious
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Charles  V,   by  corrupt  means,   procur-ed   the  abandorment  of   this  principle
of  the  Cortes.    After  this  step,   Spain  gradually  declined  in  the
western  world.     Stephens  wanted  the  people  to  study  all   types  of
government  before  deciding  on  one  of   their  own.     He  warned  that  no  one
should  hastily  and  rashly  condemn  any  system  of  goverrment,   even  the
unanimity  principle, until  they  had  studied  the  actual  practical
experiment.62
Stephens  believed  that  there  was  an  universal  rule  in  government.
Society,  he  said,   should  look  not  to  the  greatest  good  to  the  greatest
number,  but  to  the  greatest  attainable  good  to  all  without  injury  or
detriment  to  anyone.     In  his  opinion,   the  best  way  to  secure  this
practical  application  in  a  republic  was  to  make  approaches  toward  the
unanimity  principle  at  least  in  legislation.     For  Stephens,   "no  truth
was  better  established  than  that   'the  world  is  governed  too  mtich.'
No  new  law  ought  ever  to  be  passed  until   the  wants  and  needs  of   the
society  as  a  whole,   in  its  progress  requires  it."63    Thus,   it  does  not
seem  surprising  that  Stephens  was  shocked  by  Davis'   use  of  power.
To  the  vice  president,   this  was  a  danger  that  could  not  be  overlooked
and  he  would  not  allow  anybody  to  overlook  it.
Stephens  wanted  to  leave  a  way  open  for  admission  of  other
states  whether  slaveholding  or  not.     He  did  not  want  the  South  to  be
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known  as   the  Black  Republic  as  he  realized  it  would  be  without  sympathy
from  any  of   the  outside  world.64    Davis  also  favored  leaving  the  door
open  for  non-slave  holding  states   to  join  the  -Cohfederacy. 65
On  the  question  o.f  higher   law,   Davis  remarked   to  a  New  York
audience  in  October     1858,
You  have  among  you  politicans  of  a  philosophic  turn  who
preach  a  high  morality;   a  system  of  which  they  are  the
discoverers.    They  saw,   it  is  true  that  the  Constitution
dictates  this,   the  Bible  inculcates  that;  but  there  is  a
higher  law  than  these,   and  they  call  upon  you  to  obey  that
higher  law  of  which  they  are  the  inspired  givers.     Men
who  are  traitors  to  the  compact  of  their  fathers--men  who
have  prejured  the  oaths  they  have  themselves  taken  .   .   .
these  are  the  moral  law-givers  who  proclaim  a  higher  law
than  the  Bible,   the  Constitution,  and  the  laws  of  the
land  .   .   .  These  higher  law  preachers  should  be  tarred
and  feathered,   and  whipped  by  those  they  have  thus
instigated   .   .   .   The  man  who   .   .   .   preaches   treason  to
the  Constitution  and  the  dictates  of  all  human  society,
is  a  fit  object  for  a  1{;gch  law  that  would  be  higher
than  any  he  could  urge.
Whether  Davis  would  really  have  hanged  these  people  is  doubtful
but  his  speech  did  show  his  anger,  his  resentment,   and  his  .fear  of  the
people  who  preached  a  higher  law.     Benjamin  was  also  rankled  by  the
"fools  and  knaves  of  New  England,"  who  declared  that  "the  Earth  belongs
to  the  Saints  and  they  were  the  Saints  of  the  Lord."    Such  attacks  on
the  people  o.£  the  South  and  the  institution  of  slavery  spread  much
f ear  and  resentment  throughout  the  South  and  caused  many  Southerners
to  react  in  a  more  hostile,   emotional  manner.
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In  1859,   Stephens,   in  a  moment  of  despondency,   said  there  was  a
higher  law  that  might  be  said  to  justify,   in  certain  instances,   the
application  of  the  extreme  right  of  revolution  even  in  violation  of
express  constitutional  provision.68    Stephens  insisted,   "that  the
Union  was  formed  for  the  benef it  of  all,"  and  when  one  area  took
advantage  of  another  area  the  Union  was  thereby  dissolved.     In
reference  to  the  Greeks  he  stated  that,   "if  gentlemen  supposed  that
by  singing  paeans  to  this  Union  it  is  to  be  preserved,   they  will  find
themselves  mistaken."     Since  "the  Union  was  founded  upon  justice--
immutable  justice--and  right"  it  meant  the  weak  were  never  to  be  de-
spoiled  by  the  strong.69    Thus  Stephens  appealed  to  the  Constitution
and  a  higher  law  for  his  right  to  revolt.
Stephens  believed  that  the  physical  world  was  governed  by  laws
and  that  great  good  would  result  to  the  United  States,   as  a  whole,   and
to  all  of  mankind  from  the  observation  of  these  laws.70    At  another
time,  he  stated  that  he  did  not  recognize  any  higher  law  than  the
Constitution.71    Thus,   it  seemed  that  Stephens  saw  the  Constitution  as
being  in  line  or  agreement  with  the  higher  law  and  as  long  as  the
Constitution  was  followed,   all  would  be  well.     It  also  seems   that
Stephens  never  fully  worked  out  his  understanding  of  the  "higher  law"
doctrine; yet  he  used  his  higher  law  argument,   as  he  did  history,   to
advance  his  own  arguments.
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CHAPTER  Ill
HISTORY ,   NATIONALISM, AND   DIPLORACY
Nationalism  is  a  feeling  of  loyalty  and  devotion  to  a  nation,
especially  a  sense  of  national  consciousness.     Before  and  during  the
Civil  War,   Jefferson  Davis,   Judah  Benjamin,   Stephen  Mallory,   and
Alexander  H.   Stephens  exhibited  a  nationalistic  tendency.     Before  the
war,   these  men  had  loved  the  United  States  primarily  because  of  its
goverrment.     Their  devotion  was  directed  mainly  toward  the  government
as  an  institution  and  not  to  the  people  that  made  up  the  nation.
Abraham  Lincoln  had  carried  his  love  for  national  institutions  to  a
love  or  respect  for  the  common  man  much  more  so   than  did  these  Southern
leaders.    All  these  Southerners  shared  one  thing,  primarily  devotion  to
the  federal  government  and  its  constitution.    They  differed,  however,
in  the  way  they  interpreted  the  Constitution.   thus  differing  in  their
ideas  about  the  powers  of  the  di££erent  institutions  of  Federal  and
State  goverrments.    During  their  formative  years,   these  Southern
leaders  grew  up  with  the  increasingly  important  idea  of  sectional
difference  between  the  North  and  South.     In  the  North,   the  prevalent
belief  was  that  the  ways  and  principles  of  the  free  states  were  the
standard  for  all  the  states.    Thus,  a  gap  grew  in  their  nationalistic
ideas  as  the  Southerners  began  to  take  more  and  more  pride  in  their
own  section  and  states.     This  extreme  devotion  to  a  state  could  be
seen  in  Stephens,  while  Davis,   Benjamin,   and  Mallory,   although  sharing
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similar  ideas  as  Stephens  on  the  importance  of  the  state,   took  a  more
sectional  and  nationalistic  attitude  than  Stephens.     In  the  sense  that
Davis,  Mallory,   Benjamin,   and  Stephens  were  nationalistic,   they  were
for  a  southern  nationalism,  which  meant  not  independence  but  domination
from  within  the  Union.1    Davis  expressed  the  wish  that  union  of  South
and  sober  sense  of  North  would  produce  a  sense  of  justice  and  faithful
observance  of  principles  of  f ederal  compact  which  would  enable  a
minority  to  live  as  equals  in  the  United  States.2    By  the  outbreak  of
the  Civil  War,   these  four  southern  leaders  were  devoted  to  their
section;   they  all  saw  two  different  nations  not  one  united  country.
Benjamin  expressed  this  thought  quite  well  in  a  letter  to  Henri  Mercier
in  1862  when  he  wrote,   "In  reality  we  are  two  distinct  people  who  ought
to  have  each  his  own  government.     Our  population  has   today  more  hatred
f or  the  Yankee  than  the  French  have  ever  had  f or the  English."3    To
these  Southerners,   the  South  was  not  a  nation  and  their  support  of  it,
although  once  considered  sectionalism,   turned  into  nationalism  as  they
attempted  to  build  a  nation.     In  the  sense  that  they  did  have  a  feeling
of  nationalism  toward  the  United  States,   they  still  emphasized  their
spirit  of  regionalism  in  this  nationalism.    They  believed  that
Southern  leaders  had  guided  the  country  during  the  colonial  period
and  that  the  South  should  continue  to  dominate  the  affairs  of  the  Union.
±Shelby  Footei   E±±  £±¥±1  !!!±E:     A
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2Rowland,I,   p.   595,   Nov.   7,1850.
3Lynn  M.   Case  and  Warren  F.   Spencer, The  United  States  and  France:
Civil  War  Diplomacy  (Philadelphia:     University  of  Pennsylvania  Press,
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Gradually,   these  Southern  leaders  placed  more  and  more  emphasis  on
their  section  and  region  and  became  more  devoted  to  the  cause  of  the
South  and  of   the  Conf ederacy.
Before  the  South  seceded,   Davis  did  desire  a  continuance  of   the
Union  in  all  its  greatness,  while  at  the  same  time,   he  was  devoted  to
his  state  and  to  his  section.4    Extensive  travels  in  the  army  as  well
as  af terward  and  his  training  in  the  army  contributed  strongly  to  his
nationalism.5    Perhaps  his  mind  was  broadened  by  attending  school  in
the  North  at  West  Point,   yet  this  influence  as  well  as  the  effect  Yale
had    made  on  Benjamin's  mind  remains  unknown.6     Davis'   service  as
secretary  of  war,   and  Benjamin's  and  Mallory's  foreign  birth  and
overseas  connections,  as  well  as  their  religious    heritage--one  a
Jew,   the.other  a  Catholic--gave  to  these  men  an  influence  that  helped
to  broaden  their  minds.     Benjamin's  feeling  of  nationalism  was  also
inf luenced  by  the  new  capitalism  exemplif led  in  the  booming  Louisiana
port  of  New  Orleans,   of  which  he  was  a  representative.
In  the  midst  of  the  know-nothing  agitation  in  1855,   Stephens
stated  that  an  Irishman,   a  Frenchman,   a  German,   or  a  Russian  could  be
as  thoroughly  American  as  if  he  had  been  born  within  the  walls  of  the
old  Independence  Hall   itself .8    Thus,   Stephens'   sense  of  nationalism
4owsley,   "Jefferson  Davis,"  p.   764.
5wi||iam  and  Bruce  Catton9  ±|±± E9± ±9
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did  not  blind  him  to  the  fact  that  all  Caucasian  nationalities  and
Protestant  religious  groups  could  be  American;   they  did  not  have  to
be  born  in  America.     Like  Lincoln,   Stephens  expressed  a  tolerant  and
more  friendly  attitude  toward  foreigners  in  a  period  when   hostility
to  foreigners  was  rampant.9     Stephens  also  regarded  any  attempt  by  the
people  of  the  United  States  to  trace  their  ancestry  to  the  nobility
of  England  or  to  any  other  country  as  inconsistent  with  the  spirit
which  should  animate  the  descendants  of   the  sires  of  1776,   North  and
South.10    Of   the  other  three  Southern  leaders,   Davis'   attitude  had
more  prejudice  involved  in  it,   especially  when  dealing  with  non-
European  peoples.     However,   it  does  seem  that  all  four  leaders  of   the
Confederacy  adopted  a  more  tolerant  attitude  toward  the  European
nationalities,   since  they  were  members  of  the  white  race.     These
Southern  leaders  could  accept  and  tolerate  people  from  Europe  coming
to  America  much  more  easily  than  if   they  were  from  China  or  Japan.
A  large  part  of  Davis'   love  of  the  United  States,  and  later  the
Confederacy,  was  derived  from  his  feeling  toward  their  constitutions
and  governments.     Inherent  in  this  devotion  was  his  belief  in  con-
stitutional  liberty.     Davis  viewed  the  Confederacy  as  f ighting  for
constitutional  liberty,  although  he  never  became  so  fanatically
attached  to  this  idea  as  Lincoln  was  to  the  idea  that  the  North  was
fighting  for  the  preservation  of  democracy.     So,   to  a  more  limited
degree,  Davis  did  see  the  Confederacy  as  fighting  for  the  salvation  of
a  world  idea  but  he  seldom  tried  to  push  it  as  strongly  as  did  Lincoln.
9]ames  G.   Randall, Lincoln
Dodd  Mead-Co.,1947),   p.184.
£°Myrta  Lockett  Avary,
Eii 2iap E
(New  York:
Liberal  Statesman   (New  York:
Recollections
When  a  Prisoner  at  Fort  Warren=dioT9FTDoubleday,   Page
Alexander  HI.   Stephens.
Boston  Harbour   1865
p.   420.
57
One  reason  for  this  was   that  Davis  seldom  made  public  speeches.
When  he  made  them,  however,   he  always   insisted  in  telling  the  people
that  if  "the  Confederacy  falls,   constitutional  goverrment,  political
freedom  itself ,  will  fall  with  it."11    While  making  a  speech  in
Augusta,   Georgia,  Davis  was  interrupted  by  an  Irishman  who  demanded
three  cheers  for  the  Confederacy.     To  this  remark,  Davis  replied,
From  the  accents  of  that  voice,  my  friend,   I  see  that  you
may  have  come  into  this  country  from  one  that  has   lost
its   liberty.    You  may  well  exclaim  'three  cheers  for  the
Confederacy, '   upon  whose  success  now  alone  depends   the
existence  of  constitutional  liberty  in  the  world.    We
are  fighting  for  that  principle,  upon  us  depends  its  last
hope   .   .   .   Ours   is  not  a  revolution  .   .   .   our  struggle
is  for  inherited  rights.     I  believe  that  a  just  God  looks
upon  our  ca±2e  as  holy,   and  that  of   the  enemy  as
iniqui tous .
Davis,   like  many  people  in  the  Confederacy,  viewed  the  issue  of
secession  as  being  similar  to  that  of  Irish  nationalism  and  related  to
the  universal  problem  of  freedom  for  nationalities.13    Yet  Davis  did
not  consider  it  his  main  function  to  tell  the  people  in  the  South
as  well  as  the  world,   that  with  the  Confederacy's  fall,   the  world  would
see  the  fall  of  constitutional  liberty,  as  Davis  was  too  wrapped  up
in  military  matters  which  he  considered  much  more  important.     Stephens
also  spoke  of  the  Confederacy  as  being  the  only  hope  of  constitutional
liberty  in  the  world.14
1£Dodd,   p.   334.
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Iowa,1966),   p.   43.
£4Cleveland,   p.   739,   April   23,1861.
58
Stephens  had  seen  the  United  States  government  as  being  the
best  government  on  earth  but  he  felt  that  the  Confederate  Constitution
and  its  goverrment  was  an  improvement  on  the  old  goverrment.15    For
him,   the  United  States  goverrment  had  been  an  improvement  upon  England's
goverrment  and  if  one  compared  the  United  States  government  with  that
of ,   "France,   Spain,  Mexico,   the  South  American  republics,   East  to
Turkey  or  to  China,   one  could  not  find  a  government  that  better
protects  the  liberties  of  its  people  than  the  United  States  govern-
ment."16
Throughout  the  pre-Civil  War  days,   one  can  see  examples  of
nationalism  in  the  minds  of  Davis,   Stephens,   Benjamin,   and  Mallory.
F.or  example,   in  1846,   Davis'   speech  against  war  with  Great  Britain
revealed  his  deep  attachment  to  the  Union  as  well  as   to  the  Consti-
tution.17    In  1848,   Stephens  advocated  national  appropriation  for  the
telegraph.     He  hoped  to  see  the  day  "when  our  whole  body  politic  would
be  knit  together  and  the  wires  communicating  intelligence  from  one
extremity  to   the  other  would  make  us  more  and  more  one  people."18
By  1848,   however,   the  future  leaders  of   the  South,   even  Davis,  were
experiencing  sectional  pains.     Davis  wrote  that  the  South  was   the
minority  and  so  she  would  remain,with  her  security  depending  upon  the
power  of  the  constitutional  curb  to  check  the  otherwise,  unbridled
will  of  the  majority.19    0n  being  appointed  as  an  alternate  to  the
£5]ohnston  and  Browne,   p.   568,   Nov.   14,   1860.
16Ibid.
17£.£. , 29th  Congress,   1st   Session,   1846,   p.   318.
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Nashville  convention  of   1850,  Mallory  regarded  his  section  as  evidence
that  his  fellow  citizens  believed  in  his  attachment  to  the  South,  an
attachment  to  which  all  others,   even  the  most  holy  and  cherished,  must
be  subservient. 20
In  1850,   in  a  speech  before  the  Senate,   Davis  expressed  the
problem  he  had  in  reconciling  his  nationalistic  feeling  and  states
rights  ideas.
I  sir,  have  not  gone  so  far  as  the  Senator  from  Texas  has
this  morning.     He  said  the  South  was  his  country.     I  sir,
am  an  American  citizen.     My  allegiance  I  know  is  f irst  due
to  the  state  I  represent.     My  feelings  and  my  honor  both
bind  me  in  the  f irst  and  last  resort.     But  this  Union  is
my  country.     I  am  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  it  is
true  because  I  am  the  citizen  of  a  state.     My  affections
begin  in,  but  are  not  bounded  by  the  limits  of  that
state.     I  belong  to  no  state  and  no  section,  when  the
great  interests  of  the  Union  are  concerned;   I  belong  to
the  state  which  is  my  home  when  the  Union  attempts   to
trample  upon  her  rights,  when  outrages  and  oppression
shall  drive  those  affections  now  extended  over  the
broad  Union,  back  to  their  more  narr2¥  circle  than
heart  and  hand,   I  am  wholly  her  own.
Later,   during  the  Civil  War,  Davis  argued  that  since  a  man  owed    his
allegiance  to  the  United  States  as  a  citizen  of  a  state,  he  could  not
be  accused  of  being  disloyal  to  the  Union  if  he  followed  the  mandate
of  his  own  state.     Such  a  charge,  Davis  felt,  was  treason  to  the
principle  of  cormunity  independence.     It  would  be  a  return  to  a
doctrine  of  passive  obedience  which  cost  Charles  I  his  head  and  drove
James  11  out  of  England.     Since  the  English  Revolution  of  1688,   this
doctrine,   Davis  argued,   had  existed  nowhere  where  people  speak  the
English  language.     In  his   speech  to   the  Virginia  Secession  Convention,
2°Durkin,   pp.   38-40.
2LRow|and,   I,   p.   509,   August   15,   1850.
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Stephens  expressed  his  feeling  of  nationalism  thusly,   "I  was  attached
to  it  for  what  was  its  soul,   its  vitality  and  spirit;   these  were  the
living  embodiments  of  the  great  principles  of  self-goverrment."22
All  four  of  these  men  possessed  this  similar  type  of  devotion  to  the
United  States.     Perhaps,   their  devotion  and  loyalty  to  the  constitution,
as   they  understood  it,   caused  them  to  break  away  from  a  government
which .they  believed  was  corrupting  the  ideas  and  principles  of  the
constitution.
"To  train  the  men  who  are  at  the  head  of  the  armies,   to  maintain
the  honor  of  the  American  f lag, and  in  all  circumstances  to  uphold  the
Constitution,"  Davis  believed,   "required  a  man  above  sectional
prejudices,  an    intellectual  superior  to  fanaticism."23    Even  up  to
the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  Davis  retained  some  of  his  nationalistic
feelings.     Shortly  before  South  Carolina  seceded,   Davis  praised  the
corrmon  interest  and  the  common  sentiment  of  nationality  which  beat  in
every  American  bosom.24     Between  1858-59,   he   traveled   to  New  England
in  order  to  attempt  to  promote  sectional  harmony,  mainly  by  ethical
proofs,   among  the  people.25     In  1859,   Stephens  insisted  that  the  great
sectional  issues  had  been  adjusted  and  the  people  had  never  been  more
peaceful.26     |n    his  support  of  Stephen  A.   Douglas  for  president  in
22c|eve|and,   p.   729.
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1860,   Stephens  supported  a  man  who  made  an  effort  for  national
unity.27     |n  these  speeches  and  other  similar  speeches  Davis  and
Stephens  showed  they  had  pride  in  the  people  themselves  but  their
devotion  and  attachment  to  the  people  never  developed  to  the  degree
that  Abraham  Lincoln's  developed,  nor  did  their  understanding  of
human  nature.
In  Stephens'   eyes,   the  United  States  constituted  a  nation,  not
of  individuals  blended  in  a  corrmon  mass  with  a  consolidated  sovereignty
over  the  whole,  but  of  which  the  constituent  elements  or  members  were
separate  and  distinct  political  organizations  or  states.     "It  is  a
Confederated  Republic,   as  Washington  styled  our  present  Union,"
Stephens  declared,   and  "this  is  the  same  as  if  he  had  styled  it  a
Confederated  Nation."    For  Stephens   the  United  States  was  a  nation
of  nations  and  the  highest  and  grandest  type  the  world  ever  saw. 28
But  how  could  Stephens  consider  the  goverrment  of  the  United  States
the  best  ever  in  the  world  if  any  state  could  leave  the  Union  whenever
it  so  desired?    For  this  argument  Stephens  used  historical  evidence.
He  argued  that  the  Confederation  of  Greece  was  just  such  a  govern-
ment.     "To  whom,"  he  asked,   "is   the  world  so  much  indebted  for
European  civilization  at  this  time,  as  to  the  little  Republics   .   .   .
held  together  by  no  other  bands  than  their  own  consent."29    Their
greatness  only  departed  when  the  Hellenic  States  departed  from  their
principles  of  government.
27Craven,   i QE2rfu gi iguthern  Nationalism.     p.   344.
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All  these  governments,   the  Grecian,   the  Germanic  as  well
as  our  own  f irst  confederation,  were  founded  .   .   .   upon
just  such  a  principle--the  principle  o.f  voluntary  consent.
These  governments  are  all  Confederated  Republics,  which
::omM°::::::::: ::::::a:c:: ,I::::36aved  the  human  race
He  viewed  the  system  of   the  United  States  as  being  a  great  improvement
upon  all  former  models  of  this  kind  of  confederation.
Even  though  Stephens  had  not  tried  to  keep  the  Confederacy
united  and  its  people  loyal,  he  wrote  after  the  war  that  in  his
judgment,   the  strongest  force  that  could  hold  the  parts  of  constituent
elements  of  any  government  together  was   the  aft ection  of  the  people
towards  it.     "The  Universe  is  held  together  by  force--the  greatest  of
all  forces,  by  omnipotence  itself ."    In  the  material  world  he  saw
the  force  "which  bind  and  hold  together  in  indissoluble  union  all  its
parts  in  their  respective  and  most  distant  orbits  throughout  the
illimitable  regions  of  space   .   .   .   the  simple  law  of  attraction."31
Stephens  believed  it  should  be  this  way  with  all  goverrments.     He
believed  that  the  Confederate  government  was  the  world's  best  hope
and  that  it  was  "the  strongest  goverrment  on  the  Earth."    Its  strength
lay  in  its  moral  power,   in  the  heart  and  affection  of  the  constituent
elements  with  each  party  having  the  absolute  right  to  judge,  not  only
the  in.fraction  of  the  compact,   but  also  the  mode  and  measure  of
redress  as  well.     Upon  this  self-adjusting  principle  depended  the
safety,   security,   and  existence  of  each  member,   and  this  safety  and
security  are  the  chief  objects  of  all  Federal  Republics.
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Davis,   like  other  Southern  leaders,  believed  that  each  state
retained  its  sovereignty,   freedom  and  independence,   and  every  power,
jurisdiction,  and  right  which  is  not  expressly  delegated  to  the
central  goverrment  of  the  United  States.     Under  this  type  of  contract,
Davis  insisted,   the  American  Revolution  was  successfully  waged.     It
resulted  in  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain  in  1783  by  the
terms  of  which  the  several  states  were  "each  by  name"  recognized  to
be  independent.33    This  states'   rights  view  influenced  Davis'
thinking,  as  well  as  most  Southerners' ,  and  hindered  his  efforts  in
striving  for  a  central  power  or  authority  to  carry  on  the  war
successfully.
It  was  Davis'   judgment  that  the  United  States  government  was  the
best  government  ever  instituted  by  man.     On  this,  he  and  Stephens
agreed,  and  they,   along  with  Benjamin  and  Mallory,  were  relieved  to
see  the  Confederate  goverrment  and  constitution  modeled  af ter  the
United  States  goverrment.     The  reason  for  this  great  goverrment,  Davis
believed,  was  that  the  founding  fathers  learned  wisdom  from  the
experiences  of  Rome  and  of  Greece--Rome  being  a  consolidated  govern-
ment  and  Greece  being  strictly  a  Confederacy--and  were  taught  by  the
lessons  of  their  previous  experience  under  the  Confederation.34    |n
a  speech  on  this  subject  of  government,  after  Lincoln's  election,
Davis'   historical  mindedness  was  brought  out,   in  rather  full-blown
language,  however:
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In  the  long  periods  which  elapsed  af ter  the  downfall  of
the  Great  Republic  of   the  East,   when  despotism  seemed  to
brood  over  the  civilized  world,   and  only  here  and  there
constitutional  monarchy  even  was  able  to  rear  its  head,
when  all  the  great  principles  of  republicanism  and
representative  government  had  sunk  deep,  fathomless  into
the  sea  of  human  events,   it  was  then  that  the  storm  of
our  Revolution  moved  the  waters.     The  earth,   the  air,
and  the  sea  became  brilliant  and  from  the  ages  rose
the  constellation  which  was  set  in  the  political
f irmament  as  a  sign  of  unity  and  Confederation  and
community  independence,   coexistent  with  Confederate
strength.     That  constellation  has  served  to  bless  our
people.     Nay,  more,   its   light  has  been  thrown  on  foreign
:::d:;v::i:::  ::8:n::::±¥:rp:#::hw: : Lw::t::I:35Perhap s
In  this  speech,  Davis'   pride  in  the  government  of  the  United  States
could  be  clearly  seen.     Davis  declared  that  if  the  United  States  should
fail,   it  would  not  be  the  defect  of  the  system.
Though  its  mechanism  was  wonderful,   surpassing  that  which
the  solar  system  furnished  for  our  contemplation,   it  had
no  center  of  gravitation,   each  planet  was  set  to  revolve
in  an  orbit  of  its  own,   each  moving  by  its  own  impulses
and  all  attracted  by  the  affections  which  countervailed
each  other.     It  was  the  perversion  of  the  Constitution;
it  was  the  substitution  o.f  theories  of  morals  for
principles  of  government;   it  was  the  forcing  o'f  crude
opinions  about  things  not  understood  upon  the  domestic
institutions  of  other  men,  which  had  disturbed  these
planets  in  their  orbits;   it  was  this  which  threatened
to  destroy  the  constellation  which,   in  its  power  and  its
:::=¥:e::di:e::d8:::::i:: :=:I:;:::I::°:::::s:96± 1  from
Evidence  of  Davis'   cosmopolitan  mind  was  his  knowledge  of
European  governments  and  a  somewhat  more  limited  knowledge  of   the
history  of  their  organization  or  governmental  processes  and  the  use
of  this  knowledge  in  the  statements  and  argumentation.     Davis  could
not  admit  the  existence  of  a  power  or  right  in  the  legislative
35±±±±.,   v,   p.   25,   Jam.10,18.61.
36Equ.,   p.   26.
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department  of  the  government  to  control  the  continuance  in  off ice  of
principal  off icers  in  each  of  the  executive  departments  whose  choice
the  Constitution  had  vested  in  the  President  or  Chief  Magistrate.     He
believed  it  would  be  just  as  proper  for  the  executive  department  to
express  want  of  confidence  in  the  legislative  department  as  for  the
latter  to  express  distrust  in  the  former.     Davis  maintained  that  the
notion  that  under  our  form  of  government  an  expression  by  the
legislative  of  want  of  conf idence  in  the  executive  department  was  an
appropriate  exercise  of  constitutional  power  and  should  cause  a
change  in  the  cabinet,  was  quite  unfounded,  as  the  difficulty  arose
from  a  false  analogy,   that  most  fertile  source  of  error.     In  Great
Britain,   Davis   contended,   for  example,   a  vote  of   the  House  of  Commons
expressing  a  want  of  conf idence  in  the  ministry  had  a  controlling
imf luence  because  the  Parliament  was   the  government,   but  in  the
Confederacy  the  reverse  was   true.     Indeed,  Davis  was  convinced  that
the  two  cases  were  so  distinct  as  to  be  opposite  rather  than  parallel
to  each  other.     To  support  his  belief ,  he  offered  other  examples
founded  on  his  own  knowledge  of  British  history.     In  contrasting,  he
stated  that  in  Britain  the  crown was  hereditary  as  well  as  irre-
sponsible  to   the  wants  and  demands  of   the  people.     The  power  of  making
policy  in  the  government  was   in  the  hands  of   the  House  of  Commons.
In  the  Confederacy,  however,   the  president  was  elected  as  well  as  the
members  of  the  legislature.     The  president  was  given  a  six-year  term
and  the  power  to  make  the  tenure  of  office  in  the  cabinet  his  pleasure.
In  Great  Britain,  Davis  insisted,   the  ministry  were  members  of  the
legislative  department,  and  originated  laws,  guided  administration,
and  exercised  the  appointing  power  to  all  offices.     As  they  were
apprised  in  advance  of   the  grounds  of  a  proposed  vote  of  confidence,
they  had  the  power  and  means  of  defending  themselves.     In  practice,
therefore,   the  sovereign  power  was  purely  nominal.     However,   in  the
Confederacy  the  reverse  of  all  this  was  the  case,   Davis  declared.
Finally,   in  Great  Britain,  Davis  maintained,  even  after  a  vote  of
censure,   the  ministry  might  dissolve  Parliament  and  appeal  to  the
country,  which  had  not  infrequently  reversed  the  vote  of  the  House
of  Corrmons.     In  this  way,   the  members  of   the  House  of  Commons  were
usually  restrained  from  factions  or  unfounded  charges  by  their
responsibility  to  the  people  and  the  peril  of  losing  their  seats.
Again  in  the  Confederacy,  Davis  insisted  that  the  reverse  was  true.
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In  one  sense,   these  ideas  about  legislative  powers  which  Davis
talked  about  in  a  letter  to  his  retiring  Secretary  of  State,  J.  A.
Seddon,   in  1865,  was  a  reflection  of  the  bitterness  that  Davis  felt
toward  Congress  for  having  hampered  and  insulted  his  cabinet  members
and  his  own  efforts  during  the  war.     However,   these  ideas  were  also  a
ref lection  of  his  historical  mind  as  he  explored  the  history  of  Great
Britain  to  find,  what  he  considered,   the  false  analogies  that  had  made
the  founders  of  the  constitution  place  so  many  limitations  on  the
executive.     He  was  not  denying  to  enlightened  public  opinion,  which
deliberately  formed  after  knowledge  of  facts,   its  just  and  legitimate
imf luence.     He  believed  such  public  opinion  was  almost  invariably
correct  and  could  rarely  be  disregarded  without  injury  to  the  public
will.     It  was  the  unenlightened  and  uninformed  public  opinion  that  he
was  concerned  about  and  that  he  was  condemning.     Probably  Davis
37g.i.A.,   ser.   |V,   Vol.III,   pp.1046-47,   Feb.1,1865.
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believed  that  if  the  people  of  the  Confederacy  were  as  well  informed
as  he  was,   they  would  let  him  run  the  government  as  he  thought  best.
He  sincerely  believed  that,   if  his  efforts  were  unhampered,   the
Confederacy  would.have  been  better  off.
In  the  early  days  of  the  Confederacy,   it  was  hoped  that  there
would  be  neither  partyism  or  sectionalism  in  the  new  nation.     Davis'
f irst  public  utterance  made  on  his  arrival  in  Montgomery  to  assume
the  presidency  of  the  Confederacy  was,   "For  now we  are  brethern  not  in
name,   but  in  fact  -men  of  one  flesh,  of  one  bone,  of  one  interest,  of
one  purpose,   and  of  one  identity  in  domestic  institution."38    As
Allan  Nevin  has  said,   "His  dedication  to  Southern  nationalism  was
complete."39    |n  a  letter  to  General  J.   E.  Johnston,  Davis  said  he
felt  Johnston's  anxiety  for  the  arny  of  the  Potomac  even  more  than
Johnston,   because  the  South,   the  West,   and  the  East  also  demanded  his
care.40    He  saw  more  clearly  than  most  prominent  confederates  that  if
the  South  won,   it  would  have  to  be  as  a  united  nation,  not  a  loose
bundle  of  states.41    Although  some  historians  have  insisted  that
Davis'   great  weaknesses  was  his  failure  to  insist  that  the  interest
of   the  Confederacy  as  a  whole  should  take  precedence  over  the  interest
of  the  individual  states,42  Nevins'   argument  that  Davis  more  than
anybody  else  thought  of  the  South  as  a  separate  and  unif led  entity
38cou|ter,   pp.   113-14.
39A11an  Nevins,  E±±  Statesmanship  of   the  Civil  War   (New  York:
Macmillan  Co.,1953),   p.   45.
4°Rowland,   V,   p.   161,   Nov.   10,   1961.
4£janes  D.   Richardson,   ed. 9  E±± !±S£±±8± ±±± !±P£E± 9£ Jefferson
Davis  and  the  Confederacy  With  an  introduction  by  Allan  Nevins,   Vol.   1
{ff=TY6E:Thelsea  House  and  R.   Hector,1966),   p.  XXV.
42Maurice,   p.   17.
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with  the  potentialities  of  a  grand  future  seems  to  be  the  more  correct
Viewpoint.43
During  the  war,   Secretary  of  Navy  Mallory  maintained  a
vigorous  southern  and  national  sentiment.     He  saw  the  Confederacy  not
as  a  league  of  mutually  exclusive  states  but  as  a  whole.44    His
devotion  to  the  cause  of  the  Confederacy  can  be  seen  in  a  letter  he
wrote  to  the  Governor  of  Florida,  John  Milton,   in  November  of   1861.
Strange  as  it  may  sound  to  us,   the  Republicans  and
even  the  Democrats  in  the  North  are  still  dreaming  of  a
'reconstruction  of  the  Union'   and  hug  themselves  with
the  belief  that  we  would  consent  to  a  connection  with
them.     I  trust  that  those  among  us,   and  there  are  many
here,  who  entertain  such  a  dream will  soon  awake  to  its
utter  unreality.     Upon  no  terms,   and  under  no  circumstances
should  we  consent  again  to  go  into  any  Union  with  them;
and  if  we  can  silence  grumblers  for  eighteen  months  more,
there  will  not  be  found  one  man  in  one  thousand  among  us
who  will  not  feel  degraded  by  the  proposition.     We  are  a
purer,  nobler,  braver  and  better  people  in  all  respects
than  they  can  ever  become  so  long  as  the  Puritan  blood  f lows
in  their  veins,  and  I  know  as  well  as  I  can  know  anythigg
in  the  future  that  all  mankind  will  so  acknowledge  us.
With  his  cosmopolitan  background  and  wide  experience,   Benjamin
was  able  to  view  the  war  and  the  problems  of   the  Confederacy  with  a
broad  perspective.     He  was  a  Southern  nationalist  and  could  see
beyond  his  beloved  Louisiana;  he  was  capable  of  thinking  in  terms  of
the  South  as  a  whole.46    The  patriotism  of  Benjamin,  while  he  was
serving  on  the  cabinet,  was  attacked,  but  it  seems  unjust  to  deny  that
43Richardson,   I,  !±± !£S±£±8± ±E± ±±P£=± 9£
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44Hendricks,   p.   363.
45Durkin,   p.   184.
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his  patriotism was  genuine  or  that  he  gave  his  best  sincerely  and  in
his  way  unselfishly  to  what  he  felt  to  be  his  country.     However,  he
has  been  criticized  for  not  maintaining  relations  with  Jef ferson  Davis
af ter  the  war  nor  did  he  utter  any  regrets  af ter  the  defeat  of  the
Confederacy.     Thus  some  historians  are  inclined  to  believe  that
nothing  with  him went'  deep.     Perhaps  he  thought  it  better  to  let
sleeping  dogs   lie;  Davis, however, always  considered  Benjamin  a  close
friend  and  a  loyal  Southerner.     In  his  philosophy  of  life,   it  was  not
in  him  to  look  back  and  complain;   rather,  he  looked  to  the  future.
It  would  be  fair  to  say  that  Benjamin  and  Mallory  were  quite
sincere  and  very  hard  working  for  the  Confederacy,   and  few  men
believed  in  this  cause  quite  so  devotedly  as  Davis.     But  with  Stephens,
one  faces  a  dilemma.     Perhaps  he  was  one  of   those  many  seemingly  loyal
Confederates  who,   Kenneth  M.   Stampp  suggests,   not  only  lacked  a  deep
commitment  to  the  southern  cause  but  even  desired  unconsciously  to
lose  the  war.47    This  possibility  is  not  to  be  laughed  at,as  Stampp
has   so  ably  suggested.     Secession,   for  Stephens,  was  a  last  resort.
He  also  quickly  accepted  the  abolition  of  slavery  which  may  have
shown  the  guilt,  or  more  probably  the  contradiction  he  sensed  in  the
South's  possessing  the  institution  of  slavery.     Finally,  he  never
urged  the  people  of  his  own  state  to  resist  by  guerilla warfare  the
invading  Union  troops.     On  the  contrary,  he  believed  that  Georgia
should  get  out  of  the  Confederacy  if  it  so  benef itfed  her.     In  the
study  of  human  behavior,   one  frequently  encounters  cases  of  persons
47Kenneth  M.   Stampp,   "The   Southern  Road   to  Appromattox,"  E±±
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involved  in  conf licts  which  outwardly  they  seem  to  be  striving  to  win,
when,   for  reasons  of  which  they  are  hardly  conscious,   they  are  in
fact  inviting  defeat.48    Alexander  H.   Stephens  may  have  very  well
been  one  of   these  persons.
In  the  six  months   that  followed  his  election  as  Vice 4President,
Stephens  made  no  fewer  than  forty-two  speeches  in  Alabama,  Georgia,
Virginia,  and  the  Carolinas.     In  these  speeches,  he  pleaded  for
unanimity  among  the  people.     However,   during  the    critical  years  of
the  war,  he  did  not  choose  to  undertake  extensive  speaking  tours  which
might  have  wielded  great  imf luence  in  informing  Southern  opinion  and
rallying  Southern  patriotism.49    This  point  is  surprising  in  the  light
of  the  importance  which  Stephens  attached  to  public  speaking  from  an
historical  point  of  view.     Stephens  applauded  publication  Of   speeches
and  acclaimed  the  printing  press  for  making  it  possible.     He  corrmented
that  if  such  means  of  publication  had  existed  in  the  past  in  England,
it  would  have  made  it  possible  to  record  the  earlier  speeches  in
Parliament.     The  first  speech  ever  published,   according  to  Stephens,
was  a  speech  by  Dr.   Samuel  Johnson  in  1740.     Stephens  was  aware  of
the  history  of  the  speech  and  its  historical  importance.50    Thus
Stephens  was  aware  of   the  signif icance  of  publishing  speeches  when
they  were  made.     His  historical  mind  dreamed  of  reading  speeches   that
had  been  made  throughout  all  of  history.     He  also  had  a  great
48cou|ter,   p.   17.
49Rabun,   pp.   294-95.
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historical  awareness  of  orators  throughout  history,  and  of  their
important  role  in  shaping  history.     Stephens  spoke  of  orators  who  not
only  moved  masses  but  impressed  their  ideas  upon  the  world,men,   such
as  Massilon,   Bossuet,  1thitfield,   and  Wesley,   and  those  who  controlled
the  destines  o.f  nations  among  whom  he  listed  Demosthenes,   Cicero,
Pericles,   Mirabeau,   Chatham,   Burke,   Patrick  Henry,  Webster,   Clay,
Calhoun,   and  Rufus  Choate.     For  Stephens,   these  were  the  men  who
shaped  society  and  with  whom  Stephens  wanted  to  be  identified.51
Despite  his  belief  in  the  value  of  publicity,  however,   Stephens  made
no  extensive  speaking  tours  during  the  war  years.     Davis,  who  also
favored  publication  and  distribution  of  public  speeches,   expressed
the  wish  that  the  Conf ederacy  could  be  as  eff icient  as  England  in  the
distribution  of  public  speeches.52    Both  men,   perceptive  to  the
imf luence  of  public  opinion,   realized  the  advantages  of  a  well  informed
public.     This  realization  was  based  on  their  world-minded  historical
knowledge.     Davis,   like  Stephens,   also  did  not  make  any  extensive
tours  of   the  South.     He  did  not  believe  that  the  people  needed  to  be
informed  as  he  was  convinced  that  they  would  trust  him.     The  absence
of  a  two-party  system  and  the  lack  of  a  presidential  election  did  not
necessitate  these  speech-making  trips  through  the  South.     In  the  light
of  these  facts,  plus  Davis'   ill-health,  it  is  easier  to  understand
why  Davis  did  not  show  himself  much  in  public.     Neither  Benjamin  nor
Mallory  made  such  tours  through  the  South;   in  fact,   their  presence
5£Cleveland,   p.   655,   Jam.   21,   1861.
52Row|and,   |V,   p.   194,   Feb.   15,   1860.
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in  the  cabinet  may  have  hindered  the  formation  of  a  nationalistic
attitude  by  the  people,  as  many  individuals,   especially  opponents  of
Davis,   could  not  stomach  those   two  men.
Stephens  believed  that  Georgia,   if  she  left  the  Confederacy  and
made  peace  with  the  Union,  would  be  justif led  in  withdrawing  and  would
comit  no  breach  of  faith  with  her  sister-states  in  doing  so. 53
However,   Davis,   Benjamin,   and  Mallory  never  accepted  such  thinking.
It  was  Davis'   conviction  that  the  experience  of  humanity  showed  that
mankind  had  generally  been  far  better  off  when  organized  in  great
States  than  when  cut  up  into  numerous  feeble  divisions.54    This
obvious  truth  for  Davis  was  not  of ten  shared  by  many  state  governors
as   they  tried  to  make  a  separate  defense  against  the  enemy.55    The
idea  of  this   local-defense  system  was  also  discouraging  to  Benjamin.56
All   three  of   these  men,  Davis,   Benjamin,   and  Mallory  recognized  that
all  these  Confederate  states  must  work  together  or  the  cause  could
not  succeed.     Davis  expressed  it  in  this  manner,   "The  States  of  the
Con.federacy  can  have  but  one  fortune.     Localities  and  individuals  must
suffer  differently,  but  the  prize  for  which  we  strive--independence--
must  be  gained  by  all  or  we  must  all  share  a  fate  which  to  every  man
fit  to  be  a  freeman,  would  be  worse  than  torture  and  death."57
53Rabun,   p.   312.
54Eckenrode,   p.   116.
55g.i.4.,   Ser.   IV,   Vol.I,   p.   795,   Dec.14,1861.
56E±±g.,   Ser.   I,   Vol.   VI,   p.   763,   Nov.   4,1861.
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Even  though  Davis  seldom  generalized  about  how  the  Confederacy
could  win  the  war,   the  paramount  thought  in  his  mind  was  freedom  and
independence.     Af ter  the  evacuation  of  Richmond,   Davis   told  the
people  of   the  South,   "It  is  my  purpose  to  maintain  your  cause  with  my
whole  heart  and  soul   .   .   .   I  will  never  consent  to  abandon  to  the
enemy  one  foot  of  the  soil  of  any  one  of  the  States  of   the  Confederacy."58
In  a  letter  to  R.  M.  Johnson  he  stated  that  freedom  and  independence
were  worth  whatever  it  might  cost,  whether  it  was  in  the  form  of  blood
or  treasures.     Even  if  the  children  were  left  poor,   they  would  be  left
With  a  better  heritage  than  wealth.59
Davis  was  very  critical  of  the  malcontents  who  tried  to  create
a  feeling  of  hostility  to  the  government  and  the  execution  of  the
vigorous  laws  which  were  necessary  to  raise  and  feed  the  armies.     These
malcontents,  by  magnifying  every  reserve  and  prophesying  ruin,  Davis
believed,  had  sown  the  seeds  of  disintegration.     He  attacked  the  men
of  the  old  Federal  school  who  invoked  the  laws  of  states'   rights  to
sustain  a  policy  which,   in  proportion  to  the  extent  of  its  adoption,
tended  to  destroy  the  existence  of  the  states  of  the  Confederacy  and
make   them  conquered  provinces.60    Thus  Davis  was  not  one  of   those
Southerners  who  secretly  or  unknowingly  wished  failure  for  the
Confederacy.     He  was  always  against  separate  state  action,  whether  it
be  for  fighting  the  war  or  suing  for  peace.61    In  these  respects,
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Davis  differed  sharply  from  Stephens  and  these  differences  helped
increase  the  breach  between  the  two  highest  Confederate  leaders.     Both
Benjamin  and  Mallory  were  firm  believers  in  united  action  by  the
Confederate  government.     Even  when  the  Confederacy  had  been  defeated,
they  urged  the  President  to  lead  the  South  in  accepting  peace,   thus:
doing  away  with  separate  state  action. 62
The  minds  of  Davis,   Benjamin,   and  Mallory  did  have  an  inter-
national  flavor  as  they  all  recognized  the  importance  of  foreign  powers.
Nevertheless  they  did  not  realize,  as  clearly  as  Lincoln  did,   that
favors  and  disfavors  of  foreign  nations  could  have  an  important
influence  on  enlarging  and  prolonging  the  war.63    This  can  be  seen  in
the  fact  that  all  of  these  men,  with  the  exception  of  Stephens,   expected
foreign  recognition  early  in  the  war,   and  were  somewhat  surprised  when
they  failed  to  gain  recognition.     Benjamin,  with  his  past  connections
and  with  his  wife  living  in  France  during  this  time,64  had  the  best
understanding  of  current  affairs  and  ideas  in  the  European  nations.
He  was  the  f irst  to  realize  how  important  slavery  was  to  these
countries.     He  realized  that  the  abolition  of  this  institution  would
prove  more  valuable  than  any  other  diplomacy.65    As  Lincoln  looked
upon  the  struggle  as  a  struggle  for  democracy,   he  realized  and  used
to  advantage  the  fact  that  other  countries  might  look  on  the  struggle
in  the  light  of  a  war  for  slavery.     But  Davis  and  the  other  Southern
62EEig.,   Vol.   XLVII,   pt.   3,   pp.   832-34,   April   22,1865.
63±±±±.,   ser.   |v,   vo|.   Ill,   p.   826,   November  17,1864.
64Charles  Curran,   "The  Three  Lives  of  Judah  P.   Benjamin,"
History  E9±,  XVII   (London:     Bracken  House,1967),   p.   589.
65g.i.A.,   ser.   |V,   Vol.Ill,   p.   959,   Dec'ember   21,1864.
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leaders  never  tried  to  portray  the  Struggle  as  a  struggle  for  slavery
which  might  have  gained  the  support  of  other  nations  still  practicing
slavery,  particularly  Brazil.     In  this  sense,   the  South  was  caught  in
a  dilerlma  and  the  Southern  leaders  never  developed  an  international
consciousness  nor  could  they  ever  take  quite  as  world-minded  a  view
as  Lincoln.
Europe  was  essential  to  the  success  of  this  new  nation,   for  the
Confederacy,   being  mainly  an  agricultural  nation,  needed  the  manufactured
goods,   ships,  medical   supplies,   and  arrmunition  which  Europe  could  pro-
vide  for  her.    Without  the  aid  of  France  and  Great  Britain,   the
Confederacy  would  be  hard  pressed  to  f ight  the  kind  of  war  its  more
mechanized  northern  adversary  could  be  expected  to  wage.     Not  every-
body  in  the  Confederacy  knew  the  South's  acute  need  for  assistance,
but  its  leaders  did  realize  this  fact  as  they  strove  to  help  the
Confederacy  win  the  war.66     However,  Davis  failed  to  offer  enough
inducements   to  Europe,   as  his  whole-hearted  Americanism  prevented
his  wanting  independence  .from  the  North  at  the  price  of  dependence  on
Europe.     Davis  could  not  and  would  not  take  this  great  gamble,67  but
even  if  he  had  attempted  to  do  so,   it  would  be  doubtful  that  Great
Britain  or  France  would  have  changed  their  roles  in  the  war.
Davis  expected  to  get  Europe  to  recognize  his  government  and  to
receive  its  ambassadors  on  grounds  of  international  duty.68    He  also
believed  that  the  commercial  rivalry  between  the  United  States  and
66stem,   p.   13.
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Great  Britain  would  lead  the  latter  to  recognize  the  Confederacy,   if
not  actually  to  intervene.69    In  addition,  he  hoped  that  sentiment
would  lead  the  British  people  to  align  themselves  with  the  Confederacy
as  he  was  aware  that  Britain  had  long  felt  sympathy  for  small  people
battling  for  freedom.     Another  factor  he  believed  would  be  favorable
to  the  Confederacy  was  the  dislike  o'f  conservative-aristocratic
British  people  for  the  bumptious  democracy  of   the  North.70    However,
Davis  underestimated  the  force  of  European,   especially  British,
antipathy  to  slavery.    No  evidence  of  a  desire  to  placate  the  British
sensitivity  on  this  subject  appeared  in  Davis'   state  papers.71    In
fact,  as  late  as  1865,  he  argued  that  the  obstacle  to  the  recognition
of  the  Confederacy  was  an  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  the  European
nations  to  be  embroiled  in  a  quarrel  with  the  United  States.     "If
slavery  or  any  other  cause  had  been  the  impediment,  our  advances  to
European  governments  would  have  led  to  the  disclosure  of  their  reasons
for  not  acknowledging  our  independence."72
Davis  felt  that  since  France  and  Great  Britain  had  had  treaties
with  separate  states  such  as  Virginia,   these  countries  were  obligated
to  recognize  the  Confederacy.     Recognition  was  a  public  duty,   despite
the  fact  that  these  treaties  which  France  and  Great  Britain  had  signed
with  Virginia  in  the  eighteenth  century  and  which  had  remained
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unquestioned  for  nearly  three  generations,  were  being  disregarded  by
France  and  Great  Britain  during  the  Civil  War  years.73    The  disregard
of  this  just,  human,   and  Christian  public  duty  by  the  nations  of
Europe,  Davis  felt,  was  most  remarkable  considering  the  fact  that  the
goverrmients  of  both  France  and  England  believed,   in  the  earlier  part
of   the  war,   that  the  United  States  was  unable  to  conquer  the  Con-
federacy.74    It  was  Davis'   conviction  that  when  the  history  of  the  war
should  be  fully  disclosed,   the  calm  judgment  of  impartial  historians
would  be  unable  to  absolve  the  neutral  nations  of  Europe  from  a  share
'in  the  moral  responsibility  for  the  human  lives  that  had  been
unnecessarily  sacrificed  during  its  progress. 75
It  was  Benjamin's  belief  that  the  heat  of  popular  passion  which
controlled  public  policy  in  the  Northern  goverrment  would  not  permit
the  Northern  rulers  to  entertain  for  a  moment  the  idea  of  separation
"so  long  as  foreign  nations  tacitly  assert  the  belief  that  it  is  in
the  power  of  the  United  States  to  subjugate  the  South."76     |n  this  way,
Benjamin  similarly  held  the  European  nations  partly  responsible  for
the  continuance  of  the  war.
In  Davis'  mind,   it  was  and  had  long  been  the  proper  functions
and  duty  of  neutral  powers  to  judge  whether  a  nation  could  conquer
another  nation.     If  not,   the  neutral  powers  were  obligated  to  recognize
the  resisting  nation.     This  recognition  was  a  human  and  Christian  duty
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of  the  nations  of  Europe  and  it  was  most  remarkable  to  Davis  that
these  foreign  nations  disregarded  this  duty.77    At  the  same  time,
Davis  felt  and  hoped  that  the  blockade  would  make  the  South  more  self -
supporting,   independent  and  more  united.78    Benjamin  also  believed
the  blockade  would  have  the  ef feet  of  making  the  South  more  self -
sustaining  as  it  was  forced  to  provide  for  itself.79     So,   even  under
difficult  circumstances,   these  men  kept  their  nationalistic  attitudes
when  dealing  with  foreign  nations.
When  the  war  broke  out,   Stephens  believed  that  the  European
countries  would  rejoice  to  see  professed  republicans  cutting  each
others'   throats  and  to  see  the  failure,  as  they  viewed  it,  of  the
great  experiment  of  self  goverrment  on  the  North  American  continent.80
Hence,   Stephens  was  very  doubtful  as   to  whether  any  European  country
would  intervene  in  the  war.     Furthermore,  he  was  convinced  that  the
greatest  hope  of  recognition  would  lie  with  France  as  he  believed
Napoleon  Ill  could  most  easily  be  persuaded  by  a  favorable  economic
treaty'81
0n  their  parts  Mallory  wrote  to  John  Milton,   the  governor  of
Florida,   that  he  was  looking  confidently  for  a  speedy  recognition
of   the  Confederacy  by  the  great  powers  of  Europe,82    while  Benjamin
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expressed  surprise  when  recognition  did  not  come  to   the  Confederacy.83
Indeed  by  the  beginning  of   1863,   Benjamin  realized  that  the  European
nations  would  not  recognize  the  Confederate  goverrment,  although  he
never  gave  up  hope.     He  believed  fear  of  war  with  the  United  States
was  their  dominant  if  not  sole  guide  to  their  policy  which  was
opposed  to,  what  he  understood  to  be,   their  clearest  dictates  of
policy.84    Benjamin  continued  to  believe  that  recognition  of  the
Confederacy  by  the  great  powers  of  Europe  would  quickly  end  the  war.
Davis  emphasized  the  fact  that  the  Confederacy  only  wanted  recognition,
not  intervention,   as  so  many  European  nations  seemed  to  think.     The
view  of   these  European  countries  was  surprising  to  Benjamin  as  he
understood  that  history  was  full  of  recognition  unaccompanied  by  any
intervention  or  mediation,  and  productive,   if  there  was  no  further
manifestation  of  resentment  on  the  part  of  the  nation  seeking  the
subjugation  of  the  other  country  than  an  empty  protest  or  remonstrance.
He  felt  that  if  recognition  did  not  come  early  in  the  war  the  South
should  feel  entitled,   like  Napoleon  I,   "to  refuse  an  express  recog-
nition  on  the  grounds  of  its  implying  a  doubt  of  the  pre-existence  of
a  self-evident  fact."86    He  stated  that  Napoleon  Ill,  by  his  hesitating
policy  unprecedented  in  his  career,  was  quickly  losing  the  chance  of
binding  the  interest  of  France  to  the  interest  of  the  Confederacy.
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Benjamin  realized  the  importance  of  propaganda  and  of  educating
the  people  in  Europe.88    For  example,   the  Secretary  of  State,   although
limited  by  funds,   shared  French  propagandist  Paul  du  Bellet's  view  on
the  necessity  of  creating  in  France  a  journal  for  the  purpose  of
enlightening  public  opinion  about  the  South  and  defending  the  interest
of   the  Confederacy.89    He  also  wanted  England  informed.     In  a  letter
to  Henry  Hotze,   he  wrote,   "Your  position  as  corrmercial  agent  was
conferred  principally  with  the  view  of  rendering  effective  your  service
in  using  the  press  of  Great  Britain  in  aid  of  our  cause,   and  until
our  recognition,   all  other  subjects  must  be  made  subordinate  to  that
end."90    Thus,   Benjamin  was  aware  of   the  use  and  importance  of
propaganda.     In  this  sense,   he  was  more  modern  minded  and  had  a  more
resourceful  approach  than  the  other  members  of  his  cabinet.     Not  only
did  he  try  legal  arguments  based  on  historical  facts,  and  even  a
form  of  bribery  to  the  Emperor  of  France,  he  also  attempted  to
utilize  Europe's  fear  of  the  United  States  to  the  benefit  of  the
Confederacy.     He  argued  that,   in  reality,   the  Confederacy  was  fighting
the  battle  of  France  and  England.     The  sentiments  of  the  people  of
the  United  States  toward  these  countries,  he  said,  had  been  known
far  too  long  to  permit  a  doubt  of   the  aggressive  policy  which  would
be  pursued  by  the  Northern  government  on  the  f irst  favorable  occasion.
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Thus,   in  regard  to  the  French  intervention  in  Mexico,  he  accused  the
French  people  of  being  very  ignorant  if  they  thought  the  United
States  would  not  uphold  the  Monroe  Doctrine.92    Mallory  also  accused
the  French  people  of  being  very  ignorant  of  the  United  States'
purpose   in  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     He  said  the  French  people  would
soon  learn,  after  the  war,   that  whatever  doubts  New  England  might
entertain  of  the  divinity  of  Christ  or  the  irmortality  of  the  soul,
she  would  have  no  hesitation  about  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     No  man  nor
party,  he  said,   could  reach  power  in  the  United  States  whose  platform
did  not  uphold  this  policy  as  a  fundamental  truth.93    Benjamin  warned
that  if  the  United  States  was  successful  in  their  war  against  the
South,  France  would  become  involved  in  a  war  with  the  United  States
government  over  Mexico.     Benjamin  argued,   in  addition,   that  there  was
even  more  venomous  hostility  toward  Great  Britain  in  the  North.     The
insulting  letter  of  Mr.  Webb  to  the  Brazilan  Cabinet,   the  rancor  of
Mr.   Seward's  response  to  Lord  Wharncliffe,   the  debates  of  Congress
on  the  reciprocity  treaty  with  Canada,   the  arrogant  boastings  of  the
press  which  represented  the  Republican  party--all  pointed,   Benjamin
insisted,   to  the  existence  of  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  United
States  to  engage  in  a  war  with  England,  a  desire  repressed  solely  by
the  necessity  of  concentrating  their  energies  on  the  war  against  the
South.94    Benjamin  believed  that  no  future  event  on  earth  was  more
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certain  than  an  early  and  bitter  war  between  the  United  States  and
Great  Britain.95
Throughout  the  war,   Benjamin  was  convinced  that  the  interests  of
Great  Britain  and  France  really  conflicted.96    By  offering  each
Country,   especially  France,   certain  trade  benefits  as  well  as  cotton,97
Benjamin  hoped  to  drive  a  wedge  between  the  two  countries   in  the  hope
that  one  would  act  independently  of  the  other.     Benjamin  also  planned
to  create  and  stimulate  large  material  interests  in  the  Confederacy
among  the  merchants  of  Great  Britain  and  France.     In  this  attempt  he
had  partial  success,   but  his  hope  that  the  merchants  would  force
their  government  to  demand  peace  for  a  short  time  or  to  actually  aid
the  Confederates  proved  unfounded  as  he  overestimated  the  power  of
the  merchants. 98
Stephens  believed  that  the  Confederacy  had  one  element  of
tremendous  power  which  was  a  power  and  resource  unknown  in  European
wars  and  unknown  to  his  ancestors  in  the  Revolution.     This  resource
and  power  which  Stephens  alluded  to  was  cotton.     Cotton,  he  maintained,
was  one  of  the  greatest  elements  of  power,   possibly  the  greatest  at
the  command  of  the  South,   and  if  it  were  properly  and  efficiently  used
it  would  be  the  greatest  power  at  the  co[rmand  of   the  South.99    Hence,
one  can  see,   that  Stephens  was  a  victim  of  the  King  Cotton  theory.
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In  a  Biblical  allegory,   Stephens  made  his  position  even    clearer.
"Samson's  strength  was  in  his  locks.     Our  strength  is  our  locks--not
of  hair  or  wool,   but  in  our  locks  of  cotton."loo    Stephens  thought
that  any  acts  to  coerce  England  to  recognize  the  Conf ederacy  were  a
radical  and  fundamental  error, as  England  would  never  be  controlled  by
such  a  policy.     He  accepted  'the  idea  that  all  cotton  should  be  burned
or  destroyed  rather  than  to  let  it  fall  into  the  enemy's  hand.    For
I him,   this  was  the  only  acceptable  reason  for  its  destruction.
Stephens  knew  that  Lord  Palmerston  would  be  pleased  if   the  South
burned  all  its  cotton  or  failed  to  grow  any  for  twenty  years  as  the
power  of  cotton  was  well  known  to  and  felt  by  British  statesmen.
These  states  "know  it  is  King  in  its  proper  sphere,  and  hence  they
want  the  scepter  of  this  King  for  their  own  use."101
This  reliance  upon  the  economic  magic  of  cotton  was  a  funda-
mental  factor  in  Southern  diplomacy.     This  belief  or  delusion  was  held
to  be  true  by  most  of   the  men  who  were  to  guide  the  South  in  the  war.£°2
Jefferson  Davis,  himself ,   believed  cotton  was  king  and  would  remain
king.    At  the  beginning  of  the  war,   it  was  his  unwavering  conviction
that  if  England  could  not  get  cotton  she  would,   in  less  than  six
months,  be  starved  into  subjection.    When  the  North  first  started  the
blockade  of  the  South,  Davis  believed  that  England  must  raise  the
blockade  to  preserve  her  internal  peace,   if  not  prevent  revolution.
After  Davis'   death  Mrs.  Davis  testified  that  her  husband  and  his
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advisors  felt  the  power  of  cotton  was  so  great  that  foreign  recognition
was   looked  forward  to  as  an  assumed  fact.     They  looked  to  the  stringency
of  the  English  cotton  market  and  the  suspension  of  the  manufactories
to  send  up  a  ground  swell  from  the  English  industries   that  would  compel
recognition.103    Benjamin  believed  that  when  England  needed  cotton
badly  enough,   "all  the  coyness  about  acknowledging  a  slave  power  will
come  right  at  last."104    Thus  Davis,   Benjamin,   and  Mallory  all  agreed
that  foreign  recognition  would  be  soon  in  coming  and  that  it  would
result  in  European  needs  for  the  great  Southern  crop.
When  the  war  began,   Benjamin  urged  the  goverrment  to   take  some
type  of  positive  action  in  connection  with  cotton.     Vice  President
Stephens  also  had  a  clef inite  plan  to  use  the  cotton.     Neither  of  their
plans  w:as    practical.     Both  men  were  right,  however,   in  believing  that
the  Confederacy  should  ship  as  much  cotton  as  possible  to  Europe  before
the  blockade  became  effective.     If  this  had  been  done,   cotton  could
have  become  a  valuable  asset  instead  of  a liability.105
The  cormissioner  to  England,  William  L.   Yancey,   found  that
Davis  did  not  favor  the  policy  of  negotiating  commercial  treaties,  but
expected  to  base  his  diplomacy  on  the  importance  of  the  cotton  crop
and  the  legality  of  secession.106    Davis  was  convinced  that  the  whole
commercial  world  had  an  interest  scarcely  less  than  the  Confederacy
in  the  South's  exportation  of  cotton.     This  corrmon  interest  of  producer
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and  consumer  could  only  be  interrupted  by  some  exterior  force,   such
as  a  blockade.     Such  a  force  would  obstruct  the  transmission  of
Southern  staples   to  foreign  markets,   a  cause  of  conduct  which  would
be  as  unjust,   as  it  would  be  detrimental  to  manufacturing  and
commercial   interests  abroad.107
One  can  see  that  the  Conf ederate  leaders  placed  a  great  deal  of
trust  in  the  power  of  cotton.     Most  Southerners  ignored,   as  powerful
forces  as  they  may  have  been,   the  effect  of  Northern  wheat  and  the
anti-slavery  feeling  in  England  and  France.     By  this  misreading  and
misunderstanding  of  world  opinion,   the  South's  foreign  policy  was
destined  to  fail.     Believing  in  the  soundness  of  the  cotton  theory,
the  Conf ederacy  tried  to  coerce  European  powers  into  recognition.
The  Embargo  Act,  however,   quickly  proved  a  failure.     Benjamin  was
probably  in  favor  of   the  embargo.108  while  Davis  seemed  to  realize
that  it  would  not  be  good  diplomacy  to  even  allow  the  enactment  of  a
law  placing  an  embargo  upon  cotton.109    After  this  failure,   the  Con-
federacy  tried  such  desperate  means  as  burning  the  cotton  crop. 110
However,   it  is  impossible  to  tell  how  much  the  idea  of  burning  cotton
to  force  recognition  imf luenced  Davis  or  Benjamin.     Both  men  were  equally,
if  not  more,   concerned  with  keeping  the  cotton  crop  or  any  other  crop
from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  North.111
107owsley.  EL Cotton
£°8ERE.,   p.   43.
109EEi£.,   p.   3o.
iloEnI.,  p.  43.
111But|er,   p.   287.
Diplomacy,   p.   35.
86
The  great  error  of   those  who  supposed  that  King  Cotton  would
compel  the  English  ministry  to  recognize  the  Conf ederate  Goverrment
and  raise  the  blockade,   and  those  who  would  look  for  the  same  result
from  the  total  abandonment  of  its  culture  (cotton),   Stephens  said,
consisted  in  mistaking  the  nature  of  this  potentate.     Its  power  was
commercial  and  financial  not  political.     To  stimulate  the  production
of  cotton  in  the  English  dominions  was  one  of  the  leading  objects  of
English  statesmen.     This   they  could  not  do  to  any  extent  while  their
inexperienced  producers  had  to  compete  with  the  South.     While  improve-
ments  in  agriculture  were  slower  in  their  progress  than  in  any  other
department  of  life,   cotton  might  someday  be  grown  as  cheaply  in
England's  East  India  possessions  as  it  was  in  the  South.     However,
Stephens  believed  that  "there  is  nothing  within  the  bounds  of  human
knowledge  on  which  reliance  can  be  placed  with  such  certainty  as  to
result,   as  upon  the  law  of  nature."112    Thus  he  saw  the  South  having
one  distinct  advantage  over  the  other  countries  producing  cotton,  not
in  climate  nor  soil,   but  in  the  South's  system  of  labor.113    Even
though  cotton  was  very  important  to  Stephens,  he  urged  the  farmers  and
planters  to  plant  larger  grain  crops  in  order  to  feed  the  troops  and
maintain  the  cause.     So  duty  and  patriotism,   as  well  as  necessity  due
to  the  blockade,   required  the  South  to  curtail  its  cotton  production.114
Stephens  believed  that  cotton  could  be  used  in  breaking  up  the
blockade.     It  was  his  early  belief  that  the  North  would  inf lict  more




serious  injury  on  the  Confederacy  by  the  blockade  than  by  all  other
means  combined.     Unlike  Davis,   he  never  believed  that  such  was   the
demand  for  cotton  in  England,   that  she  would  disregard  the  blockade.
Both  leaders  saw  the  blockade  as  being  illegal  as  it  never  came  within
the  bounds  of  the  Paris  agreement,   but  Stephens  insisted  that  the
Confederacy,   itself ,  would  have  to  lift  the  blockade.     This,  he  said
could  be  done  through  the  agency  of  cotton,  not  as  political  power,
but  as  a  commercial  and  f inancial  power. 115
By  1863,   Benjamin  broke  sharply  away  from  the  King  Cotton
doctrine.     He  asserted  that  it  was  a  matter  of  primary  importance  to
bring  in  army  supplies  at  the  Confederate  ports  and  proposed  a  clef inite
export  of  cotton  to  be  received  by  the  merchant  vessels  of  France  at
certain  designated  points.116    Benjamin  first  had  the  idea  of  using
cotton  as  a  pledge  for  security  for  debts  of  the  Confederacy. 117
However,   it  was  Secretary  of  Navy,  Mallory,  who  first  passed  beyond
the  stage  of  vague  inquiry  and  took  clef inite  steps  to  pledge  cotton
in  exchange  for  equipment  when  he  sent  G.   N.   Sanders   to  Europe  with
orders   to  use  cotton  bonds  for  money.118     Since  the  Treasury  Department
was  unable  to  supply  the  money  appropriated  by  Congress  'for  the  navy,
to  be  used  abroad,   the  use  of  cotton  certificates,  where  cotton  would
be  delivered  within  a  stated  time  after  the  war,  was  the  only  way
Mallory  could  buy  foreign  supplies. 119
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As  one  can  see,   there  were  many  different  proposals  for  the  use
of  cotton,  but  practically  all  were  doomed  at  the  onset.     In  this
sense,   the  Confederacy  was  a  victim  of   its  own  delusion--King  Cotton.
Since  the  1820's  many  Southerners  had  begun  to  believe  that  the  world
needed  their  cotton.     By  1850,   Davis  himself  felt  that   the  North  could
not  do  without  the  cotton  of  the  South.     It  seems  that  the  Confederacy
could  never  break  away  from  this  trust  in  cotton,  but  even  if  they  had
gotton  away  from  this  belief  there  was  little  else  they  could  have
done  as  cotton  was   their  most  important  commercial  crop.
After  the  Trent  incident  in  November  of  1861,  where  two  Con-
federate  commissioners,   James  Mason  and  John  Slidell,  were  seized  from
the  British  ship,  Davis  hoped  to  use  this  incident  to  gain  recognition
for  the  Conf ederacy.     In  his  opinion,   the  United  States  had  violated
the  rights  of  embassy  by  seizing  the  cormissioners  while  under  the
protection  and  within  the  dominions  of  a  neutral  nation.    This  right,
he  argued  was  held  sacred  even  among  most  barbarians.     He  attempted
to  show  that  the  corrmissioners  on  the  British  ship  were  just  like  any
private  citizen  on  British  soil.     If  the  conduct  of  the  United  States
were  legal,   then  the  Un`ited  States'   claims  would  be  good  in  the
streets  of  London.     In  actuality,  however,   the  only  way  the  United
States  could  arrest  even  their  own  criminals  would  be  under  the  express
provisions  of  a  treaty.120    In  his  argument,  Davis  tried  to  show  the
danger  and  insult  this  seizure  represented  for  England.    Another
reason  why  Davis  expected  foreign  recognition  was   the  advantage  in
trade  the  South  would  prove  to  be  to   these  countries.     The  Confederacy
£2°9.i.4.,   Ser.   IV,   Vol.I,   p.   736,   Nov.18,1861.
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would  off er  to  manufacturing  nations  the  most  favorable  markets  which
ever  invited  their  corlmerce. 121
Davis,   in  spite  of  all  the  Confederate  setbacks,  was  convinced
that  if   the  European  powers  had  promptly  admitted  the  Confederacy's
right  to  be  treated  like  all  other  independent  nations,   the  moral
effect  alone  would  have  dispelled  the  delusion  under  which  the  United
States  had  persisted  in  its  efforts  to  subjugate  the  Southern  people.
Like  other  Southern  leaders,   including  Benjamin,  Mallory,   and  Stephens,
Davis  believed  that  the  neutrality  of  England  and  France  was  an  actual
decision  against  the  rights  of  the  Confederacy. 122
Benjamin  and  Davis,   in  questioning  the  legality  of  the  United
States'   blockade,  argued  from  a  strong  historical  slant.     They
considered  the  paper  blockade  so  manifestly  a  violation  of  the  law  of
nations  that  it  seemed  incredible  that  it  could  have  been  issued  by
the  President  of   the  United  States.     When  the  European  nations
accepted  the  blockade  as  being  a  real  blockade  to  combat  the  insur-
rections  of  the  rebels,   they  were  again  astonished.123    Davis  stated
that  compared  with  the  monstrous  pretensions  of  the  United  States,
the  blockades  established  by  the  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  and  the
British  Orders  in  Councils,   1806-07,   seemed  mild  in  their  pretense  of
legality.124    Benjamin  and  Davis   saw  the  blockade  as  being  opposed
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to  the  declaration  of  the  maritime  rights  of  neutrals  made  at  Paris  in
1856.t25     Davis  realized  that   the  customary  law  of  nations  was  made  up
of  their  practice  rather  than  their  declarations.     If  such  declarations,
as   that  of  Paris  in  1856,  were  only  to  be  enforced  in  particular
instances  at  the  pleasure  of   those  who  made  them,   then  the  commerce
of  the  world,   instead  of  being  placed  under  the  regulation  of  a
general   law,  would  become  subject  to   the  caprice  of   those  who  execute
or  suspend  it  at  will.     If  such  was  to  be  the  course  of  nations  in
regard  to  this   law,   Davis  warned,   it  would  become  a  rule  for   the  weak
and  not  for  the  strong.126     Benjamin,   as  well  as  Davis,   spent  much  time
in  gathering  information  to  show  the  European  governments   that  the
blockade  was  ineffective.     Lord  Russell,  however,   stated  that  the  mere
escape  of  vessels  through  the  blockade  did  not  invalidate  the  legality
of  the  blockade  provided  a  number  of  ships  were  stationed  at  the
entrance  of  the  port  to  prevent  access  to  it,  or  to  create  an  evident
danger  in  entering  or  leaving  it.     Benjamin  pointed  out  that  this
outmoded  meaning  was  clef ined  in  an  old  treaty  between  England  and
Russia  in  1801,   not  the  Paris  decree  in  1856.127     Throughout  his   legal
arguments,   Benjamin  relied  heavily  on  historical  facts.    When  historical
precedence  did  not  support  his  argument,  he  insisted    "that  Great
Britain's  history,like  that  of  mankind  in  general,  offers  exceptional
instance  of  indefensible  conduct  in  'former  times,'   and  we  may  well
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deny  the  morality  of  violating  recent  engagements  through  clef erence
to  the  evil  precedents  of   the  past."128    For  both  Benjamin  and  Davis,
the  Christian  nations  of  Europe  did  not  act  as  justly  as  might  have
been  expected  on  the  basis  of  their  history  in  performing  the  duties
imposed  by  international  law,  nor  in  fulf illing  the  claims  of
humanity.129    Mallory  was  primarily  concerned  with  the  idea  of  mutual
interest.130    Davis  and  Benjamin  also  believed  that  the  blockade
would  seriously  injure  the  trade  and  manufactures  of   the  United
Kingdom. 131
To  combat  the  injustice  of  the  northern  blockade,  Davis  saw  two
possible  remedies.     One  possibility  would  be  to  retaliate  by  the
declaration  of  a  paper  blockade  of  the  coast  of  the  United  States  and
to  capture  all  neutral  vessels  trading  with  their  ports.     In  so  doing,
the  Confederacy,  Davis  reasoned,  would  but  follow  the  precedents  set
by  Great  Britain  and  France  in  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  and  the
British  Orders  in  Council  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century.
But  this  policy  Davis  was  not  in  favor  of  so  he  would  not  recommend
it.     A  second  measure  would  be  to  ignore  the  declaration  o£  Paris
compact  as  the  North  refused  to  fulfill  the  compact.     But,  Davis
reminded,  war  was  but  temporary  while  peace  should  be  permanent.     The
future  policy  of  the  Confederacy,  Davis  believed,  was   to  uphold  neutral
rights  to  their  full  extent.    The  principles  of  the  declarations  of
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Paris  were  more  just,  more  humane,   and  more  consistent  with  modern
civilization,  Davis  declared,   than  those  belligerent  pretensions
which  great  naval  powers  had  previously  sought  to  introduce  into  the
maritime  code:     "To  forego  our  undeniable  right  to  the  exercise  of
those  pretensions,"  Davis  believed,   "is  a  policy  higher,  worthier  of
us  and  our  cause,   than  to  revoke  our  adherence  to  principles  that
we  approve."132     So,   for  Davis,  his  redress  for  the  Confederacy  would
rest  on  a  returning  sense  of  justice  to  awake  the  people.    Thus  it
would  seem  that  Davis  as  well  as  Stephens,   pictured  themselves  as
being  more  concerned  with  a  sense  of  right  than  were  their  northern
contemporaries.     Davis  seemed  to.  hope  that  history  would  do  justice  to
the  Confederacy  as  well  as  to  himself .    This  same  desire  of  justif ication
is  evidenced  by  Davis'   statement  that  even  if  civil  war  could  not  be
avoided,  he  hoped  and  expected  that  "posterity  will  acquit  us  having
needlessly  engaged  in  it."133    Davis  not  only  had  a  more  historical
view  of  the  world  than  Lincoln  but  also  thought  of  his  actions  in  an
historical  perspective.     He  was  concerned  about  what  future  historians
would  think  of  him  and  the  Conf ederacy.
when  one  considers  the  appointees  of  Davis  to  foreign  positions,
it  would  seem  that  interests  other  than  his  understanding  of  history
and  of  those  nations,  or  a  lack  of  understanding,   influenced  his
decision  in  appointing  his  diplomats  and  commissioners.     Many  of  the
so-called  radicals  before  the  war  were  appointed  to  represent  the
Confederacy  in  other  nations.     Since  this  author  does  believe  that  Davis
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did  possess  a  considerable  amount  of  knowledge  about  these  European
nations,   it  would  thus  seem  that  Davis'   desire  to  get  these  radicals
out  of   the  country  where  they  could  not  hinder  the  war  effort,   and  his
overwhelming  concern  with  the  army,  where  he  usually  appointed  more
moderate  men  and  showed  great  skill  in  his  appointees,   predisposed  him
to  give  only  superficial  thought  to  his  choice  of  foreign  corrmissioners.
The  other  cabinet  members,  as  well  as  the  Vice  President,   did  not  exert
much  influence  over  the  President  in  choosing  his  appointees,   especially
during  the  early  part  of   the  war.     For  example,  William  L.   Yancey,
Pierre  A.  Rost,  andA. mdley Mann  were  extreme  pro-slavery  men  and  eager
secessionists.     In  his  appointment  to  France,  Davis  disregarded  the
fact  that  Henry  Hotze  was  born  in  Germany,   a  fact  that  offended  many
Frenchmen,   including  Paul  P.   du  Bellet.     The  youth  of  the  military
agent,  Major  Huse,  made  a  bad  impression  on  the  French.     His  job  was
one  that  young  active  of f icers  in  France  scorfled  as  being  one  more
bef itting  an  incapacitated  soldier  or  a  person  too  old  for  active
duty.134    Thus,   it  would  seem  that  while  Davis  was  generally  wise  in
making  his  military  appointments,   he  devoted  less  consideration  to
and  less  sagacity  in  his  political  appointees,   and  was  imf luenced  more
by  politics  as  well  as  by  personal  desire  in  choosing  his  foreign
cormissioners.     In  selecting  John  T.   Pickett  as  cormissioner  to  Mexico,
Davis  selected  a  quick  tempered,   sharp  tongued  individual.     Although
Pickett  was  familiar  with  Mexico  where  he  had  been  a  consul  at  Vera  Cruz
for  a  number  of  years,  he  was  more  of  a  so-called  radical  Southerner
than  Davis.     Furthermore,  he  was  no  diplomat.135    Here,   as  on  previous
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occasions,   it  seems   that  Davis  did  not  recognize  what  was  needed  in
order  to  be  a  successful  diplomat.
With  the  occupation  of  Mexico  by  France,   unlike  many  leaders  in
the  North,  Davis  showed  little  concern.     Although  Davis  preferred  his
own  government  and  institutions,  he  felt  that  he  had  little  right  to
contest  the  Mexicans'   right  of  self-government.     If  the  Mexican  people
preferred  a  monarch  to  a  republic,   it  was  the  duty  of  the  Confederacy
to  wish  them  a  sincere  and  friendly  interest  in  their  prosperity.136
0n  January  12,   1865,   the  old  JacksonienDemocrat,   Frances  P.   Blair,
proposed  to  Davis   that,   if  Davis  and  Lincoln  could  obtain  the  benef it
of  an  amnesty,  Davis  should  transfer  a  portion  of  the  Confederate
armies  to  Texas  and  then  to  Mexico  to  help  Juarez  throw  out  the  French
leader  Maximillian.     Davis  approved  the  plan  although  he  was  very
skeptical  of   it.137  Stephens  however  was  enthused  about  the  plan  as
he  believed  it  would  be  a  natural  and  proper  enterprise.     Too,  he  was
convinced  that  Europe  would  never  intervene.     This  plan  gave  the
Confederacy  a  way  to  end  the  war.138    At  a  conference  during  the  same
month,  he  pointed  out  to  President  Lincoln  that  history  was  full  of
examples  of  nations  at  war  laying  aside  a  quarrel  and  co-operating  in
matters  of  mutual  interest.139    To  this  argument,  Lincoln  responded
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that  he  knew  nothing  about  history,   but  if  Stephens  wanted  to  talk
about  historical  subjects  he  could  do  so  with  the  Northern  Secretary
Of   State,   Seward.£4°
Earlier,  by  1863,   Benjamin  had  seen  little  hope  of  action  by
Great  Britain  and  began  to  suspect  Napoleon's  designs  for  Texas.     He
felt  that  the  French  would  try  to  use  Texas  as  a  buffer  state  between
Mexico  and  the  Confederacy  and  make  it  a  colony,   dependent  on  Mexico.
He  was  also  suspicious  that  the  Emperor,   in  accordance  with  the
tradition  of  the  French  policy,  had  secret  designs  on  some  of  the
other  Southern  states.141    He  then  asked  John  Slidell   to  open  communi-
cations  with  Spain  by  suggesting  the  advantage  of  alliance  and  by
offering  to  join  in  a  disclaimer  as  to  designs  on  Cuba.     Benjamin  wrote
that  the  Confederacy  thought  it  particularly  desirable  that  Cuba  remain
a  colonial  possession  o£   Spain.142    He  also  diplomatically  praised  the
extraordinary  development  of  Spanish  power  and  resources.143     However,
one  cannot  fully  trust  diplomatic  correspondence,   as  Benjamin  had,
and  in  all  likelihood  continued  to  have,  a  desire  to  expand  slavery
and  the  Confederacy.     In  any  event,  his  work  failed  to  gain  recognition
for  the  Confederacy.     By  1864,   Davis  was  saying,   "Put  not  your  faith
in  Princes  and  rest  not  your  hopes  on  foreign  nations.     This  war  is
ours;  we  must  fight  it  ourselves."144    The  year  before,   in  1863,   Davis
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had  yielded  to  the  Senate  and  recalled  the  foreign  commissioners  until
the  foreign  nations  would  recognize  the  independence  of  the  Con-
federacy.145    Benjamin,   however,  was  reluctant  to  risk  the  loss  of  any
advantage  that  might  occur  through  a  possible  change  of  attitude  on
the  part  of  the  British  goverrment,   so  he  left  the  decision  up  to  the
corrmissioner  as   to  whether  he  should  obey  irrmediately  or  disregard  the
order  to  withdraw.146     Benjamin  saw  the  current  conditions  of  Europe
as  being  disturbed  with  grave  events  impending  and  a  possibility  of
new  and  unexpected  relations  arising  between  the  European  powers.
He  saw many  disturbing  causes  threatening  the  tranquility  of  Europe
with  a  general  war.     He  seemed  especially  concerned  with  France  and
Austria  and  he  warned  his  cormissioners  to  be  on  the  lookout  for  any
advantage  they  might  find  in  these  countries. 147
There  is  some  evidence  that  Davis,   in  the  final  stages  of  the
war,   entertained  the  idea  of  seeking  support  or  assistance  from  other
slave-holding  countries.     Davis  desired  to  see  a  growth  in  power  and
inf luence  of  any  slave  country.     He  wanted  to  see  all  such  nations  with
this  common  interest  bound  together,   and  armed  with  the  means   to
protect  their  common  interest.     Of  all  the  nations  on  earth,   Davis
believed, there  could  be  no  country  as  deeply  interested  in  the  out-
come  of  the  war  as  Spain.     He  did  not  expect  Spain  to  intervene  in  the
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war  but  he  did  expect  Spain  to  recognize  the  Conf ederacy  and  the  cause
for  which  she  was  fighting.148    In  September  1865,   Benjamin  wrote  to
Mrs.   Davis   that  he  had  been  charged  by  the  President  to  perform
certain  public  duties  in  Nassau  and  Havana,   and  then  to  rejoin  Davis
in  Texas.149    Although  one  can  only  speculate  on  what  Benjamin's
duties  were  to  be,   perhaps   these  men  had  decided  to  conduct  the  war
in  a  more  international  vein  by  trying  to  persuade  certain  countries
which  still  retained  slavery  as  an  institution,   to  help  the  Confederacy.
By  their  historical  knowledge,   the  Confederate  leaders  realized
the  importance  that  the  European  powers  would  have  on  the  outcome  of
the  war.     Unfortunately  they  assumed  that  Europe  would  come  to   their
aid.     Although  from  an  historical  perspective,   they  should  have
expected  Europe  to  come  to  their  aid,   they  failed  to  understand  the
European's  mind  at  that  time,   and  his  disgust  for  slavery.
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CHAPTER   IV
SLAVERY,   WAR,   AND   HISTORY
When  Abraham  Lincoln  issued  his  Emancipation  Proclamation  on
January  1,   1863,   Jefferson  Davis  and  his  Confederate  cohorts  responded
with  harsh  condemnation.     All  four  Confederate  leaders  believed  that
this  act  represented  a  usurpation  of  powers  by  Lincoln.     For  Davis,
this  proclamation  was  a  direct  and  unconstitutional  interference  with
slavery.     Davis  saw  a  broad  moral  distinction  between  the  use  of  slaves
as  soldiers  in  defense  of  their  homes  and  the  incitement  of  Negroes   to
insurrection  against  their  masters.     The  first  example  would  be  justi-
fiable,   if  necessary,  while  the  other  was  iniquitous  and  unworthy  of  a
civilized  people.     He  averred  that  this  judgment  was  insisted  on  by  all
enemies  in  all  the  wars  prior  to  the  war  waged  against  the  South.     He
declared  that  the  North  had  been  loudest  in  its    denunciation  of  such
practices  in  the  two  wars  with  Great  Britain;  while  the  climax  of
atrocity  was  deemed  to  be  reached  only  when  the  English  monarch  was
denounced  as  having  "excited  domestic  insurrection  amongst  us."1    To
Davis  the  incitement  of  slaves  to  insurrection  against  their  masters
was  as  great  an  atrocity  as  the  incitement  of  domestic  insurrection  by
the  English  monarch.     In  the  early  years  of  the  war,  he  could  not
£Rowland,   VI,   p.   396,   Nov.   7,   1864.
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accept  the  necessity  of  using  slaves  as  soldiers  even  when  experience
had  shown  this  necessity  to  be  an  important  factor  in  waging  war.
Yet  by  the  end  of  1864,   Davis  himself  was  considering  such  action.
Both  Davis  and  Judah  Benjamin  understood  that  Lincoln's  emanci-
pation  act  would  have  a  great  impact  abroad;  yet  at  that  time  neither
man  was  willing  to   take  some  responsive  action  which  would  make  the
South  seem  better  in  the  eyes  of  the  European  leaders.     Some  European
countries  had  expected  the  Conf ederacy  to  enter  into  treaties  which
stipulated  against  the  slave  trade.     However,   in  a  secret  message  to
L.   Q.   C.   Lamar,   Confederate  minister   to  Russia   in  1863,   Benjamin,
Secretary  of  State,   issued  orders  that  the  commissioners  were  not  to
enter  into  any  treaty  which  stipulated  against  slave  trade.2    While
this  action  might  have  cushioned  the  armouncement  of  Lincoln's  pro-
clamation,   Benjamin  felt  that  the  Confederacy  could  not  enter  any  such
agreement  as  that  decision  must  be  lef t  up  to  the  individual  states
themselves.3    However,  Lincoln's  declaration  of  freedom  made  the
Confederates  realize  that  they  must  take  some  positive  action  toward
the  emancipation  of  slaves.     Still  their  prior  experiences  with  Negroes
and  their  belief  that  Negroes  were  inferior,  based  upon  their  historical
interpretation,  made  any  similar  action  difficult  to  seriously  consider
and  even  more  difficult  to  put  into  effect.
The  early  experiences  of  these  men  and  their  close  connection
with  slavery  left  a  deep  impression  on  their  minds.     All  of  these  men
2]udah  P.  Benjamin,  ±
C.   Sherman,1863),   p.   6.
African  Slave  Trade
3E±.,   p.   9,  Jan.15,1863.
(Philadelphia:
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owned  slaves  and  thus  they  could  appreciate  the  disastrous   losses
which  would  have  been  brought  through  emancipation  without  compensation
to  the  owner.4    The  years  that  Jefferson  Davis  spent  at  his  plantation
implanted  in  his  mind  two  convictions  which  would  never  leave  him:
first,   that  emancipation  would  not  solve  the  Negro  problem,   and  second,
that  the  only  hope  for  improvement  of   the  Negro   la-y   in  the  slow
process  of  making  him  f it  for  economic  competition  with  his  white
superior.     In  other  words,   he  viewed  sudden  emancipation  as  being  a
destructive  force,  not  only  to  the  Caucasion  race,   but  the  Negro  race
as  well,   as  they  were  unfitted  to  compete  in  white  society.5    Even
though  these  men  pictured  Negroes  as  only  suited  for  being  slaves,
their  minds  could  not  be  regarded  as  full  of  hatred  for  Negroes.
Davis  and  Benjamin  were  both  kind  masters   to  their  slaves,   and  most
Negroes  who  came  into  contact  with  Davis  respected  and  admired  him.
Alexander  Stephens,   and  Mallory  too,  were  kind  and  humane  men  in  their
treatment  of  their  Negro  slaves.
Before  the  war,  Davis,   Stephens,   and  Benjamin  had  definite  ideas
on  Negroes  and  slavery.     However,   on  the  issue  of  slavery,   Stephen
Mallory's  position  was  more  vague.     His  position  on  slavery  was
unpopular  with  many  Southerners.     He  took  no  firm  stand  and,   except
for  unfriendly  remarks  on  John  Brown,   Harriet  Beecher  Stowe,   and
Hinton  Rowan  Helper,   it  is  difficult  to  find  any  other  corrments  of
Mallory  dealing  with  Negroes.6    During  the  war,  he  was  more  interested
4Meade,   p.   63.
5MCE|roy,   p.   41.
6Durkin,   p.   366.
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in  providing  Negro  labor  for  naval  services  than  in  participating  in
arguments  in  regard  to  slavery.7   He  felt  Negroes  would  make  good
workers  as  they  were  used  to  following  orders  and  working  with  their
hands  at  hard  labor.     After  the  war  was  over,  Mallory  did  take  an
optimistic  outlook  on  the  future  of  the  Negro.     He  pointed  out  that
free  Negroes  had  themselves  been  slaveholders  and  real  property
holders  in  Florida  ever  since  the  acquisition  of  the  territory  from
Spain,   and  these  freedmen  had  always  been  regarded  as  good  law-
abiding  people.     Mallory  believed,  at  least  af ter  the  war,   that  God
had  decreed  "not  only  that  the  Negro  should  dwell  amongst  us,   but
also  that  he  should  be  free."8
Both  before  and  during  the  war,   Benjamin  approached  the  subject
of  slavery  with  much  reluctance.     Perhaps  this  reluctance  was  due  to
the  great  difficulties  in  slavery  being  steeped  in  history,   especially
legal  history.     As  early  as  1844,   he  saw  the  problem  of  slavery  as
being  a  problem  that  would  obliterate  all  party  distinctions,  with  the
South  forming  a  single  party.9    He  insisted  that  slavery  existed  under
the  cormon  law  of  the  English  people  and  traced  prevailing  conditions
back  to  English  soil.10    He  stated  that  from  the  time  the  Negro  was
first  known  in  Europe  and  America,   up  to  the  time  that  Lord  Mansfield
made  his  decision  in  the  Sormersett  case,  Negroes  had  never  existed
except  as  slaves.     Although  there  was  no   law  declaring  them  to  be  slaves,
7g.E.A. , Ser.   IV,   Vol.   Ill,   p.   143,   Oct.   25,   1862.
8Durkin,   p.   358.
9Meade,   p.    55.
£°£.£.,   34th  Congress,1st   Session,1st  pt.,1856,   p.1095.
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they  were  so  treated  by  the  common  consent  of  mankind,  not  merely  by
the   tacit  consent  of   the  people  of  England.     Benjamin  showed  that
Negiroes  existed  in  England  and  were  bought  and  sold  in  the  market.
For  example  in  1702,   a  Negro  slave  called  Pompey  complained  because
his  collar  was  not  as  pretty  as  the  collar  of  the  mistress'   dog. 11
Years  earlier  in  the  Senate,   Benjamin  had  declared  that  slavery  was
not  outlawed  under  the  law  of  nations,   but  rather  was  protected  by  the
law  of  nations.     Chief  Justice  Marshall  had  held  this  view,   Benjamin
argued,   as  well  as   the  High  Court  of  Admiralty  of  Great  Britain  and
the  Court  of  Kings  Bench  of  Great  Britain.12
Benjamin's  first  legal  case  of  national  significance  which
occurred  in  1842  was  a  suit  resulting  from  the  mutiny  of  slaves  being
transported  on  the  Brig   j=EfgLe.   13    The  cases  that  grew  out  of  this
kept  him  busy  for  many  years.     In  one  appeal  he  attacked  the  traditional
Southern  contention  that  the  slaves  were  resigned  to  their  lot.     He
argued  that  the  Negroes  were  human  beings  and  were  thus  anxious   to  be
free.     A  slave  was  a  human  being,he  said,  with  feelings,  passions,
and  intellect.     This  passion  and  feeling  might  be  somewhat  different
from  that  of   the  white  man,   and  he  might  be  more  violent  and  dangerous,
due  to   the  circumstance  that  his  mind  was  comparatively  weak  and
unenlightened.     Considering  the  character  of  the  Negro  and  the  condition
he  was  kept  in,   Benjamin  feared  the  Negro  would  be  prone  to  revolt  and
££±±±±.,   36th  Congress,1st  Session,1st  pt.,1860,   p.1095.
£2±±±±.,   34th  Congress,1st  Session,1st  pt.,1856,   p.1094.
13Meade,   p.   40.
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ever  ready  to  gain  his  liberty  where  a  probable  chance  presented  itself .
In'  view  of  this  fact,  Benjamin  insisted  that  police  measures  had  to  be
used  to  keep  the  Negro  in  slavery.14    How  serious   this  argument  can  be
taken  is  debatable.     Was  Benjamin  just  arguing  for  his  clients  or
was  he  speaking  with  his  own  genuine  feeling?     In  any  event,  he  was
opposed  to  any  plans  for  irmediate  emancipation  of  the  Negro. 15
In  the  early  years  of  his  life  Alexander  H.   Stephens  prof essed
that  he  was  no  believer  of  slavery  in  the  abstract.16    However, as  the
attacks  of  the  abolitionists  increased,  his  ideas  on  slavery  hardened.
In  1845  he  confessed  to  have  no  wish  to  see  slavery  extended  to  other
countries.17    At  the  same  time,  he  had  no  desire  to  deprive  the  people
of  any  state  or  territory  of  the  right  of  adopting  such  institutions.
Such  an  action  would  be  entirely  anti-American  and  entirely  at  war  with
the  spirit  of  the  age.18    He  considered  any  attempt  by  Congress  to
restrict  the  legislative  authority  of  a  territory  as  more  odious  than
the  attempt  by  the  British  Parliament  to  tax  the  colonies  which  led  to
the  American  Revolution.19     Stephens'   defense  of  slavery  was  also  along
economic  lines.     He  brought  out  statistics  to  prove  that  slavery  had
L4ERE.,   p.   62.




28th  Congress,   2nd  Session,1st  pt.,1845,   p.189.
33rd  Congress,   2nd  Session,   1855,   p.   57.
£9±±±±.,   32nd  Congress,   2nd   Session,1853,   p.193.
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made  Georgia  more  prosperous,20  yet  he  also  realized  that  the  western
territories  could  not  support  slavery.21    Gradually  Stephens  became
convinced  that  slavery  was  humane  and  right,   and  that  the  Negroes  from
the  jungles  were  better  off  around  southern  homes  than  they  could  ever
be  in  their  native  land.     He  looked  upon  slavery  as  being  conducive
to  progress  in  the  South.     Thus  from  a  mild  advocate  of  slavery,
Stephens  had  evolved  by  1858  into  a  vehement  defender  of  slavery. 22
In  Stephens'   opinion,   the  Negro  was  inferior  to  the  white  man
on  the  basis  of  original  nature  had  made  him  so.         Observation  of
history,  from  the  most  remote  times,   established  this  fact  and  any
attempts  to  make  the  inferior  Negroes  equal  to  the  superior  Whites  was
but  an  ef.fort  to  reverse  the  decrees  of  the  Creator.     Using  a  stereo-
typed  allegory  from  nature,   Stephens  stated  that  "the  Ethiopian  can  no
more  change  his  nature  or  his  skin  than  the  leopard  his  spots."23
Thus,   in  the  South,   Stephens  did  see  a  degraded  caste,  but  he  believed
it  was  a  race  f itted  by  nature  for  its  subordinate  position.    Turning
to  history,   Stephens  wanted  to  see  only  that  the  Negro  was  placed  in
a  subordinate  position  since  he  believed  history  taught  it  unwise  to
subordinate  members  of  the  same  race.     Such  subordination  and  its
resulting  misfortunes  occurred  when  the  helots  in  Greece  were  placed
in  an  inferior  position.     It  was  Stephens'  wish  that  such  a  state  of
affairs  would  never  exist  in  the  United  States. 24
2°±±±4.,   33rd  Congress,   2nd  Session,1855,   p.   58.
2L±±±g.,   34th  congress,   3rd  Session,1856,   p.134.
22Richardson. Little  Aleck: A  Lif e  o£ Alexander I.   Stephens,   p.   183.
23£.£.,   34th  congress,1st  Session,1856,  Appendix  p.   728.
24c|eve|and,   p.   465,   May  5,   1855.
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By  1859,   Stephens  was  convinced  that  slavery  rested  upon
principles  that  could  never  be  successfully  assailed.     He  looked  on
any  attempt  to  overthrow  it  as  the  absurdest  of  all  crusades.     He  saw
the  world  as  growing  wiser,   especially  in  relation  to  the  proper  status
of  Negroes--with  natural  subordination  being  their  status.     Stephens
had  a  basic  conception  of  the  human  society  as  a  hierarchy.     In  this
hierarchy,  order  was  the  first  law  of  nature  and  with  it  came  gradu-
ation  and  subordination.     He  looked  at  nature  and  Heaven  as  providing
other  examples  of  hierarchies.     In  heaven,   the  hierarchy  consisted  of
the  greater  and  lesser  lights  as  the  stars  differed  from  each  other.
On  the  earth,   in  the  vegetable  kingdom  ranging  from  the  stateliest
trees  of  the  forest  to  the  rudest  mosses  and  ferns,   one  could  see  this
hierarchy.     The  animal  kingdom  of  earth  also  exhibited  evidence  of
hierarchy.     One  could  see  similar  distinctions  and  graduation  in  the
races  of  men.     For  Stephens  these  graduations  were  mysteries  in  the
creation  which  were  not  for  him  to  explain.     In  this  hierarchy, Negroes
were  inferior,   their  logical  place  in  the  social  organism was  that  of
slaves.     In  the  Southern  social  organism,   Stephens  saw  their  place  as
being  clearly  f ixed  and  this  position  provided  for  their  comfort  and
satisfaction.    Nevertheless,   Stephens  argued  that  without  an  increase
of  African  slaves  from  abroad,   the  North  need  not  fear  any  more  slave
states.     Thus,   if  the  North  would  just  let  things  follow  their  natural
course,   all  would  be  well.25    In  a  comparative  spirit,   Stephens  insisted
that  the  Negro's  condition  in  the  South  was  better  than  any  place  else
in  the  world.26    To  further  justify  his  belief  in  slavery,  he  employed
25von  Abe|e,   pp.   175-76.
26£.£.,   33rd  Congress,   2nd   Session,1855,   P.   57.
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another  Biblical  argument,   declaring  that  such  great  and  good  men  like
Job,   Issac,  Jacob,   and  all  other  patriarchs,  owned  slaves;   and  Jesus
Christ  lived  in  a  world  that  was  full  of  slaves  and  never  condemned
it.27 Thus  Stephens  carried  the  Biblical  argument  a  step  farther  than
Davis.
By  1848,  Jefferson  Davis  was  one  of   the  leading  defenders  of
slavery.     In  1859  he  addressed  the  Southern  people  and  insisted  that
"if  slavery  be  a  sin,   it  is  not  yours.     It  does  not  rest  on  your  action
for  its  origin,  on  your  consent  for  its  existence.     It  is  a  cormon  law
right  to  property  in  the  service  of  man,   its  origin  was  Divine  decree."28
Davis  believed  in  the  Biblical  origin.     This  curse  as  decreed  by  Father
Noah  condermed  all   the  dusky  sons  of  Ham  to  everlasting  servitude.29
Again  bringing  to  focus  the  cosmopolitan  quality  of  his  historical  mind,
Davis  attempted  to  justify  and  explain  slavery  other  than  using  the
Bible  when  he  looked  at  history.     He  found  that  under  laws  older  than
the  records  o.f  history,  men  were  taken  captive  in  war  and  held  as
slaves.     The  slaves   that  were  brought  from  Africa  were  saved  from  a
more  degrading  form  of  slavery.     The  Negroes  also  benef ited  from  the
blessings  of  civilization  and  Christianity.     Davis'   prejudices  were
aimed  not  only  at  Negroes.     His  view  of   the  American  Indian  was  similar
to  his  view  of   the  Negroes.     He  considered  the  Indians   to  be  as
deceptive,   as  blood-thirsty,   as  treacherous,   as  cowardly  a  race  of  men
as  were  to  be  found  on  the  globe.30    He  believed  it  was  absurd  for  the
27C|eve|and,   pp.   558-59,   June   28,   1856.
28Row|and,   |V,   pp.   71-72,   July  6,   1859.
29£.£.,   36th  Congress,1st   Session,   2nd  pt.,1860,   p.1682.
30EEig. , 35th  Congress,1st   Session,1st  pt.,1858,   p.   55.
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United  States  government  to  make  treaties  with  Indians  as   they  possessed
no  intelligence  to  understand  any  such  agreement.     Furthermore,  govern-
ments  which  had  made  no   treaties  with  Indians  had  maintained  more
peaceful  relations  with  the  Indians  than  the  United  States.
31
The  inequality  of   the  races,   Davis  declared,  was  confirmed  by
history  through  all  its  successive  stages  beginning  at  the  most  remote
period  of  time.     Thus  for  Davis  his  defense  of  slavery  took  on  religious
overtones  as  well  as  historical  arguments.     He  attacked  the  people  who
insisted  that  the  two  races  were  equal.     He  could  not  understand  that
people  of  any  state  could  make  such  an  accusation.     From  what  race  of
these  states  have  the  men  descended  who  make  this  argument?
Not  from  the  old  Puritan  blood  which  asserted  its  supremacy
both  against  the  Negro  and  the  Indian  .   .   .  not  the  Cavaliers,
not  the  Quakers  nor  the  younger  sons  of  noble  families,  who
peopled  different  colonies;  for  in  all  o.f  them  they  asserted
their  supremacy  as  a  race  and  only  permitted  emancipation
¥±::i:a#::521imits  When  the  Negro  slave  had  ceased  to  be
For  Davis,   the  equality  argument,   or  pseudo-philanthropy,  was
an  unnatural  outgrowth  of   the  American  mind  which  sprang  from  a  more
recent  foreign  germ.     This  foreign  germ  developed  from  Great  Britain,
af ter  the  colonies  had  broken  away,   as  Great  Britain  was  one  of  the
first  nations   to  emancipate  her  slaves.33    He  blamed  both  New  England
and  Great  Britain  for  having  contributed  to  the  domestic  disorder
deriving  from  the  Southern  institution.     He  felt  that  New  England  should
3LRow|and,   Ill,   pp.   151-52,   January  26,   1858.
32£.£. ,
33Ibid.
36th  Congress,1st   Session,   2nd  pt.,1860,   p.1682.
108
support  the  South  as   the  South  had  supported  New  England  during  the
American  Revolution.34    He  considered  Great  Britain  the  instigator  of
the  slave  problem  in  the  South,   as  during  the  colonial  period,  Great
Britain  not  only  protected  the  slave  trade,  but  also  denied  to  the
colonies  the  right  to  prohibit  the  importation  of  Negro  slaves  into
the  respective  territory.     These  descendants  were  the  same  ones  held
in  bondage  and  thus  Britain  had  no  right  to  complain  about  slavery. 35
In  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  Davis  argued,   there  was  no
reference  to  slaves.     Looking  at  history  he  saw  that  one  of  the  items
of  arraignment  made  against  George  Ill  was  the  accusation  that  he  was
endeavoring  to  do  just  what  the  North  was  endeavoring  to  do--to  stir
up  insurrection  among  the  slaves.     He  concluded.
Had  the  Declaration  announced  that  the  Negroes  were  free
and  equal  how was  the  Prince  to  be  arraigned  for  stirring
up  insurrection  among  them?    And  how was  this   to  be
::u:::::e:h:I:n:o:::c::8: ::::e:h¥h:::h::u:::n::; 358 L°n±es
In  a  speech  in  1859,   Davis   traced  what  he  thought  had  been  the
history  of  the  institution  of  slavery  through  Spain  to  America,   through
the  native  tribes  and  through  Dutch  and  English  traders.
When  the     Spaniards  discovered  this  continent  and  reduced
the  sons  of  Shem  to  bondage,   unsuited  to  the  condition
they  pined  and  rapidly  wasted  away  in  unproductive  labor.
The  good  Bishop  Las  Casos  with  philosophical  humanity
inaugurated  the  importation  of  the  race  of  Ham;   they
came  to  relieve  from  an  unnatural  state  the  dwellers  in
tents  and  to  fulf ill  their  own  destiny,   that  of  being
the  servants  of  servants.     In  their  normal  conditions
they  thrived  and  by  their  labor  the  land  was  subdued
and  made  fruitful   .   .   .   Reckless  indeed  must  that  man
be  who  in  the  face  of  the  results  which  have  followed
34±±±±.,   3oth  Congress,1st  Session,   p.   927,1848.
35Row|and,   IV,   pp.   71-72.
36£.£.,   36th  Congress,   2nd  Session,1st  pt.,1860,   P.   487.
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emancipation  in  the.  West  Indies  and  Hispano  America
would  seek  under  similar  circumstances   to  repeat  the
experiment   .   .   .  The  history  of  man  traced  back  to  the
period  which  has  left  none  other  than  pictorial  records,
exhibit  the  Negro  in  all  times  as  the  subservient  race,
nowhere  has  he  shown  capacity  to  found  civil  govern-
ment  .   .   .   In  the  Northern  states  where  a  .false  sentiment
has  prevailed  and  the  great  efforts  have  been  made
by  enthusiants  to  raise  the  Negro  to  social  equality,
he  is  still  subjected  to  such  odious  discriminations,
as  persons  f it  to  be  free  would  not  for  a  day
voluntarily  endure.     For  far  less  cause,   the  Puritans
embarked  for  the  inhospitable  shores  of  New  England,
and  the  Hugurmts  penetrated  the  swamps  of  Carolina
with  no  sustaining  hand  to  aid  and  to  guide  them.
:::ew:::=e3::=§7W±tness  to  the  triumphs  which  both
Other  evidence  that  indicated  to  Davis  that  Negroes  were  unf it
to  live  as  equals  to  white  men  was  that  all  experiments  to  colonize
Negroes  had  failed.     Surprisingly,  Davis  pictured  these  experiments
as  being  made  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances.     In  this  event,
Davis'   historical  knowledge  was  not  at  all  correct,   as  these  Negroes
faced  tremendous  problems.     But,   the  failure  of  colonization  proved,
for  Davis,   that  the  best  situation  for  Negroes  was   to  keep  them  in
their  normal  condition.38    He  wanted  to  allow  the  problem  of  slavery
to  bring  about  its  own  solution;   in  other  words,   to  leave  natural
causes  to  their  full  effect  and  when  the  time  arrived  when  emancipation
would  be  proper,   then  those  most  interested  would  be  the  most  anxious
to  free  the  Negroes.     He  wanted  the  country  to  the  South  and  to  the
North  to  be  lef t  open  in  order  that  Negroes  could  move  to  this  open
country  and  live  in  independent  cormunities.     It  was  his  belief  that
Negroes  must  f irst  be  separated  from  white  men  and  be  relieved  from
37Row|and,   |V,   pp.   71-72.
38Ibid.
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the  condition  of  degradation  which  would  always  be  attached  to  them  as
long  as  they  were  in  contact  with  a  superior  race.     Furthermore,  he
insisted  that  Negroes  must  be  elevated  by  association  and  instruction,
or,   instead  of  a  blessing,   liberty  would  be  their  greatest  curse.39
Although  Davis  was  a  defender  of  slavery  as  a  necessary  stage
in  the  progress  of  the  Negro  race  toward  ultimate  f reedom,  he  never
looked  upon  slavery  as  the  f inal  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  race.
For  him, the  practical  and  useful  emancipation  of  the  slaves  could  not
and  would  not  be  the  labor  of  one  generation,   as  slaves  f irst  had  to
be  made  unfit  for  slavery.41    The  best  way  to  abolish  slavery,  he
argued,  was  to  extend  slavery  and  thus  diffuse  it.42    In  Davis'  mind,
slavery  was  not  only  a  solution  to  the  labor  problem  in  the  South,   it
40
was  also  a  partial  solution  to  the  problem  of  how  to  make  two  distinct
races  live  together  without  friction,  without  creating  what  has  generally
been  called  the  race  problem.43    Many  Southerners  as  well  as  Northerners
refused  to  recognize  the  problem  of  two  races   living  together.     But
some  Southern  and  later  Confederate  leaders,   recognized  this  problem




30th  Congress,1st  Session,1st  pt.,1848,   p.   927.
42Hendrick,   p.   43.
43£.£.,   34th  Congress,   |st  Session,1st  pt.,1865,   P.1094.
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one  of  the  chief  obstacles  to  emancipation  was  where  to  f ind  a  home
for  the  freedman.44    Thus  slavery  was  seen  by  some  Southern  leaders
as  being  a  partial  solution  to  the  race  problem.
Davis'  view  on  the  economic  justification  of  slavery  was  very
interesting.     He  held  to  the  notion  that  only  Negroes  could  be
eff icient  laborers  in  producing  the  staple  crops  of   the  lower  South.
Other  irrmigrants  such  as   the  Germans  or  the  Irish  might  produce  southern
crops  but  in  the  long  run,   only  the  Negroes  could  endure  the  climate.45
Stephens  also  held  to  this  view.46    Stephens  even  felt  that  the  slave
system  in  the  South  gave  to  it  an  advantage  over  all  other  cotton  pro-
ducing  nations.47    In  Davis'   judgment,  history  taught  that  whenever  a
country's  population  had  reached  a  certain  density  and  it  could  trade
easily,   it  of ten  decided  not  to  provide  for  slavery  or  serf don,  and  they
thus  disappeared.     However,  Davis  felt  the  southern  climate  presented
a  new  problem  untouched  by  contemporary  cormentators.     The  problem  of
a  semi-tropical  climate  produced  a  different  result  from  that  found  in
cooler  climates.     For  Davis,   there  was  only  one  race  suited  to  this
type  of  labor  in  the  southern  climate.48    Furthermore,   even  if  one
attempted  to  substitute  men  from  China  or  India  for  the  African,   it
44Wa|ter  C.   Fleming,   "Je££erson  Davis,   the  Negro  and  the  Negro
Problem,"   Sewanee  Review XV   (New  York,   London:     Longman  Green  and
Co.,1968),   p.   407.
45£.£.,   35th  Congress,   |st  Session,1st  pt.,1856,   p.1094.
46Richards0n9
p.    97.
Little  Aleck:     A  Lif e  of  Alexander I.   Stephens,
47stephens,   11,   p.   785.
48£.£.,   35th  Congress,1st  Session,   2nd  pt.,1857,   p.   619.
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would  but  neglect  the  lessons  'of  history  and  uselessly  repeat  the
cruelties  for  the  suppression  of  which  the  African  was  originally
imported  into  America.49     In  a  comparative  sense,  with  other  societies
possessing  Negro  slaves,   Davis  boasted  that  the  people  of  the  South
had  abundant  reason  to  be  satisf led  with  their  peculiar  institution. 50
In  addition,  Davis  was  convinced  that  slave  labor  removed  from  the
South  and  the  Confederacy  all  that  controversy  between  the  laborer
and  the  capitalist,   "which  has  fil.led  Europe  with  starving  millions  and
made  their  poorhouses  an  onerous  charge."51
Davis'   prejudice  went  beyond  a  dislike  for  just  the  Negroes  or
other  races.     He  felt  it  would  be  dangerous  to  mix  the  blood  of  the
white  Americans  with  that  of  Negroes  as     this  would  delete  the  Puritan
blood  which  .f lowed  in  their  veins  and  which  was  responsible  for  their
great  civilization.     He  did  not  desire  to  see  incorporated  into  the
Union,   countries  densely  populated  with  a  different  race.
We  are  one,   let  us  remain  unmixed.     In  our  neighbors  of
Southern  and  Central  America  we  have  a  suff icient
warning,  and  may  it  never  be  our  ill-fortune  to  learn
by  experience  the  lessons  taught  by  their  example,
¥::r:o::::::i:: =:::rg:::::::::5!as occurred since
Davis  assumed  these  people  because  of   their  heredity       were  incompetent
to  govern  themselves. 53
49Row|and,   |V,   p.   70,   July  6,   1859.
5°MCE|roy,   p.   496.
5LRow|and,   Ill,   p.   357.
52EE±.,   pp.   313-14.
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By  the  time  that  the  secession  crisis  arose,   Benjamin  was
convinced  that  the  southern  slaveholder  was  only  the  magistrate  of  his
slaves.     This  system  gave  the  Negroes  their  only  fair  legal  system.
For,   Benjamin  argued,   il.  a  slave  was  caught  stealing  from  another
slave,   his  master  would  have  him  whipped  and  the  legal  process  would
end  there.     However,   if   the  same  occurrence  took  place  in  the  North
between  two  white  persons,   the  guilty  person,   if  convicted,  would  be
sentenced  to  the  penitentiary.     In  England,   the  situation  was  even
worse,   for  there  a  convicted  person  would  be  hanged  or  sent  to  some
penal  colony.     Yet,   said  Benjamin,   the  American  slaveholder  who
punished  his  slave  was  held  to  be  a  monster  of  guilt,  while  British
philanthropy  chuckled  in  self -compacency  at  its  tender  mercies  toward
the  transported  cormict.54    By  the  time  of  the  secession  crisis,   both
Davis  and  Benjamin  were  tired  of  apologies  for  the  institution  of
slavery.55     However,   it  was  Vice  President  Stephens  who  became  the  most
outspoken  proponent  of  slavery  as  an  institution  in  the  South.
Stephens  stated  that  the  ideas  that  the  forefathers  had  con-
cerning  the  equality  of  the  races  were  fundamentally  wrong.     "It  was
a  sandy  foundation;   and  the  idea  of  a  government  built  upon  it  when
the  storm  came  and  the  wind  blew,   it  fell."56     Stephens  was  also
critical  of  the  great  philosophers  of  antiquity.     Pythagoras,  Plato,
Aristotle,  all  directed  their  minds  on  the  systems  of  goverrment  and
the  proper  constitution  of  a  state.     The  republican  form was  the  ideal
model  of  each  man.     They  all  saw  the  necessity  of  some  sort  of
54£.£. , 34th  Congress,   2nd  Session,   1st  pt.   1856,   p.   1095.
55Dodd,   p.    168.
56C|eve|and,   p.   710,   March   21,   1861.
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graduation  in  the  element  of  its  composition.     Their  system  failed,
Stephens  believed,  because  they  violated  nature  in  making  the
subordinate  class  of  the  same  race.     Subordination,  however,  was   the
normal  condition  of  Negroes.     That  slavery  was  the  natural  and  moral
condition  of  Negroes  was  the  idea  that  the  Conf ederate  government  was
based  upon.     Furthermore,   he  stated,   "This,   our  new  Goverrment,   is
the  first  in  the  history  of  the  world  based  upon  this  great  physical,
philosophical,  and  moral  truth."57    He  believed  this   truth  had  been
slow  in  developing  like  all  other  truths  in  the  various  .departments  of
science.     It  was  so  with  the  principles  announced  by  Galileo;   it  was
so  with  Adam  Smith  and  his  principle  of  political  economy;   and  it  was
So  with WilliamHarvey  and  his   theory  of   the  circulation  of   the  blood.58
Stephens  hoped  that  a  change  was  occurring  in  the  intellectual  world.
The  British  West  Indies  experiment  was  doing  much  to  produce  this
change.59    Many  people,   he  said,   based  their  premises  on  defective
reasoning  and  were  still  slow  to  catch  on  to  the  truth.     Stephens  saw
the  Negro  as  being  f itted  by  nature  or  by  the  curse  against  Canaan  to
an  inferior  position.     He  declared  that  the  Confederate  system  did  not
violate  any  laws  of  nature.     For  Stephens,   slavery  had  become  the  real
corner  stone  of  the  government,     a  stone  upon  which  the  Confederacy
stood  and  was  determined  to  stand.
The  Confederate  leaders  did  not  regard  the  issue  of  slavery  as
the  primary  or  long  range  cause  of  secession  and  conf lict.     These  men
57Ibid.
58ERE.,   p.   717.
59±±±±.,   p.   743,   April   23,1861.
115
interpreted  the  cause  of  the  conf lict  in  terms  of  the  constitutionality
of  secession.60    Mallory  was  not  particularly  concerned  with  the  issue
of  slavery  and  neither  did  he  deplore  the  issue  of  Southern  political
power  nor  fear  the  consequences,  for  the  South,  he  insisted,  had  built
a  republic  that  was  the  wonder  of  the  world.     Nevertheless,  Mallory
did  warm  the  North  that  it  was  assuming  a  great  responsibility.61
Benjamin  saw  the  North's  real  motive  as  an  attempt  to  secure  political
power  as  a  contrivance  whereby  it  could  subvert  the  equality  of  the
states.     In  Benjamin's  eyes,   the  North  was  struggling  for  the  possession
of  a  power  to  which  she  had  no  legitimate  claim  under  the  Constitution,
while  the  South  was  struggling  for  all  that  was  dear  to  man:     property,
honor,  and  safety.     He  declared  in  1856  that  the  history  of  the  world
had  never  exhibited  an  example  of  a  people  occupying  a  more  noble
attitude  than  the  people  of  the  South.     Once  the  North  had  secured  a
predominant  political  power  and  reduced  the  South  to  a  feeble  minority,
the  North  would  then  reveal  its  real  abolitionist  sentiments  and  ruin
and  desolation  would  spread  over  the  slaveholding  states.62    For
Stephens,  Negro  slavery  was  the  immediate  cause  o'f  the  rupture  of  the
Union  and  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war.     However,  he  too,  viewed  the
the  rupture  of  the  Union  as  being  primarily  a  constitutional  question.
Davis  believed  that  the  conf lict  was  not  a  contest  between  freedom  and
6°Thomas  J.   Presslyi Americans Interpret  Their  Civil  War
(Princeton,  New  Jersey:     Princeton  University  Press,1954),   p.   85
6£Rembert  W.   Patric`  . Jefferson  Davis  and  His  Cabinet  (Baton
Rouge,   La.:     Louisiana  State  University  Press,1948),   p.   4.
62£.g.,   34th  Congress,   2nd  Session,1st  pt.,1854,   P.1194.
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slavery,   that  in  fact,   slavery  was  a  false  issue  brought  on  and  argued
by  Northerners,  a  moral  justification  for  political  aims.     He  saw  the
basic  issue  as  a  desperate  determination  of  the  South  to  maintain
local  self-goverrment  under  a  strict  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,
which  rigidly  clef ined  and  limited  the  power  of  the  central  government
and  insured  a  genuine  federal  government.     The  North,  on  the  other
hand,  was  desperately  determined  to  establish  a  consolidated  national
government,   thereby  weakening  and  ultimately  destroying  the  local
self-government  of  the  states.     Thus  the  American  Civil  War  grew  out
of  this  conflict  of  principle.63    Yet  the  question  of  slavery  and  race
were  central  in  Davis'   thoughts.
The  belief  in  slavery  of  these  four  Confederate  leaders  was  an
important  criteria  for  their  belief  in  expansion.     By  the  time  the
southern  states  had  seceded,   they  were  looking  forward  to  expanding  the
Confederacy.     Even  before  the  southern  states  had  seceded,  Jefferson
Davis  had  been  interested  in  expanding  the  country.     Davis  wanted  to
see  the  United  States   take  over  Mexico,   capture  Cuba,  Yucatan,   and
other  Central  American  states.     By  making  these  countries  slave  states
he  believed  a  permanent  equilibrium would  be  established  between  the
North  and  the  South.     If  possible,  Davis  would  probably  have  resorted
to  physical  force  to  take  over  these  countries.     In  1854,  Davis  had
declared  that  the  recent  acts  and  declarations  of  the  Cuban  authorities,
considered  in  connection  with  Spain's  port  policy,  was  designed  to
throw  Cuba  ultimately  into  the  hands  of  the  Negro  population  which
would  revive  the  scene  of  the  Sam  Domingo  revolution.64    In  another
63ows|ey,   ".efferson  Davis,"  p.   766.
64£.i.,   33rd  Congress,1st  Session,1nd  pt.,1854,   p.1194.
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examination  of  history,  Davis  argued  that  the  United  States  could
exchange  money  for  cuba.65
Mallory  was  also  interested  in  expanding  slavery  into  the
tropics,   primarily  Cuba.     He  defended  the  strategic  and  commercial
importance  of  Cuba.     It  was  his  desire  that  the  Americanization  of  the
island  would  result  in  the  annexation  of  Cuba.66    Benjamin  was  another
leading  advocate  of   the  movement  to  encompass   the  rich  sugar  lands  of
the  island  for  the  United  States.67    As  early  as  1854,   he  proposed  that
the  government  adopt  "most  decisive  and  energetic  measures"  on  Cuban
annexation.68    Stephens  was  in  favor  of  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  on
the  grounds  of  humanity,   public  interest  and  statesmanship.69    However,
he  was  careful  to  warn  against  imperialism.     In  an  early  speech  in
1845,   he  reminded  his  audience  of   the  growth  of   the  Roman  Empire  which
became  so  large  and  unwielding  that  it  fell,   and  of  England,  which  was
hardly  able  to  keep  together  its  extensive  parts.70    By  1860,   Stephens
saw  the  importance  of  Cu\ba  for  slavery.7t    After  the  outbreak  of  the
war,  Davis  stated  to  a  Mississippi  audience  that  the  Confederacy  was
justified  in  seeking  to  carry  out  the  most  settled  policy  of  the
65Row|and,   IV,   p.   82.
66g.£.,   33rd  Congress,   2nd  Session,1855,   p.   264.
67Basi|  Rauch9 American  Interest in  Cuba   1848-1855   (New  York:
Columbia  University  Press,1948),   pp.   205-06.
68£.£.,   33rd  Congress,   2nd  Session,1854,   p.1298.
69Ibid.
7°Cleveland,   pp.   299-300,   Jam.   25,   1845.
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United  States,   that  of  expansion.     "In  nations  as  in  Organic  bodies,
the  suspension  of  that  law  is  the  unfailing  evidence  of  decline.''72
While  these  four  Confederate.  leaders  tried  to  argue  from  a  more
practical  standpoint,   there  did  exist  in  the  back  of  their  minds  the
idea  that  these  countries  could  become  a  breeding  ground  for  slavery.
The  use  of  slaves  during  the  war  years  posed  many  problems  for
the  Confederate  leaders.     The  sinew  and  craftsmanship  of  Virginia
Negroes  contributed  much  to  Conf ederate  naval  ordnance  and  naval
stores.     They  worked  diligently  procuring  raw materials  and  fabricating
naval  essentials.     For  Mallory  the  best  use  of  Negro  slaves  for  the
war  effort  would  be  to  employ  them  in  building  ships  and  fortifications.
Stephens  was  convinced  that  the  Negro  slaves  were  needed  at  home
just  as  much  as  in  the  arny.74    Davis  also  realized  that  not  every-
body  could  be  in  the  army  as   this  would  leave  nobody  to  provide  the
labor  at  home.     Stephens  carried  this  idea  a  little  further  than  Davis.
Thus  for  the  Vice  President,   slaves  would  be  most  beneficial  to  the
Con.federacy  working  in  the  fields.     However,   Stephens  agreed  with
Aristotle's  idea  that  emancipation  should  be  held  out  to  slaves  upon
their  Proving  themselves  worthy.75
Although  rumors  of   insurrections  among  the  slaves  were  numerous
during  the  war,  only  a  few  outbreaks  actually  occurred.76    This  danger,
and  the  example  which  had  occurred  in  India,   in  1857,  where  Indians
72Row|and,   |V,   p.   84-85.
73ca||ahan,   p.   95.
74g.E.4.,   Ser.   IV,   Vol.Ill,   pp.   520-21,   July,1864.
75Avary,   p.   322.
76Be||  |rvin  Wiley.
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formerly  employed  as  soldiers  by  the  British  army  had  arisen  against
their  former  masters,  were  deterrents  to  arming  the  slaves.     In  August
o.f  1863,   Benjamin  believed  that  the  arming  of  slaves  might  be  very
dangerous  and  that  the  labor  of  the  slaves  was  needed  in  the  mines  and
in  the  fields.77    It  was  contended,  however,   that  slaves  could  be
easily  disciplined  and  would  make  good  soldiers,   that  slave  soldiers
would  enable  still  further  the  institution  of  slavery  and  lighten  its
rigors  after  the  war,   that  without  more  soldiers  the  war  might  be  lost,
and  that  as  slaves  had  fought  for  American  .ihdependence  during  the
Revolution  they  should  now  help  gain  southern  independence. 78
Early  in  1864,   General  Pat  Cleburne  advocated  the  use  of  slaves
as  soldiers  before  a  meeting  of  the  off icers  of  the  Army  of  Tennessee.
A  copy  of  his  paper  was  sent  to  the  President.     Davis,   however,
requested  that  Cleburne's  paper  be  suppressed:
Deeming  it  to  be  injurious  to  the  public  service  that  such
a  subject  should  be  mooted,   or  even  known  to  be  entertained
by  persons  possessed  of  the  conf idence  and  respect  of  the
people,   I  have  concluded  that  the  best  policy  und:79the
circumstance  will  be  to  avoid  all  publicity  .   .   .
During  the  early  war  years,   the  Confederacy  had  impressed  large
amounts  of  black  labor  to  dig  f ield  fortif ications  and  to  throw  up
earthworks  around  cities  and  towns.     The  War  Department  alone  had
been  authorized  to   impress  up  to  20,000  blacks.     By  November,   1864,
Davis  was  ready  to  ask  Congress  for  authority  to  purchase  40,000  black
men  for  non-combatant  military  duty.     He  still  advised  against  a
general  arming  of  slaves,  however:
77But|er,   p.   349,   Aug.   18,   1863.
78cou|ter,   p.   267.
79wiiey,   p.   82.
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Until  our  white  population  shall  prove  insuff icient  for  the
armies  we  require  and  can  afford  to  keep  the  field,   to
employ  as  a  soldier  the  negro,  who  has  merely  been  trained
to  labor,  and  as  a  laborer  under  the  white  man,   accustomed
from  his  use  to  the  use  of  firearms,  would  scarcely  be
deemed  wise  or  advantageous  by  any,   and  this  is   the
question  before  us.     But  should  the  alternative  ever  be
presented  of  subjugation  or  of  the  employment  of  the
:i:::da:eao::L8::::i:::56  Seems  no  reason  to  doubt  what
Davis  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  the  expediency  of  freeing  those
who  should  render  faithful  service  to  the  end  of  the  war.     In  some
quarters  this  was  regarded  as  a  "f eeler"  to  ascertain  the  f eeling
of  the  country  with  the  idea  of  following  it  with  a  proposal  to
enlist  and  free  Negro  soldiers.81    At  the  end  of  1864,   due  to  arguments
of  Benjamin  and  General  Robert  E.   Lee,  Davis'   stand  on  his  refusal  to
arm  slaves  was  weakening.82    Benjamin  wrote   to  Fred  Procher  in
December  1864,   asking  him  to  agitate  for  action  in  favor  of  arming  the
slaves  through  the  newspaper,  always  urging  this  point  as  the  true
issue.     "It  is  better  for  the  Negro  to  fight  for  us  or  against  us."83
In  this  argument,   Benjamin  showed  that  he  understood  the  necessity  o'f
using  public  means  to  educate  the  people.     His  line  of  reasoning  con-
verted  many  opponents  of   the  arming  of  slavery  to  his  side.     Even  Davis
was  influenced  by  his  Secretary  of  State's  argument.     In  February,1865,
Davis  wrote  to  John  Forsyth  that,   "It  is  now  becoming  daily  more  evident
80g.i.A. ,
81]ournal
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to  all  ref lecting  persons  that  we  are  reduced  to  choosing  whether  the
Negroes  shall  fight  for  or  against  us."84    Judah  Benjamin  carried  on
a'n  active  campaign  to  arm  the  slaves.     However,   it  was  Robert  E.   Lee
who   spoke  the  most  decisive  words.     In  January,   1865,   Lee  wrote   to  a
Virginia  legislator  in  support  of  a  proposal  to  recruit  Negro  soldiers
authored  by  Virginia's  Governor,  William  Smith,     Benjamin,   realizing
the  necessity  of  using  slaves  as  soldiers  and  the  impact  which  Lee's
support  would  have  on  Congress,   urged  Lee  to  express  himself  fully  on
the  matter  to  Congress.     In  a  letter  to  Ethlebert  Barksdale,  Lee
aff irmed  that  black  troops  were  indeed  required,   that  black  men  would
make  good  soldiers,   and  that  slave  soldiers  ought  to  receive  their
freedom.85    In  a  second  letter  that  month,   to  Andrew  Hunter,  Lee  wrote
that  military  necessity  compelled  the  abandorment  of   the  slave  system
of  the  past.     He  argued  that  black  troops  were  needed,   and  military
service  must  be  followed  by  their  emancipation,   and  that,   in  time,   by
a  general  abolition  of  slavery. 86
Slaves  were  not  draf ted  even  though  General  Lee  expressed  the
opinion  that  some  form  of  compulsion  was  desirable.87    Davis'   idea  was
that  the  policy  of  asking  owners  to  volunteer  their  slaves  was  pre-
ferable  to  the  Confederate  president's  request  for  Negro  military
support.     If  this  plan  failed,  he  realized  he  would  still  have  the
option  of  compulsory  enlistment.88    Even  at  the  very  end  of  the  war,
84ERE.,   p.1110.
85Thomas,   pp.   129-30.
86g.i.4.,   Ser.   IV,   Vol.Ill,   pp.1012-13.
87Equ. ,
88Ibid.
Ser.   I,   Vol.   XLVI,   pt.   3,   p.   1349,   March   25,   1865.
Davis  was  not  yet  willing  to  use  certain  powers  which  he  deemed
unconstitutional.     Lee's  influence  was  shown  by  the  Richmond
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Examiner .
It  was  strongly  opposed  to  the  policy  of  enlisting  the  Negroes  until
Lee's  opinion  was   expressed.     On  February  15,1865,   its   editor  wrote:
"General  Lee  urgently  calls  for  a  large  force  of  Negroes.     The  country
will  not  deny  to  General  Lee   .   .   .   anything  he  may  ask  for."89
Secretary  of  State  Benjamin,  who  had  been  one  of  the  early  proponents
in  the  administration  for  the  arming  of  slaves,  again  spoke  in  favor
of   this  move  in  a  speech  to  a  crowd  in  Richmond  in  February.
Is  it  not  a  shame  that  men  who  have  sacrif iced  all  in  our
defense  should  not  be  re-enforced  by  all  the  means  in
our  power?     Is  it  any  time  now  for  antiquated  patriotism
to  argue  refusal  to  send  them  aid,   be  it  white  or  black  .   .   .
Could  divine  prophecy  have  told  us  of   the  enemy's  death
grapple  at  our  throats ,...   should  we  have  entertained
any  doubt  upon  the  subject.     I  feel  that  the  time  is
coming  when  the  people  will  wonder  that  they  ever
doubted.     Let  us  say  to  every  negro  who  wished  to  go
i:::t::;o:a:i:  ::e:,?g6tion  of  being  made  free,   'Go  and
He  further  stated  that  the  institution  of  slavery  had  preserved  the
Negro  race  since
the  Southern  system  was   the   tr-ue  system  for  the  improve-
ment  of  the  blacks,   and  freedom  of  the  whites  but  if
we  were  in  a  condition  in  which  we  could  no  longer
protect  our  slaves,  we  would  say  to  them  'we  yield
what  we  believe  to  be  the  best  system  on  earth  under
protest
obtained
a?gf take  the  next  best  system which  could  be
On  March  13,   1865,   the  Confederate  Congress  authorized  the
government  to  recruit  up  to  300,000  slaves  for  the  army.     But  no  more
89wiiey,   p.   158.
9o!ky ][9E± Efa,   voi.  xlv,  NO.   4177,  Feb.   13,   1865.
91Ibid.
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than  twenty-f ive  percent  of  the  male  slaves  between  eighteen  and
forty-f ive  years  old  could  be  drawn  from  any  one  state.     The  act
further  stated,   "nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  construed  to  authorize
a  change  in  the  relation  which  the  said  slaves  shall  bear  toward
their  owners."92    The  last  provision  was  understood  as  being  little
more  than  verbiage  by  many  Confederate  leaders  including  Benjamin,
Lee,  Mallory,   Stephens,   and  probably  Davis,   as   they  recognized  that
should  the  slave  soldiers  eventually  be  part  of  a  victorious  army,
freedom  would  be   their  only  just  reward.93    0n  March  13,   1865,   shortly
af ter  Congress  had  f inally  decided  to  allow  the  use  of  slaves  as
soldiers,  Davis  communicated  to  it  this  criticism:
The  bill  for  employing  negroes  as  soldiers  has  not  yet
reached  me,   though  the  printed  journal  of  your  pro-
ceedings  inform  me  of  its  passage.     Much  benef it  is
anticipated  from  this  measure,   though  far  less  than
would  have  resulted  from  its  adoption  at  an  earlier
:::ein::I::t::na:::::gt::: :::t::ei:n::::gazation
Davis'   remarks  angered  many  Senators for  which  a  special  corrmittee
replied:
.   .   .   if  the  policy  and  necessity  of  the  measure  had
been  seriously  urged  on  Congress  by  an  Executive
message,   legislative  action  might  have  been  quickened.
The  President,   in  no  official  cormunication  to  Congress,
has  recorrmended  the  passage  of  a  law  putting  slaves
into  the  army  as  soldiers,  and  the  message  under
:::£±:e:::i::u:: :::tf:::ta;:::::::9§nfo-tion that
92journal
9£ £±±  Congress  8£ £E±
IV'   p.   703.
93Thomas,   p.   130.
94]ournal
9£ £E±  Congress  e£ £E±
IV,   p.    704.
95Equ.,   pp.   726-27.
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Hence  it  would  seem  that  some  time  between  November   7,   1864,   and
March  13,   1865,   Davis  became  a  convert  to   the  scheme  to  enroll  slaves
as  soldiers.     The  knowledge  of  the  universal  hostility  of  Europe  to
slavery  and  the  frequent  warnings   that  Europe  would  never  recognize
the  Confederacy  as  a  slave  power  were  as  important  in  the  f inal
decision  to  begin  the  emancipation  of  slaves  as  was  the  need  for
soldiers.     So  the  Confederate  goverrment  determined  to  capitalize  in
its  diplomacy  upon  the  ideas  of  emancipation. 96
In  speeches  to  the  Confederate  Congress,   as  well  as  in  private
letters,  written  during  the  war,  Davis  expressed  the  doubt  that
slavery  was  or  had  been  an  impediment  to  recognition.     He  believed
that  the  only  obstacle  to  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy  was  an
unwillingness  of  the  European  powers   to  be  embroiled  in  a  quarrel  with
the  United  States.97     Stephens,  who  was  aware  that  the  French  and
English  goverrmen`try  while  jealous  of   the  United  States,  were  also
opposed  to  slavery,  had  never  looked  to  foreign  intervention  or
recognition.98    Considering  this,   one  can  see  why  Stephens  had  given
his  famous  cornerstone  speech,   in  which  he  had  stated  that  the  slavery
institution  was  a  basic  fundamental  of  the  Confederate  goverrment.
It  would  seem  that  Stephens  did  not  expect  any  foreign  intervention;
neither  did  he  want  any  help.
Benjamin  had  seen  ealfly  in  the  war  that  slavery  would  be  a
stumbling  block  for  the  Confederacy  in  its  efforts  to  gain  recognition
by  foreign  goverrments.     In  1864,  he  sent  a  minister,  Duncan  F.   Kenner,
96ows|ey,   p.   532.
97g.E.A.,   Ser.   IV,   Vol.Ill,   p.   792,   Nov.   7,1864.
98g.E.I.,   Set.11,   Vol.Ill,   p.   903.
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to  Paris  and  to  London  to  discover  whether  such  a  policy  of  freeing
the  slaves  would  be  likely  to  induce  France  and  England  to  help  the
Confederacy.     For  Benjamin,  no  sacrifice,   except  that  of  honor,  was
too  great  to  save  the  Confederacy.
I.f ,   then  the  purpose  of  France  and  Great  Britain  has  been,
or  be  now,   to  exact  terms  or  conditions  before  conceding
the  right  we  claim,  a  frank  exposition  of  that  purpose
is  due  to  humanity.     It  is  due  now,   for  it  may  enable  us
::  :::: ::=sp::c::::n::v:: ::o:::rc;:::?: ::in;::::?53ng
He  authorized  Kenner  to  supersede  the  other  ministers  and  to  declare
that  his  powers  came  .from  Davis  himself .     These  powers  extended  to
the  authorization  to  make  a  promise  that  the  Confederacy  would  abolish
slavery  if  it  were  found  to  be  an  obstacle  to  recognition.loo    Benjamin
realized  that  slavery  was  like  a  disease,   slowly  causing  any  hope  for
foreign  recognition  to  die.
By  March  1865,   Davis  and  Benjamin  had  demonstrated  just  how
far  the  Confederacy  was  willing  to  go  in  the  matter  of  emancipation.
By  the  end  of   the  war,   these  two  Confederate  leaders  had  realized  the
signif icant  impact  that  emancipation  of  slaves  would  have  had  on  the
world.     Mallory,   Davis,  and  Benjamin  were  able  to  learn  from  their
own  knowledge  of  history,  while  Stephens  seemed  little  concerned  with
the  impact  which  the  use  of  slaves  as  soldiers  and  their  emancipation
could  have  had  on  the  history  of   the  Confederacy.     Their  historical
understanding  that  slavery  was  the  proper  position  for  Negroes  to
occupy  in  society  was  slowly  changed  by  the  lessons  they  learned  from
their  own  experiences  and  history.     Only  the  Vice  President  seemed
99g.E.4.,   Set.   IV,   Vol.Ill,   p.   854,   Nov.   21,1864.
£°°MCElroy,   p.   423.
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unable  to  accept  the  fact  that  Negroes  were  destined  to  be  free,  while
Davis,   Benjamin,  and  Mallory  realized  that  for  the  South  to  win  the
war,   certain  fundamental  ideas  in  the  Confederacy  concerning  Negroes
had  to  be  changed.
CRAPTER   V
HISTORY   IN   THE   POLITICAL-MILITARY   COURSE
OF   THE   CONFEDERACY
How  did  the  historical  cosmopolitanism  of  Davis,   Stephens,
Benjamin,   and  Mallory  shape  their  understanding  and  their  interpre-
tation  of  the  internal  aspects  of  the  great  conf lict  in  which  they  were
engaged?     How  did  they  view  the  actions  of  Lincoln  and  of   the  North
in  general?    What  was   each  one's  understanding  of  his  own  position     A
and  role  as  he  viewed  them  from  a  historical  perspective?    These  are
just  some  of  the  questions  which  must  be  answered  in  trying  to
determine  the  shaping  of  each  man's  view  toward  the  political  and
military  course  of  the  war  toward  ultimate  Confederate  defeat.
Jefferson  Davis  talked  alternately  of  war  and  peace.     Once  he
reported  that  he  anticipated  a  long  and  bloody  war,  but  later  he
assured  his  friends  that  he  had  not  expected  it.1    He  and  Vice
President  Alexander  Stephens  viewed  Lincoln's  calling  of  troops  as  a
declaration  of  war.     They  were  especially  critical  of  I.incoln's  acting
on  his  own  without  the  shadow  of   lawful  or  constitutional  authority.
Stephens  expressed  Lincoln's  move  this  way,   "No  ukase  of   the  Autocrat
of  Russia  was  ever  more  impartial  or  absolute  in  its  character."2
£Richard  N.   Current,   "The  Confederates  and  the  First  Shot,"
§i][±| !!Z±E  History,   VII   (Iowa  City:     State  University  of  Iowa,   1961)
pp.    366-67.
2stephens,11,   p.   408.
127
128
0n  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter,  Robert  Toombs  alone  in  the  cabinet
counseled  restraint,  while  all  the  others,   incl.uding  Judah  Benjamin
and  Stephen  Mallory,   insisted  the  time  had  come  to  act.     So  Davis
acted,3     trusting  the  world  to  understand  the  complicated  reasoning
with  which  he  ably  sustained  the  Southern  position.     It  was  not
apparent  to  him  that  the  public  seldom  concerns  itself  with  subtleties.
Davis  had  either  to  take  over  Fort  Sumter  or  suffer  a  loss  of  prestige
at  the  beginning  of  his  administration.4    Davis  also  was  aware  that
there  would  be  future  judgment  of  his  actions.     He  was  conscious  of
what  history  and  historians  would  think  of  him.    Af ter  the  f iring  at
Fort  Sumter,  he  believed  the  truth  of  history  would  show  the  North  to
be  the  aggressor.
Even  before  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter,   Stephens  declared  that
the  South  would  be  in  one  of  the  bloodiest  civil  wars  that  history
had  ever  recorded.     He  moaned  that  the  Conf ederacy  was  on  the  road  to
ruin.6    After  the  war  had  begun,   Stephens  wrote  to  his  half-brother,
Linton,   speaking  in  favor  of  a  purely  defensive  war  as  being  the  only
chance  for  the  Confederacy  to  avoid  a  general  war.7    Very  early  in
the  war,   Stephens  foresaw  that  the  Confederacy  was  on  the  eve  of  a
tremendous  conf lict  between  the  sections.
3current,   p.   368.
4MCE|roy,   pp.   287-88.
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the  Confederacy,   p.   117,   July  20,1861.
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Davis  believed  the  nation's  military  policy  should  logically
duplicate  its  political  intentions.    He  did  not  intend  to  give  the
North  another  chance  to  br`and  him  an  aggressor  in  the  eyes  of  history
and  of  Europe.     He  announced  that  all   the  South  asked  was   to  be  lef t
alone.     In  meeting  Lincoln's  challenge  o.f  gathering  resources  and
manpower,  Davis  chose  to  interpose  troops  where  they  blocked  the  more
obvious  paths  of  invasion.
One  of  the  first  tasks  facing  Davis  was  the  organization  of  the
army.     He  was  especially  concerned  with  the  organization  of  a  general
staff ,   "which  would  be  permanent  in  its  character,   trained  in  its
duties,   aspiring  to  promo`tion  in  its  own  corps,   and  responsible  to  the
head  of  the  department."9    The  training  and  knowledge  that  he  had
gained  while  Secretary  of  War,  made  him  realize  that  it  would  be
impracticable  to  organize  and  administer  armies  with  efficiency  with-
out  the  aid  of  such  a  general  staff.     He  preferred  to  develop  his  staff
by  the  European  methods  where  years  of  varied  education  in  the  schools,
in  the  cantorment,  and  in  the  f ield  made  the  officers  fit  for  their
positions.     But  due  to  the  emergency  of  the  situation,  he  realized  this
training  would  be  impossible.10    Davis  attempted,   in  dealing  with
military  promotions,   to  be  guided  exclusively  by  military  consideration.
Even  if  a  person  had  been  in  opposition  to  secession,   Davis  would  not
hesitate  to  give  such  a  rank  as  he  deserved  according  to  his  military
record.
8Foote,   I,   p.   56.
9g.i.A.,   Ser.   IV,   Vol.Ill,   p.   450,   hay  28,1864.
10Ibid.
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Through  his  historical  knowledge,  Mallory  also  understood  the
importance  of  providing  for  the  education  of  naval  officers.     On  the
strength  of  his  historical  knowledge,  Mallory  insisted  that  naval
education  and  training  lay  at  the  foundation  of  any  naval  success,  and
any  power  which  neglected  this  essential  element  of  strength  would
find  that  its  ships,   however  formidable,  would  succumb  to  a  more
thoroughly  trained  and  educated  enemy.     From  1793  to  1815  the  French
built  and  equipped  f leets` only  to  have  them  captured  by  the  accomplished
seamen  of  Britain,   and  in  "the  memorable  combat  of  the  eventful  period
of  history  in  which  the  strength,  models,  and  ordnance  of  French  ships
and  the  courage  of  their  personnel  were  in  no  respect  imf erior  to
those  of  Britain.     The  superior  seamanship  of  the  British  navy  Secured
an  almost  unbroken  succession  of  naval  victories."11    With  his
historical  insight,   Secretary  of  Navy,  Mallory.   insisted  that,along
with  proper  training,  a  system  of  naval  discipline  must  be  maintained
in  the  Confederate  navy.12    Before  the  outbreak  of  war,  Mallory  was
convinced  that  the  state  of  deterioration  in  naval  personnel  was  due
mainly  to  the  abolition  of  strict  naval  discipline.13  and  he  was
determined  that  the  Conf ederate  navy  would  not  lack  such  a  system.
Like  Davis,  Mallory  was  familiar  with  the  educational  system  in  Europe.
He  realized  that  the  scientif ic  education  of  naval  off icers  was  more
necessary  at  that  time  than  at  any  previous  period,  and  that  all  the
£L9.i.E.,   Ser.11,   Vol.11,   p.   635,   April   30,1864.
£2E±2±£±.,   Ser.11,   Vol.Ill,   p.   365,   May   7,1864.
13Durkin,   p.   53.
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other  naval  powers  of  the  earth  had  made  for  it  the  most  ample  and
thorough  provision.14    Under  his  guidance  a  naval  school  was
established  at  Richmond.15
During  the  early  period  of  the  war,  Mallory  followed  the  rule
that  no  naval  appointment  would  be  made  from  civil  life  while  resigned
off icers  of  the  old  Union  navy  were  available.     Mallory  allowed  off icers
to  retain  in  the  Confederate  navy  the  rank  which  they  held  in  the  old
service.     Eventually,  Mallory  was  responsible  for  the  passing  of  an
act  which  would  allow  promotion  solely  dependent  on  "gallant  or
meritorious  conduct  during  the  war."16    In  using  this  system  of  pro-
motion  based  on  education,   experience,  and  training,  Mallory  and  Davis
differed  from  their  northern  counterparts  in  avoiding  political
appo intments .
Davis,   in  choosing  his  general  staff ,  appointed  primarily  men
who  had  graduated  from  West  Point.     Unlike  Lincoln,   he  did  not  appoint
many  political  leaders  to  lead  the  army  and  for  this,  many  dissatisfied
states-rights  leaders  attacked  him.     Stephens  was  also  against  the
appointment  of  West  Pointers   to  so  many  offices.     He  argued  that  West
Point  made  a  mechanism  of  a  soldier,  killed  his  spirit,   enthusiasm,
initiative,  and  native  ability  and  made  him  forget  he  was  a  gentleman.
Furthermore,  he  contended,   it  forced  the  war  into  an  uneven  contest  of
material  force,   thereby  eliminating  the  only  resource  with  which  the
149.E.I.,   Ser.11,   Vol.11,   p.152,   Feb.17,1862.
£5]ohn  Thomas   Schar£9  ±±±±9E]£  9± the  Confederate  States
(New  York:     Rogers   &   Sherwood,1887),   p.   46
L6Durkin,   p.   148.
Eay,
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South  could  ever  hope  to  win--superior  enthusiasm,   superior  spirit,
and  superior  morale.17
Benjamin  was  also  concerned  with  the  org.anization  of   the  army.
Like  Davis,  he  was  not  in  favor  of  using  suffrage  in  the  army  in
selection  of  officers.18    One  of   the  main  problems   that  Benjamin  was
concerned  with  as   Secretary  of  War  from  September  17,   1861  to
March  18,   1862,  was   the  short  enlistments   in  the  army.     Benjamin  was
one  of  the  f irst  men  to  see  the  necessity  of  having  men  serve  for
longer  periods  of  time  than  just  six  months.     He  quickly  saw  that  it
was  useless  for  the  state  to  accept  any  troops   that  she  could  not
arm,  unless  they  were  willing  to  enlist  f.or  the  war,   in  which  event
the  Con.f ederate  goverrment  would  pay  for  the  expenses  of  keeping  the
men  in  training  camps  until  they  were  armed.19    Through  his  urging,
the  Confederate  government  soon  passed  a  law  making  all  enlistments
last  until  the  end  of  the  war.
When  the  war  began,   Davis  first  favored  a  defensive  war.20    His
earlier  idea  of  a  defensive  war  was  the  traditional  type  defense  where
the  idea  of  defending  territory  was  predominant.     Later  Davis  became
more  concerned  with  buying  time,   if  need  be  with  the  loss  of  territory,
although  he  was  always  disheartened  when  the  Confederacy  had  to  give
up  territory.
£7johnston  and  Browne,   p.   372,   Dec.   30,   1860.
189.E.4.,   Ser.I,   Vol.   VI,   p.   794,   Jan.   5,1862.






Davis,  who  at  the  outset  favored  a  defensive  war,  had  been
influenced  while  at  West  Point  by  the  Frenchman,   Baron  Jomini,  one
of  the  foremost  writers  on  the  theory  of  war  in  the  eighteenth  century.
It  was  Jomini  who  stressed  the  offensive  and  who  inf luenced  Davis  to
adopt  the  ultimate  position  that  the  best  defense  is  a  good  offense.
Jomini  also  emphasized  importance  of  the  objective,   the  capital  city
as  being  the  primary  objective.21    Davis  also  saw  the  capital  as  being
very  important.     Consequently,   the  South  spent  much  time  in  trying  to
capture  Washington  and  expended  much  energy  and  many  men  in  clef ending
Richmond.     For  Davis,   it  was  a  matter  of  national  pride  that  the  South
maintain  Richmond  as  its  seat  of  government.     He  believed  that  the
preservation  of  the  capital  was  usually  regarded  as  the  evidence  to
mankind  of  a  separate  national  existence.     Thus  the  loss  of  Richmond
was  a  great  moral  as  well  as  material  injury  to  Davis  and  to  the
South.22     Some  historians  have  suggested  that  with  his  close  connection
at  Richmond,  Davis  began  to  see  the  war  through  the  eyes  of   the  border
states,  especially  Virginia,  and  began  to  lose  his  contact  with  the
Gulf  region.23    However,   the  influence  of  General  Lee  and  the  Jomini
ideas  seemed  to  play  a  far  greater  role  in  Davis'   concentration  on  the
border  states.     Too,  most  of  the  early  fighting  was  centered  around
the  border  states.     To  say  that  Davis  saw  the  war  through  the  eyes
2£T.   Harry  Williams,   "The  Military  Leadership  of  North  and  South,"
::B]:v:=gi¥;=±±e:;;:; E#oS±][;+ :i:8=  (Baton  ROu8e9  La. :     Louisiana  state
22g.E.4.,   Set.I,   Vol.   XLVI,   pt.   3,   pp.1381-83,   April  4,
1865.
23Eckenrode,   p.   144.
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of   the  border  states  and  was  less  concerned  with  the  Gulf  region  seems
to  be  a  oversimplif ication  and  a  somewhat  faulty  interpretation  of
Davis'   mind.
A  distinctive  characteristic  of  Davis  was  a  curiously  dogged
obstinacy  which  made  him,  while  loath  to  encourage  and  even  permit
offensive  adventures,  regard  retreat  as  an  indefensible  weakness,   even
when  retreat  was  obviously  the  correct  military  course.24    Thus  he  was
of ten  angered  by  the  action  of  General  J.   S.  Johnston.     This   tendency
to  argue  with  Johnston  or  other  military  leaders  interferred  with
Davis'   thinking  and  the  best  use  of  his  time.     In  his  arguments,  he
seemed  to  have  a  gaze  bent  to  some  degree  on    posterity  as  well  as
the  current  exigency.25    With  one  eye  toward  what  the  future  would
think  of  him,  he  differed  sharply  from  his  northern  counterpart,  Mr.
Lincoln.
With  the  South  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  guarding  cities
and  particular  points  which  were  important  but  not  vital  to  her  defense,
Davis  saw  that  the  Confederate  army  would  be  f ree  to  move  from  point  to
point  and  strike  in  detail  the  detachments  and  garrisons  of  the  enemy,
operating  in  the  interior  of  the  South.26    With  the  loss  of  Richmond,
Davis  recognized  advantages  which  were  not  present  when  the  Confederacy
was  trying  to  defend  its  capital.     On  the  other  hand,   Stephens  never
believed  that  the  maintenance  of  Richmond  as  the  seat  of  goverrment  was
very  important.     One  reason  may  have  been  that  he  disliked  Richmond,
seldom  stayed  there,   and  wanted  Montgomery  to  be  the  Southern  capital.
24Maurice,   p.   31.
25Nevins,   Statesmanship  9£  £±±£±|  !!|±E9   P.   43.
26g.E.A.,   Ser.I,   Vol.   XLVII,   pt.   3,   p.1383.
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Another  reason  was  that  he  never  regarded  the  capital--any  capital--as
being  that  important.     Here  again  Stephens  turned  to  history  to  f ind
examples  which  would  support  his  belief .     He  used  the  lessons  of
Frederick  of  Prussia  who  fought  all  the  great  powers  o£  Europe  for
seven  years  and  was  ultimately  successful.     His  country  was  overrun
and  his  capital,   Berlin,  was  twice  taken  and  sacked  during  the  war.
Thus,   Stephens  believed  that  if  Richmond  should  yet  fall  and  twice
fall,   the  South  should  be  no  worse  off  than  Prussia;  nor  should  the
South  be  more  disposed  than  the  great  Frederick  to  give  up  its  cause
as  a  lost  one.27     He  also   looked  at  the  Seven_Year  War  for  America's
independence.     During  that  struggle  several  of  the  states  were  over-
run,  occupied,   and  held  for  long  periods  of  time  by  the  enemy,
including  the  capital,  Philadelphia.     But  the  colonies  did  not  give
up,   and  eventually  they  were  successful.     So,   Stephens  reasoned,   the
South  should  not  be  downhearted  by  the  loss  of  Richmond,   as  history
showed  many  countries,  which  after  the  loss  or  capture  of  their
capitals,  were  later  successful  in  the  end.     Stephens  called  for  the
people  of  the  Confederacy  to  follow  these  early  examples  for,  as  these
earlier  people  had  fought  on,   so  could  the  Confederacy  continue  its
f ight  for  the  same  rights  and  principles  until  success  was  f inally
theirs.     "Nor  have  our  sufferings  or  sacrifices,  as  great  as  they  are,
been  anything  like  as  severe  as  theirs  were."28    Thus  Stephens
reasoned,   that  with  equal  patience  and  fortitude,   the  Confederacy
could  maintain  their  rights  and  principles.     Benjamin  stated  that  he
27stephens,   11,   p.   782.
28Ibid.
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was  not  afraid  of  the  North  taking  cities  in  the  South.    Talking  to
Mercier  in  1862,   Benjamin  showed  that  his  reason  for  not  worrying
about  this  situation  was  taken  from  history.     He  said,
We  remember  that  in  the  War  of  Independence,   the  English,
at  one  time  possessed  almost  all  the  coastal  cities,   and
yet  they  lost.     It  will  be  the  same  this  time  .   .   .  Like
the  English,   the  Yankees  are  f ighting  today  to  save  their
power  and  riches,  and  we  are  fighting,   like  the  Americans
did,   to  win  our  independence.
A  weakness  of  Davis,   shared  by  many  people  of  his   time,   especially
the  military  mind--and  Davis'  mind  was  shaped  by  his  military  training--
was  the  belief  that  war  was  the  business  of  the  military  not  the
politician.     His  choice  of  military  appointees  reflects his  belief.
Unfortunately  he  seldom  attempted  to  explain  the  action  of  his  adminis-
tration  as  he  made  the  mistake  of  assuming  his  purity  of  motive  would
be  unquestioningly  accepted  by  the  Southern  people.     It  was  of ten
Davis'   rule  to  ignore  assaults  upon  himself  and  his  policy,  not
realizing  that  the  leader  of  a  political  cause  is  inviting  disaster  if
he  assumes  that  the  people  need  no  additional  enlightenment  about  their
goverrment  and  its  leader's  policies.30    This  was  an  important  lesson
which  Davis  failed  to  see  in  history  and  it  proved  to  be  a  costly
mistake.
Unlike  many  Southern  contemporaries  who  made  f un  of  Lee  for
digging  fortifications  and  entrenchments,  Davis  seemed  to  understand
the  importance  and  the  necessity  of  using  such  methods.     In  one  letter
to  his  wife,  Davis  wrote  that  the  greatest  generals  of  ancient  and  modern
times  have  won  their  renown  by  labor,  with  victory  as  the  result.
29Lyrm  M.   Case  and  Warren  F.   Spencer, The  United  States  and  France:
§i][±| !!Z±E  Diplomacy  (Philadelphia:     University  of  Permsylvania  Press,1970),
pp.   279-80.
3°Rabun,   p.   300.
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Caesar  who  revolutionized  the  military  system  of  his  age  never  slept
in  a  camp  without  entrenching  it.     To  this  day,  France,   Spain,   and
Great  Britain  retain  memorials  of    Roman  invasion  in  the  massive  works
constructed  by  the  Roman  armies.31    Through  the  lessons  of  history,
Davis  realized  the  importance  of  entrenchments.     In  this  sense,   Davis
was  very  modern  minded.     Not  only  did  he  understand  the  real  function
of  a  staff ,  but  also  he  understood  the  importance  of  railroads  to
interior  lines.32    He  understood,   too,   the  importance  of  the  develop-
ment  of  internal  resources.33    Even  before  the  South  had  seceded
Davis  had  been  calling  for  these  new  developments  for  the  South.
Davis  believed  that  like  the  American  colonies  during  the
American  Revolution,   the  South  could  win  independence.     In  other  words
the  Confederates  could  win  by  not  losing.34    Even  when  the  end  was
near,  Davis  exhorted  Southerners  to  take  to  the  hills  and  resist  as
long  as  necessary  to  secure  independence.     In  1864  while  Sherman  was
marching  to  the  sea  and  the  Confederates  were  being  pressed  from  all
sides,  he  declared  that  the  Confederate  cause  was  not  lost  as  Sherman
could  not  keep  up  his   long  line  of  conmunications  and  must  retreat
sooner  or  later.    When  the  day  came,  he  said,   the  fate  that  befell  the
army  of   the  French  empire  in  its  retreat  from  Moscow  would  be  reenacted.35
3£Rowland,   V,   p.   272,   June   11,   1862.
32wi||iaus,   P.   40.
33g.i.A.,   Ser.I,   Vol.   LIII,   p.   831,   Oct.   21,1862.
34Emory  M.   Thomas,  !±±  Confederacy  ±± i Revolutionary  Experience
(Englewood  ClifJS   New  Jersey:     Prentice  Hall,   Inc.,1971),   p.   46.
35Dodd,   p.    334.
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In  his  vision  of  this  disaster  he  somehow  forgot  to  consider  the
effects  of  the  morale  of  the  people,   the  condition  of  the  land,   and
the  variation  in  the  two  climates.     He  insinuated  that  simply  because
Sherman  was  over-extending  his   line  of  supplies,   disaster  would  befall
him  as  it  had  Napoleon.     Davis  miscalculated  the  effect  of  "total  ivar"
upon  the  Southern  People.     They  had  had  enough.     Thus,   the  Confederacy
failed  to  do  what  the  colonies  had  done  against  England  because  the
Union  had  revolutionized  the  art  of  war. 36
Benjamin,   like  Davis,   saw  clearly  the  problems  of  the  Confederacy
as  a  whole,  and  made  a  strenuous  effort  to  prevent  dispersion  of  men
and  materials  to  nonessential  places.37    Benjamin  realized  the
importance  of  the  West  to  the  Confederacy.     He  declared  that  the  lines
of  communications   to  the  West  must  be  held  "at  any  sacrifice."38
Davis  attempted  to  follow  this  same  pattern  in  his  dealing  with  the
military  although  many  states' rights  men  became  angered  with  him.38
As  far  as  organizing  recruits  into  companies  and  companies  into
regiments,  Davis  followed  the  practice  of  requiring  men  of  the  several
states  to  be  kept  together.     However,  he  would  not  carry  this  practice
into  any  higher  echelons  such  as  into  a  division,  as  its  destruction
would  bring  too  heavy  a  calamity  upon  a  single  corrmunity.     Too,   the
assigning  of  troops  from  separate  states  to  comprise  a  division  would
keep  up  a  spirit  of  emulation  among  state  goverrments.40    Furthermore,
36Thomas,   p.   51.
37g.E.4.,   Ser.I,   Vol.   XV,   p.   871,   Feb.   23,1862.
38Meade,   "The  Relations  Between  Judah  P.   Benjamin  and  Jefferson
Davis,"  p.   473.
39g.E.4.,   Ser.I,   Vol.   XXXII,   pt.   2,   p.   554,   Jan.14,1864.
4°Row|and,   V,   p.   462,   March   30,   1863.
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Davis  did  not  believe  it  to  be  wise  to  allow  each  state  to  retain  its
own  troops  for  its  own  defense,   as  this  practice  would  give  strength
to  the  fatal  error  of  supposing  that  the  great  war  could  be  waged  by
the  Confederate  States  severally  and  unitedly.    This  theory  offered  the
least  hope  of  success.     For  Davis,   the  very  existence  of   the  Confederacy
depended  upon  the  "complete  blending  of  all  the  states  into  one  united
body  to  be  used  anywhere  and  everywhere  as  the  exigences  of  the  contest
may  require  for  the  good  of  the  whole."41    As  far  as   the  organization
and  placement  of   land  troops,   Davis  and  Benjamin  took  a  more  national
view  than  Stephens,  wh6  was  primarily  concerned  with  the  defense  of
his  own  state.
Besides  his  personal  and  historical  disposition,   there  were
other  reasons  why  Davis  favored  a  clef ensive  war.     He  wanted  to  present
to  the  world  the  idea  that  the  South  was  waging  the  war  solely  for
self-defense  and  that  the  South  desired  only  to  govern  itself.42
Another  reason  he  did  not  mount  a  major  offensive  was  because  he  did
not  want  to  withdraw  troops  defending  the  different  parts  of  the  South.
Here  the  idea  of  states'  rights  seemed  to  hinder  Davis  from  acting,   as
Davis  was,   in  the  beginning,   too  cautious   to   take  any  domestic  measures.
One  of   the  weaknesses  of  Benjamin  while  he  was   serving  as
Secretary  of  War  was  his   lack  of  military  knowledge  of  procedure  and
tactics.43    Benjamin  was  also  often  overly  optimistic  which  interfered
with  his  handling  and  interpretation  of  events.     Once,   in  1862,  when
4£9.i.4.,   Ser.I,   Vol.   LIII,   p.   831,   Oct.   21,1862.
42E±±±.,   vo|  X|X,   pt.   2,   p.   598,   Sept.   7,1862.
43Meade,   "The  Relations  Between  Judah  P.   Benjamin  and  Jefferson
Davis,"  p.   473.
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talking  about  a  recent  engagement,  he  exclaimed  about  "the  enormous
losses  suffered  by  the  enemy  during  the  present  campaign  to  which
history  furnishes  no  paralled  except  the  disastrous  retreat  from
Moscow."44    He  was   the  only  cabinet  member  who  supported  Davis   in  his
determination  to  continue  fighting.     A  poem  that  he  wrote,  when  the
Confederacy  was  quickly  sinking,   shows  this  optimistic  outlook.
My  voice  is  still  for  war
Gods!     Can  a  Roman  senate   long  debate
Which  of  the  two  to  choose,   slavery  or  death!
No,   let  us  arise  at  once,   gird  on  our  swords
And  at  the  head  of  our  remaining  troops
Attack  the  foe,  break  through  the  thick  array
of  his  thronged  legions,   and  charge  home  upon  him.45
Even  after  Johnston  surrendered,  Benjamin  did  not  lose  all  hope.
Mallory,   on  the  other  hand,   admitted  that  "the  great  object  of  our
Struggle   is  hopeless.n46
Initially  it  was  believed  that  the  war  would  be  a  conventional
nineteenth  century  clash  of  nations,  but  Davis  and  many  of  his  generals
gradually  changed  their  minds  and  adopted  a  strategy  more  compatible
with  the  revolutionary  nature  of  the  Confederacy.     Perhaps  because  they
were  revolutionary,  and  chief ly,  because  they  felt  they  were  aff irming
the  true  spirit  of  1776,   the  Confederate  leaders  drew  heavily  on  the
experience  of   the  American  Revolution.47    As   the  situation  became  more
desperate,   the  Confederate  leaders  adopted  more  revolutionary  ideas.
Neither  Davis,   Stephens,   Benjamin,  nor  Mallory  looked  on  the
Southern  secession  as  being  a  revolutionary  movement,  however; instead,
44Richardson,   11,  ±±± ±!e±£±8± ±±± !±B£E± 9£
the  Confederacy,   p.   32&,   Sept.   26,   1862.
45Meade,   p.   315.
46Durkin,   p.   339.
47Thomas,   p.   44.
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they  were  upholding  the  Constitution.     Only  Benjamin,   later  during  the
war,   seemed  to  grasp  the  fact  that  the  Confederacy  would  have  to  take
drastic  steps  to  win  its  independence.     Davis  failed  to  realize  he  was
a  revolutionary  chief  and  looked  upon  himself  as  a  constitutional
ruler,  forgetful  of  the  fact  that  the  South  had  to  win  independence.48
Davis  emphasized  that  the  Confederate  movement  was  not  a  revolution  as
they  were  seeking  to  preserve  the  laws  and  the  old  constitution,  not
to  change  them.49    Davis,  unlike  Lincoln,  was  not  a  reformer.     The  life
he  inherited  .from  his  forefathers,  his  experiences  as  a  soldier  and
farmer,  his  education,   contacts,   and  experiences  as  Senator  shaped  his
mind.50    He  read  widely  in  military  history  and  the  British  classics
which  helped  make  him  the  type  of  politician  he  was,   steeped  in
precedent  and  instances.     The  London  Times   said  in  1865   that  one  of
the  causes  of  the  Conf ederate  failure  was  the  reluctance  of  the
President  "to  assume  at  any  risk  the  dictatorial  powers   .   .   .  which
are  alone  adapted  to  .the  successful  management  of  revolutions."51
Davis  soon  realized  and  understood  that  the  Confederacy  was  fighting,
not  for  some  abstraction,  but  first  and  foremost  for  the  right  to  exist.
On  the  other  hand,   Stephens'  mind  seemed  to  think  in  terms  of
abstract  ideas  and  principles.     He  was  never  able  to  grasp  the  truth
that  no  nation  can  f ight  a  successful  war  against  a  formidable  foe  when
it  is  torn  by  internal  quarrels.     He  never  realized  that  a  governlnent
48Eckenrode,   p.   351.
49press|y,   p.   62.
5°Russell  Homer  Quynn9
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5£Rabun,   p.   321.
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that  lacks  power  in  wartime  is  foredoomed  to  diffusion  of  effort,
demoralization,   and  probably  defeat.     Neither  did  he  understand  that
the  Confederacy  must  first  fight  for  its  right  to  exist,  not  for  some
abstractions.52    Yet  Davis  was  more  of  a  conservative  leader  than  his
northern  counterpart.     He  exhibited  a  strong  sense  of  protocol  and
convention  but  a  weak  sense  of  innovation.     He  was  a  man  who   loved
order  and  logical  organization  better  than  he  loved  results  which  are
achieved  by  unorthodox  methods.     He  often  thought  more  in  terms  of
principles  rather  than  of  possibilities.53    In  his  message  to  Congress,
Davis  showed  his  conservative  nature  and  early  non-revolutionary  spirit.
For  him,   the  Conf ederacy  desired  "no  evils   to  our  enemies  nor  do  we
covet  any  of  their  possessions,  but  we  are  only  struggling  to  the  end
that  they  shall  cease  to  devastate  our  land  and  inflict  useless  and
cruel  slaughter  upon  our  people  and  that  we  be  permitted  to  live  at
peace  with  all  mankind."54    This  language  implied  that  Davis  did  not
look  on  the  South  as  a  new  nation  or  as  a  revolutionary  nation  but  as
the  continuation  of  an  old  established  nation.
Benjamin  seemed  to  have  a  broader  mind  and  a  broader  understanding
of  the  problems  facing  the  new  government.     Eventually,   he  was  even
ready  to  adopt  a  dictatorship  with  Davis  at  the  head.     Furthermore,
his  realistic  and  farsighted  view  on  slavery  showed  his  open  and  broad
mind.     Secretary  o£  Navy  Mallory  also  realized  the  necessity  of  the
52Ibid.
53potter,   p.   106.
54Richardson,   11,  E±± !£S£±±8± ±±± ±±P£EE 9±
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South  to  be  a  unit,   but  his  mind  was  mainly,   and  sometimes  solely,
concerned  with  the  developments  in  the  naval  department.     Mallory  was
an  able  administrator  and  a  clever  innovater  but  most  of  his  time  was
taken  up  by  the  war  at  sea.     To  him,   the  road  to  victory  was  on  the
shoulders  or  ships  of  the  Confederate  navy.    Although  his  dedication
to  the  navy  was  admirable,  his  mind  lacked  breadth  of  vision  in  that  it
only  recognized  and  was  concerned  with,   the  necessity  and  importance
of  the  Con.federate  navy.     Still  he  realized  the  importance  of  support
from  foreign  sources.     His  ideas  extended  not  only  to  the  major
European  countries  and  Latin  American  nations,   but  also  to  the
Mediterranean  nations  and  China  as  well.55    However,  neither  Davis  nor
Benjamin  placed  as  much  emphasis  on  the  maintenance  of   the  Confederate
ports  as  did  Mallory  as  they  devoted  more  of  their  thinking  toward  the
army  and  the  maintenance  of  territory. 56
Mallory,  far  earlier  than  his  Union  counterpart,  Gideon  Wells,
became  aware  that  the  American  Civil  War  was  being  waged  in  an  era  of
transition  in  naval  architecture  and  fighting  methods.    In  the  half-
century  prec`e:ding  the  war,  at  least  five  great  naval  revolutions  were
under  way.     These  new  developments   included  steam,   shell  guns.,   and
screw  propeller,   rifled  ordnance,   and  armor.     It  was   trie  shell  gun  that
upset  the  balance  between  offense  and  defense  and  sounded  the  knell  of
the  unarmored  wooden  ship.57    During  the  war  Mallory  contributed  to  the
development  of  new  naval  tactics.     It  was  his  belief  that  the  Confederate
55g.i.i.,   Ser.11,   Vol.11,   pp.   672-73,   June  20,1864.
56jones,   p.   55.
57Randa||  and  Donald,   p.   439.
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ships  could  attack  New  England  ports  and  cripple  the  f ishing  trade
from  Maine  to  California.     Such  Confederate  ships,   he  believed,   could
make  a  united  dash  at  New  England  fisheries  and  ports,   then  separate
for  reunion  at  Wilmington  or  Charleston,  where  they  might  strike  a
telling  blow,   to  separate  again  for  coaling  among  the  West  Indies.
"Such  a  system  of  alternate  united  and  separate  action  naval  light
infantry  tactics,"  Mallory  said,   "has  never  been  adopted  upon  the  sea,
simply  because  under  sail  it  would  be  impracticable,"  and  "since  the
application  of  steam  to  warships,   the  opportunity  has  never  been
offered.     Let  us  be  the  first  to  put  it  to  good  account."58    Even
though  Mallory  was  not  acutely  aware  of  the  happenings  in  foreign
countries,   these  foreign  countries,  especially  the  naval  powers,  were
probably  closely  observing  his  actions  because    of  his  development  of
tactics  and  equipment.
One  can  see  that  Mallory's  mind  was  concerned  mainly  with  the
Confederate  Navy.     In  light  of  the  means  and  resources  he  had  at  his
command,   the  job  he  accomplished  was  highly  admirable  and  somewhat
surprising.59    He  displayed  exceptional  imagination  and  initiative
in  developing  modern  equipment  peculiarly  adaptable  to  Conf ederate
resources  and  needs.
Throughout  the  1850's,  while  he  was   in  Congress,   and  into   the
1860's,  when  he  was   Secretary  of   the  Navy,  Mallory  reviewed  the  history
of  the  ironclad  ships  in  Gieat  Britain  and  France  and  recognized  that
58Ej2±4.,   p.   622,   April   7,1864.
59scharf ,   p.   37.
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not  only  economy  but  also  naval  success  dictated  the  wisdom  and
expedience  of  the  use  of  ironclad  ships.60    Especially  in  use  of  the
ironclads,  Mallory's  action  was  highly  commendable  as  he  saw what  the
federal  experts  had  either  failed  to  see  or  failed  to  act  upon,   the
importance  of  ironclads.     Both  Davis  and  Mallory  realized  that  the
possession  of  an  iron-armored  ship  must  be  a  matter  of   the  highest
necessity.61    While  Davis  was  Secretary  of  War,  he  had  studied  closely
the  Crimean  War  and  its  eff ects  upon  warfare  both  on  land  and  on  sea.
Mallory  had  also  been  aware  of   the  ironclad,   steam-propelled  battleship
and  the  power  it  had  demonstrated  in  the  Crimean  War.     By  1860,   its
full  meaning  had  even  startled  the  world,   especially  Great  Britain
and  France. 62
Another  reason  for  his  emphasis  on  the  ironclad  was  the  reali-
zation  that  the  ironclad  was  the  quickest  way  to  raise  the  Confederate
f leet  on  a  level  similar  to  and  eventually  superior  to  the  northern
f leet.     His  strategy  was  to  concentrate  on  the  building  of  ironclads.
In  his  report  to  Congress  in  1861,  he  talked  about  the  rivalry  between
France  and  Great  Britain  on  the  building  of  ironclads  and  about  their
various  uses.     If  the  South,  he  said,   concentrated  on  building  wooden
ships,   it  would  have  to  build  much  quicker  than  the  North  as   the  North
already  possessed  more  ships   than  the  South.     The  wooden  vessels  built
by  the  Confederacy  would  fall  easy  prey  to  the  enemy's  comparatively
numerous  steam  frigates.     Hence,   he  would  try  to  compensate  for  this
inequality  of  number  by  invulnerability.    Mallory  felt  that  naval
6°strode,   11,   p.   77.
619.E.I.,   Ser.11,   Vol.11,   pp.   67-69,   May   10,1861.
62ERE.,   pp.   67-69.
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engagements  between  wooden  f rigates  as   they  were  built  and  armed  were
obsolete  efforts.63     So  he  decided  not  to  try  to  build  large  wooden
ships  even  if  they  could  be  made  superior  to  the  northern  wooden
vessels.64    An  example  of   this   single-minded  devotion  to   the  Confederate
Navy  can  be  seen  in  a  letter  he  sent  to  W.  W.   Hunter,   the  commanding
off icer  at  Savarmah.
Should  the  city  fall,  however,  you  must  save  your  vessels.
Under  any  circumstances,   it  is  better  for  the  vessels,  for
the  Navy,   for  our  cause  and  country,   that  these  vessels  should
fall  in  the  conf lict  of  battle  .   .   .   than  that  they  should
be  tamely63urrendered  to   the  enemy  or  destroyed  by  their  own
officers.
Here  Mallory's  mind  seemed  only  to  grasp  the  importance  of  the  naval
vessels,  not  the  military  and  economic  effect  that  the  fall  of  Savannah
would  have.     One  of  the  surprising  aspects  of  the  war  was  not  only  the
fact  that  Mallory  recognized  the  importance  of  new  developments  such  as
the  ironclad  but  also  the  fact  that  the  North  was  so  slow  in  recognizing
and  responding  to  these  significant  advancements.
While  Mallory  realized  that  the  Confederate  Navy  by  use  of  force
could  not  destroy  Federal  blockade,  he  believed, however,  that  such
Confederate  ships as   the  Tallahassee  and  the  Alabama  could bring  about
a  compulsory  withdrawal  of  a  portion  of  the  blockade  force.     Thus  he
saw  naval  strategy  as  more  than  one  ship  f ighting  another  ship.     He
understood  that  the  consequent  insecurity  of  the  United  States  coastline
commerce,   the  detention  and  delay  of  vessels  in  ports,   and  the  augmen-
tation  of  the  rates  of  marine  insurance, adding  millions  to  the  expenses
63±±±±.,   voi.   I,   pp.   742-43,   May  8,1861.
64±±±±.,   voi.   ||,   p.   64,   May  9,1861.
65±±±£.,   ser.   I,   vo|.   XV|,   p.   481,   Dec.17,1864.
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of  commerce  and  navigation,were  more  important  in  the  overall  picture  of
strategy  and  Confederate  success. 66
Mallory  hoped  to  increase  the  Confederacy's  limited  naval
resources  with  foreign  aid.     At  first,  he  was  optimistic  about  the
Confederacy  receiving  resources  from  abroad.     Shortly  af ter  the  Con-
federacy  seceded,  he  sent  men  to  the  United  States  and  Canada  to  buy
vessels,  but  the  opening  of  hostilities  prevented  any  purchases  from
these  two  sources.67    Then  Mallory  turned  his  attention  toward  Europe,
particularly  England  and  France.     Here  again  Mallory  seemed  somewhat
naive  in  anticipating  no  cliff iculties  in  purchasing  materials  for  his
ironclads  as  he  misunderstood  world  opinion  at  that  time.     Eventually,
as  the  war  wore  on,  he  realized  that  construction  of  ironclads  within
the  jurisdiction  of  the  English  and  French  governments  was  very
unlikely.68    Mallory  continued  to  strive  toward  the  construction  of
a  Confederate  navy  within  her  own  boundaries.
In  times  of  war,  one  is  especially  aware  of  the  humanity  or
cruelties  of  the  two  opposing  sides.     In  spite  of  such  hardships  and
cruelties,   Davis,   Benjamin,   Stephens,   and  Mallory  showed  a  benevolent
spirit.     In  a  corrmunication  with  the  Vice  President  Davis  declared  that
he  wanted  "to  place  this  war  on  the  footing  of  such  as  are  waged  by
civilized  people  in  modern  times,   and  to  divest  it  of  the  savage
character  which  has  been  impressed  on  it  by  our  enemies  in  spite  of
all  our  efforts  and  protest."69    Fundamentally  Davis  and  Stephens
66±±±±.,   vo|.   x,   pp.   793-94,   Oct.   22,1864.
67patrick,   p.   249.
68g.E.A.,   Ser.I,   Vol.   XXVII,   pt.1,   p.   595.
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thought  in  terms  of  principles,   rather  than  in  how  to  defeat  the  North
and  win  the  war.     They  would  hardly  consider  carrying  the  war  to  the
civilian  population  of  the  North  as  they  believed  that  the  Southern
military  should  be  only  concerned  with  the  Northern  military.
Both  Davis  and  his  Secretary  of  War  Benjamin  believed  to  the
last  that  it  was  not  merely  right,  but  the  wisest  and  best  policy  to
maintain  and  respect  every  one  of  the  humane  restrictions  in  the
conduct  of  the  war  which  other  civilizations  had  maintained.     They  did
not  agree  with  the  United  States  War  Department  that  any  and  all
destruction  of  the  property  of   the  eneny  was  justifiable.70    Although
the  Secretary  of  Navy,  Mallory,   could  adopt  harsh  measures   toward
prisoners  of  war,71  he  urged  the  Confederacy  to  act  in  accordance  with
the  rules  of  Christian warfare,  even  when  trying  to  inflict  upon  the
eneny  the  greatest  injury  in  the  shortest  time.72    Implicit  in  his
orders  was  his  conviction  that  even  in  war  one  must  remain  a  gentle-
man.73    He  also  expected  the  officers  and  seamen  alike  to  live  up   to
the  codes  of  sound  morality.     He  insisted  that  each  vessel  having  a
chaplain  was  to  provide  worship  services  for  its  men.74    Stephens  always
considered  himself  to  be  high-minded  and  superior  to  other  people  so  he
abhorred  the  conduct  of  the  war,  on  the  southern  side  as  well  as  Qn
the  northern  side.     These  men  found  themselves  more  traditionally
7°Richardson,   11,  ±±± !±e±±±g± ±±± ±±P£E± 9±
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linked  to  the  past  than  the  leaders  in  the  North  were.     They  were
horrified  by  the  North's  use  of  "total  wart'  and  did  not  utilize  the
more  modern  barbarous  methods  of  warfare,   either  psychological  or
military,   if  they  thought  it  was  beneath  their  principles  and  was
opposed  to  previous  codes  of  warfare  of  other  civilizations.
Yet  Davis  made  privateering  legal  and  was  violently  attacked  for
doing  so  by  Abraham  Lincoln  and  the  North.     Davis  made  it  known  that
the  United  States  had  previously  accepted  privateering  and  had  used  it
successfully  against  the  British  merchant  marine  in  the  War  of  1812.
In  addition,   the  United  States  goverrment  had  refused  to  sign  the
Declaration  of  Paris  which  was  an  agreement  among  the  European  powers
which  had  defined  privateering  illegal.75    From  this  legal-historical
point  of  view,  Davis  was  convinced  that  privateering  was  a  legal  means
of  waging  war.     But  here  again  he  would  only  go  so  far,   insisting  he
had  no  idea  of  becoming  the  chief  of  disorganized  land  pirates  who
obeyed  no  rules  of  organized  warfare.76    This  suggestion  was  abhorent
to  him  until  near  the  end  of  the  war  when  he  realized  that  guerilla
warfare  was   the  only  way  the  South  could  continue  to  exist.     Then  he
advocated  such  types  of  warfare  only  until  the  South  was  again  able  to
get  back  on  her  feet.    Mallory,  who  also  favored  privateering,   turned
a  cold  shoulder  to  an  offer  made  by  certain  people  who  desired,  for  a
share  of  the  prize  money,   to  initiate  guerilla  tactics  on  the  western
rivers.77    Thus,  a  combination  of  high  standards  of  morality  and  an
75Foote,   ||,   p.   114.
76MCE|roy,   p.   402.
77g.i.A.,   Ser.   I,   Vol.   XXII,   pt.   2,   pp.1001-02,   Sept.10,1863.
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insistence  on  order  and  regularity  made  Mallory  and  Davis  opposed  to
certain  military  measures  however  closely  they  resembled  privateering,
which  they  both  favored.
While  these  men  were  concerned  with  principles  and  rights,   they
seldom  gave  extended  consideration  to  the  basic  question  of  what  the
South  would  hav'e  to  do  in  order  to  win  the  war.     In  contrast  to  Davis
who  seldom  mentioned  it,  Lincoln  emphasized  this  basic  question  of  what
was  necessary  to  win  the  war  in  his  speeches   to  Congress.78     It  seems
that  the  mind  of  Benjamin  understood  better  than  Davis,   the  importance
of  this  question.     He  recognized  it  as  being  the  most  important  and
the  fundamental  question  for  the  South.     However,   like  Davis  and
Mallory,  he  failed  to  comprehend  the  importance  of  the  military  and
the  civilian  working  in  harmony  with  an  understanding  of  what  each  was
doing.     Thus  the  South's  leadership  fell  short  of  the  North's  leader-
ship  and  made  it  increasingly  unlikely  that  the  South  could  ever  gain
its  independence.
While  Davis  was  not  overly  concerned  with  what  the  people  thought,
he  was  not  indifferent,  as  Stephens  implied,   to  the  personal  liberty
of  the  Southern  people  nor  was  he  forgetful  of  the  rights  of  individuals.
He  was  slow  to  suspend  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  and  when  he  did
f inally  yield  to  the  needs  of  any  given  situation  it  was  only  under
the  form  of  law  and  at  the  request  of  Congress  and  the  people  concerned.
When  the  need  for  martial  law  in  a  given  locality  had  expired,  he  was
quick  to  restore  the  authority  of  the  civil  magistrates.79    Not  until
78potter,   p.   111.
79Dodd,   p.    294.
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the  war  was  racing  to  its  close  did  he  suggest  the  suspension  of  the
writ  of  habeas  corpus  in  all  disaffected  districts.    This  action
would  have  been  equivalent  to  putting  the  country  into  the  hands  of
a  supreme  dictator.80    Whereas,   previously  he  had  been  very  harsh  to
any  military  corrmanders  who  exercised  martial  rule  without  his
permission,  he  finally  realized  that  such  steps  must  be  taken  if  the
South  was   to  win  the  war. 81
Viewing  the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  from  an
historical  perspective,   Stephens  was  especially  alarmed  that  Davis
would  take  such  action.     Stephens   looked  at  the  history  of  England,   the
beheading  of  Charles  I  and  the  subsequent  strife  between  the  people  and
the  crown  which  f inally  terminated  in  1688-89  when  William  and  Mary
became  the  sovereigns.     In  this  settlement,  all  the  ancient  rights  and
liberties  of  the  English  people,   including  the  right  of  the  writ  of
habeas  corpus,  werereaffirmed  and  secured.     He  believed  that  everyone
should  study  closely  the  effect  that  the  suspension  of  the  writ  of
habeas  corpus  had  had    on  England.82     So,   for  Stephens,   if  the  Con-
federate  government  suspended  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,   the  result
could  be  disastrous  to  its  internal  harmony.     In  September  of  1862,  he
implied  in  a  letter  to  James  Callahan  that  the  suspension  of  the  writ
amounted  to  nothing  at  all  except  withdrawing  the  privilege  of  bail.83
These  theories  of  Stephens'  were  directly  contrary  to  historic  practice.
In  Great  Britain  and  in  America,   the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas
corpus  had  always  meant  that  the  state  could  arrest  and  imprison  a
8oEap.,   p.   323.
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suspected  traitor  or  conspirator  of  treason  and  hold  him  imprisoned
with  a  practical  indefiniteness.84    In  a  letter  to  the  mayor  of
Atlanta  in  1862,  after  the  city  had  been  placed  under  martial  law,
Stephens  again  turned  to  history  to  support  his  argument  that  since
the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  was  not  a  written  law,
only  an  unconstitutional  decree  by  Davis,   the  people  did  not  have  to
obey  it.     His  example  was   that  when  the  British  Queen  Anne  was  once
urged  by  the  emperor  of  Russia  to  punish  one  of  her  off icers  for  what
the  emperor  considered  an  act  of  indignity  to  one  of  his  ambassadors,
though  the  off icer  had  violated  no  written  law,   the  Queen  replied
that  "she  would  imf lict  no  punishment  upon  any  of  the  meanest  of  her
Subjects,   unless  warranted  by  the  law  of  the  land."85
Another  reason  Stephens  was  fearful  of  such  action  was  that  he
was  afraid  of  one  man  having  too  much  power.     Stephens  believed  that
power  was  a  corrupting  force,  and  he  saw  Davis  affected  by  the  same
problem.     This  excess  power  caused  Davis   to  become  enraged  when  any-
body  questioned  his  decisions.     Stephens  warned  that  what  thousands
of  others  under  like  temptations  had  done  was  history  as  it  was  an
eternal  truth  that  power  "fascinates,  intoxicates,  and  changes  the
nature  of  man."86    Stephens  further  stated  that  he  did  not  fight  the
act  of  habeas  corpus  simply  to  censure  the  President.     He  again  turned
to  an  historical  parable  as  he  replied  that  it  would  be  humiliating
and  almost  degrading  to  human  nature  if  people  insisted  that  Washington,
84james  G.   Randall,
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in  his  memorable  address   to  the  army  in  1782,   the  greatest  speech
Stephens  believed  ever  delivered  by  man,  had  no  higher  object  than  to
censure  or  put  down  the  supposed  author.     Stephens   implied  that  his
own  motives  were  similar   to  those  of  Washington,   and  of  a  purer  and
more  noble  spirit  than  spite  or  malice.     Even  in  his  argument  he  hunted
for  an  historical  lesson  to  support  his  own  argument.87     Stephens
believed  that  if  the  suspension  of  habeas  corpus  continued,   constitutional
liberty  would  go  down,  never  again  to  rise  on  this  continent.88    He
even  insisted  that  it  was
Far  better  that  our  country  should  be  overrun  by  the  enemy,
our  cities  sacked  and  burned,   and  our  land  laid  desolate,
than  that  the  people  should  thus  suff er  the  citidel  o.f
:I:::d::B9rties  to  be  entered  and  taken  by  prof essed
Stephens  continued  to  warm  the  Confederate  legislature  against
two  fatal  snares  which  he  believed  were  being  spread-trust  in  a
dictator  and  "that  most  insidious  enemy  which  approaches  with  the
syren  (sic)   song,   independence  first  and  liberty  afterwards."90    In  a
paraphrase  o£  Patrick  Henry's  speech,  he  concluded  his  address  to  the
legislature,   "As  for  myself ,  give  me  liberty  as  secured  in  the  constitu-
tion  with  all  its  guaranties,  amongst  which  is  the  sovereignty  of
Georgia--or  give  me  death."91    Unlike  Benjamin,   Mallory,   or  Davis,
Stephens  never  considered  independence  as  being  the  foremost  question
Or  goal.
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While  Stephens  believed  the  suspension  of  habeas  corpus  would
cause  a  bad  reaction  abroad,92  the  President  did  not  foresee  any
difficulties  from  the  suspension  of  habeas  corpus.     Indeed,  Davis
recognized  that  in  the  last  hundred  years,   the  history  of  England  was
full  of  examples  where  she  had  been  forced  to  suspend  the  writ  of
habeas  corpus.93    Thus,   Davis  reasoned,   England  could  not  object  to
the  Confederacy  suspending  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.
To  Stephens,   the  preservation  of   liberty  was  more  important
than  the  preservation  of  the  Confederacy.     He  believed  that  all  wars,
especially  civil  wars,   always  mena.ced  liberty  while  they  seldom
advanced  it,  and  they  usually  ended  in  the  overthrow  and  destruction
of  liberty.     For  Stephens,   this  problem was  the  most  significant  one
the  young  Confederacy  faced.     The  teaching  of  history,  he  declared,
illustrated  this  fact.     An  example  he  gave  was  England  in  1639  when
she  abandoned  reason  and  resorted  to  the  sword  as  the  surest  means  of
advancing  her  cause.     Even  af ter  the  great  accomplishments  under
Charles  I,   the  people  were  still  not  satisfied,  and  as  a  result,  a
civil  war  erupted.     Even  though  the  king  was  deposed,   the  end  result
was  the  reduction  of  the  people  of  England  to  a  worse  state  of  oppression
than  they  had  experienced  for  centuries.     They  retraced  their  steps,
and  it  was  not  until  twenty  years  later  that  they  restored  their
liberties.     Henceforth  the  House  of  Corrmions  and  the  House  of  Lords  were
the  theatres  of  operations,  not  the  field  of  Newberry  or  Marston  Moor.
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The  result  was  that  in  less  than  thirty  years,  all  their  ancient  rights
and  privileges,  which  had  been  lost  during  their  civil  war,  were  re-
established  with  new  securities  in  the  ever-memorable  settlement  of
1688,  which  for  all  practical  purposes  might  be  looked  upon  as  a
bloodless  revolution.     From  that  time,  all  reforms   that  were  made  in
England  were  made  in  peace.     This  hope  was  Stephens'   dream  for  the
South.94    Throughout  the  war  he  fought  against  such  action  that  he
believed  would  deprive  the  people  of  the  South  of  their  liberties.
In  this  light,  perhaps,  .one  can  better  understand  Stephens'   opposition
to  the  Davis'   administration.
During  the  last  few months  of  the  war,   Benjamin  hinted  at  the
need  for  a  dictatorship  if  the  South  could  win  by  no  other  means. 95
In  this  direction,  he  went  much  farther  than  the  other  members  of  the
Confederate  cabinet.     Benjamin  would  have  preferred  Davis  to  be  the
dictator,   not  Robert  E.   Lee.     In  November,   1864,   Benjamin  declared
tha t ,
If  the  Constitution  is  not  to  be  our  guide,  I  would  prefer
to  see  it  suppressed  by  a  revolution  which  should  declare
a  dic.tatorship  during  the  war,  after  the  manner  of  ancient
::::'a::a¥:::1::  :::e:::::.68e  Care  of  reestablishing
Stephens  considered  federal  warfare  against  the  Confederacy  as
being  unnatural,  unjust,  unchristian,  and  inconsistent  with  every
fundamental  principle  of  American  constitutional  liberty.97    The  Civil
94johnston  and  Browne,   pp.   584-85.
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War  would  also  be,   believed  the  Vice  President,   the  greatest  war  waged
on  the  largest  scale  of  any  since  the  birth  of  Christ.     "The  history  of
the  world--not  excepting  the  Crusade--furnishes  no  parallel  to  it  in
the  present  era."98    Hence  the  American  Civil  War  was  especially  tragic
for  Stephens  in  two  ways;   one,   because  of  the  great  killing  which  took
place,  and  two,   becarise  of  the  enfringements  upon  the  constitutional
liberty  of  the  American  people  which  occurred.
Even  though  he  expressed  a  high  personal  regard  for  Lincoln,
Stephens  considered  him  to  be  a  usurper  of  power  who  disregarded  his
oath  and  was  lacking  in  a  feeling  of  humanity.     Stephens  recognized  that
Lincoln  was  a  kind-hearted  individual  in  his  private  lif e  but  so  were
many  men  who  f igured  in  history,  men  who  brought  the  greatest  suff ering
and  miseries  upon  mankind.     Stephens  insisted  that  Danton  and
Robespierre,   "the  bloodiest  monsters  in  the  form  of  men  we  read  of
in  history,"  were  distinguished  by  the  same  qualities  in  their  private
lives.99     Stephens  thought  that  Lincoln
may  have  indulged  in  a  'casuistry'   after  the  sort  of  that
indulged  by  Danton.     It  may  be  that  he  thought  that  he  was
not  the  'minister  of  Justice'   in  these  things,  but  the
'Preserver  of  the  Union.'     He  may  even  have  come  to  the
conclusion,  as  I  think  not  improbable,   that  he  was  an
instrument  especially  raised  up  by  Providence  to  emanci-
pate  the  Black  race  in  the  Southern  states--an  object  so
dear  to  the  hearts  of  so  many  of  his  Party,   as  it  was  so
dear  to  the  hearts  of  Robespierre,   towards  a  like
population  in  other  parts  o`f  the  world.    All  this  may
be  possible,   but  his  acts  like  Robespierre,  and  the
acts  of  all  men  of  like  character  belong  to  history,
and  with  them  as  such  only  I  now  deal.     They  must,   like
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Stephens  also  found  Julius  Caesar  to  be  a  kind-hearted  man  as
well  as  sharing  a  number  of  other  characteristics  with  Lincoln.
Caesar  was  certainly  esteemed  by  many  of  the  best  men  of  his  day  for
some  of  the  highest  qualities  which  dignified  human  nature.     Caesar
was  a  thorough  scholar,   a  profound  philosopher,  an  accomplished  orator,
and  one  of  the  most  gif ted,   as  well  as  published  writers  of  the  age  in
which  he  lived.     He  had  many  devoted  personal  friends.     "Yet  notwith-
standing  all  these  distinguishing,  amiable,  and  high  qualities  of  his
private  character,  he  is  by  the  general  consent  o.f  mankind  looked  upon
as  the  destroyer  of  the  liberties  of  Rome."101     Stephens  used  the  case
of  Caesar  to  illustrate  his  own  view  on  the  private  character  of
Lincoln  and  of  his  public  acts.     Stephens  believed  that  power  generally
changes  and  transforms  the  character  of  those  invested  with  it.     Hence,
he  saw  a  great  necessity  for  "chains"  in  the  Constitution,   to  bind  all
rulers  and  men  in  authority,   spoken  of  by  Thomas  Jefferson.102
If  a  prophetic  disclosure  had  been  made  to  Lincoln,   regarding
his  action,   Stephens  believed  that  he  would  have  been  shocked  like  the
prophet  Hazael  when  he  was   told  by  Elisha  that  Benhodad,   the  King  of
Syria,  would  surely  die  and  that  he,  Hazael  would  be  elevated  to  the
throne.     But  Hazael  did  everything  which  was  told  to  him  that  he  would
do.     He  maintained  a  government  over  an  unwilling  people,   though  in
doing  it,  he  put  thousands  to  death,   because  they  would  not  submit  to
his  rule.     He  also  found  it  necessary  to  burn  their  cities  and  to
destroy  their  land.     Thus  so  Lincoln,  and  it  did  not  excuse  them  that
1°1EE±.,   p.   447.
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both  Lincoln  and  Hazael  were  perfectly  conscientious  in  all  that  they
did  to  maintain  their  goverrment.103     Stephens  seems   to  have  had  a
difficult  time,  as  a  commentator  from  history,   in  that  he  usually
tried  to  put  the  blame  of  some  event  on  the  head  of  one  person  in
particular.     He  could  not  look  at  events  in  an  objective  way  and  when
he  studied  history,  he  seemed  to  know  what  he  wanted  to  f ind  before
he  even  started  searching  for  it.
Another  target  of  Stephens'   attack  was  the  Confederate  conscription
law.     He  believed  that  nothing  could  be  more  ruinous  to  the  cause  of
the  Confederacy  than  the  conscription  law,   if  it  was  carried  into  effect.
In  his  judgment,   to  wage  war  successfully,  men  at  home  were  as  necessary
as  men  in  the  f ield.     The  people  could  successfully  carry  on  a  long
war  with  more  than  a  third  of  its  arms  bearing  population  kept  constantly
at  home.     Especially  if  cut  off  by  the  blockade  and  thrown  upon  its
own  internal  sources,   a  country  needed  men  at  home.     He  used  historical
evidence  to  show  his  case.     He  viewed  the  success  of  Greece  against
the  invasion  of  Persia,   the  success  of  the  Netherlands  against  Phillip,
the  success  of  Frederick  against  the  allied  powers  of  Europe,  and  the
success  o.f  the  colonies  against  Great  Britain;   in  this  light  all  these
historic  examples  o.f  resistence  to  invasion  proved  that  a  country,
even  without  all  its  arms  bearing  young  not  in  the  f ield,  waged  war
successfully.     He  insisted  that  an  invaded  people,   the  Confederacy,  had
many  advantages  that  might  be  resorted  to  in  order  to  counterbalance
the  North's  superiority  in  numbers.     Thus,  he  insisted,   the  people
should  study  and  compare  the  present  conditions  with  past  conditions  in
£°3ERE.,   p.   451.
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order  to  understand  these  advantages,  as,   in  order  to  secure  success,
brains  must  be  used  as  well  as  muskets.104    So  Stephens'   historical
knowledge  and  his  interpretations  of  this  knowledge  argued  against  the
use  of  conscription.     Stephens  also  believed  that  once  the  conscription
law was  repealed,   the  people,  no  longer  fearing  a  military  tyranny,
would  volunteer  in  large  numbers.105     Stephens  also  used  a  moral
argument  in  his  opposition  to  conscription.    He  believed  that  war
ought  to  be  abandoned  the  moment  conscription  became  necessary  to  f ill
up  the  army,   as  conscripts,  who  might  be  effective  machines  for  erecting
dynasties,  could  never  be  the  means  of  establishing  free  institutions
or  maintaining  them. 106
Davis  upheld  conscription  under  the  clause  of  the  Constitution
which  gave  to  Congress  the  power  to  raise  and  support  armies,  and  since
the  Constitution  did  not  specify  just  how  Congress  was  to  raise  armies,
Congress  itself  had  to  devise  this  mode.£°7    Davis  believed  that  to
deny  to  Congress  the  right  to  say  how  it  would  carry  out  one  of  its
unquestionable  powers  would  compel  it  to  abandon  the  power  altogether.
"That  was  a  conclusion  so  mani.festly  absurd,"  said  Davis,   "that  the
framers  of  the  Constitution  could  never  have  contemplated  it."108
While  Stephens  saw  conscription  as  an  elrmachment  upon  the  sovereignty
of  the  states,  he  also  regarded  it  as  a  violation  of  not  only  the  spirit
but  also  the  letter  of  the  Constitution.109    If  Davis  had  concurred
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with  Stephens'   contentions  in  controlling  his  policy,   the  Confederate
goverrment  would  have  had  as  little  assured  military  strength  as  the
goverrment  of  the  Conf ederation  had  had  during  the  American  Revolution.
Such  an  ineffective  government  Davis  had  no  thought  of  heading,  for
having  given  his  loyalty  to  the  Confederacy,  he  was  ready  to  sacrif ice
the  supposed  interest  of  any  part  to  the  attainment  of  the  independence
of   the  whole.110    Indeed,  Davis'   determination  to  run  the  show  caused
him many  problems  as  he  was  an  unyielding  nationalist,   loyal  to  the
South  rather  than  to  Mississippi,  ready  to  consolidate  the  Confederacy
at  the  cost  of  state  privileges,  and  bold  in  his  strokes  for  independence
no  matter  how  angrily  governors  protested  at  some  of  them. 111
Davis,  in  calling  for  all  the  people  in  the  Confederacy  to  fight
the  enemy,   used  as  his  example  the  American  Revolutionary  War  in  which
no  man  was   too  old  and  no  boy  was   too  young,   if  he  had  the  physical
capacity  to  enter  the  army  and  fight  for  his  cause.112    Benjamin  and
Mallory  agreed,  and  were  in  favor  of  the  conscription  law  and  the
abolition  of  class  exemptions,  while  Stephens  opposed  such  measures.
Another  reason  for  Stephens'   opposition,  although  one  does  not  know
what  role  it  played,  was  his  personal  dislike  and  mistrust  of  Davis
which  grew  as   the  war  ralton.     In  any  event,  Davis,   Benjamin,  and
Mallory  were  more  concerned  with  reality  and  the  war  than  with  the
high-minded  principles  of  Stephens,  who,  although  he  seemed  to  have
had  a  great  knowledge  of  history,   saw  history  in  terms  of  eternal
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principles  and  easily  perceived  truths.    Davis,  although  lacking  part
o£  Stephens'   great  knowledge,   could  see  the  stark  realities  of
history  and  could  learn  from  history  much  more  than  Stephens  ever
could.     Davis,   Benjamin,and  Mallory  did  benefit  from  their  study  of
history  and  were  able,   especially  Mallory,   to  apply  lessons  from
history  to  benef it  the  Confederate  cause.
CHAPTER   VI
CONCLUSION:       HISTORICAL   THINKING   AND   UNDERSTANDING
OF   FOUR   CONFEDERATE   LEADERS
It  can  f irmly  be  maintained  that  the  concepts  of  history  and
historical  understandings  held  by  Je.fferson  Davis,  Alexander  Stephens,
Judah  Benjamin,  and  Stephen  Mallory  had  significant  imf luences  on  their
thought  and  action  during  the  Civil  War  years.     How were  the  policies,
roles,  and  activities  of  each  man  influenced  by  their  ideas  of  history
and  world  views?
Stephen  Mallory's  early  influences,  his  religion,   and  his  schools
helped  him  to  develop  a  world  view.     Mallory's  interest  in  naval  history
developed  due  to  his  interest  in  maritime  law.     His  mind  was  also  linked
to  tradition  as  he  had  great  pride  in  the  United  States  navy,   even
though,   like  other  navies,   it  was  deteriorating  due  to  the  problem  of
discipline.     As  Secretary  of  Navy,  Mallory's  continuous  interest  in
naval  history  became  very  important  to   the  Confederacy.     He  understood
the  importance  of  educating  and  training  the  naval  personnel  as  he
believed  this  had  made  the  navy  of  Great  Britain  superior  to  the  navies
of  France  and  Spain.     Mallory  also  used  naval  history  to  improve  upon
his  own  navy  and  thus  he  was  one  of  the  f irst  to  realize  the  great
impact  which  the  ironclad  ships  would  have  on  the  future  of  the  world.
However,   the  lessons  he  learned  from  history  were  directed  primarily
toward  improvement  of   the  Confederate  Navy.     Indeed,   it  seemed  that  his
mind  was  directed  almost  singularly  toward  naval  history.
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Mallory's  mind  was  not  as  concerned  with  slavery  as  that  of  the
other  Confederate  leaders.     Yet  he  expressed  hope  that  the  Negroes
could  become  useful  members  of   society,   and  during  the  war  he  was
desirous  o.f  using  slaves  to  help  construct  the  navy.     This  probably
contributed  to  his  feeling  that  the  future  would  show  that  Negroes
were  f it  to  be  members  of  society.
Mallory  regarded  secession  as  only  the  last  resort.     He  warned
the  North  not  to  repeat  the  mistakes  of  the  Bourbons  and  mistake  a
nation  for  a  .faction.     Mallory  saw  the  Confederate  states  as  being  one
united  nation  and  expressed  great  pride  in  the  Confederate  government.
Mallory  also  believed  that  a  speedy  recognition  would  .follow  the
South's  secession.     He  accused  the  French  of  being  very  ignorant  of
United  States'   history  if  they  thought  the  United  States  would  ignore
their  own  Monroe  Doctrine.     It  was  Mallory  who  f irst  pledged  cotton  in
return  for  equipment,  becoming  the  first  to  attempt  to  use  cotton  in
his  diplomacy.
From  his  early  background,   Judah  Benjamin  gained  a  cosmopolitan
outlook.     In  the  1850's,   along  with  Davis,   Benjamin  recognized  the
importance  that  trade  with  China  and  Japan  could  represent  for  the
South.     While  he  was  interested  in  Greek  and  Roman  history,  his  main
contact  with  history  was  through  his  law  practice.     Benjamin  exhibited
a  great  deal  of  knowledge  concerning  not  only  the  legal  history  of
the  United  States  but  of  foreign  nations  as  well.
Benjamin  argued  for  slavery  from  a  historic-legal  viewpoint.
From  the  time  when  Greece  had  made  slaves  o-f   their  prisoners  captured
in  war  until  the  formation  of  the  English  empire,   slavery  had  been
recognized  by  all  nations.     He  examined  court  cases  in  Great  Britain
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and  the  United  States  to  support  his  argument.     Hence,  his  historical
knowledge  formed  the  basis  for  Benjamin's  defense  of  slavery.
Benjamin  saw  the  Southern  states  as  having  a  legal  right  to
secede.     He  studied  similarities  between  the  events  leading  up  to  the
revolution  of  1776  and  the  secession  of   the  Southern  states.     Benjamin
believed  that  as  history  gave  lessons  to  the  people,   it  was  up  to  the
people  to  profit  by  its  teachings.     On  the  other  hand,   the  North's
desire  to  control  the  South  made  her  overlook  the  teachings  from
history.
Like  Davis  and  Stephens,   Benjamin  also  took  great  pride  in  the
governmental  structure  of  the  United  States  and  rejoiced  to  see  the
Confederacy  following  its  example.     By  the  late  1850's,  however,   he
felt  there  could  never  be  a  truly  unif led  North  and  South  as  this  would
be  like  uniting  the  French  and  English.     Benjamin  was  quick  in  under-
standing  the  importance  that  European  nations  would  play  in  the  Civil
War.     He  expected  recognition  but  when  it  did  not  come,  he  was  one  of
the  f irst  in  the  cabinet  to  recognize  that  slavery  had  been  the  chief
impediment  for  recognition.     Thus  he  became  one  of  the  leaders  to
advocate  arming  slaves  and  having  them  f ight  for  the  Con.federacy  with
emancipation  to  follow.     Benjamin  argued  that  recognition  of  the
Confederacy  was  called  for  by  international   law.     He  accused  the  French
and  English  of  ignoring  the  history  of  the  United  States  and  chided
France  for  believing  that  the  United  States  would  not  act  to  overthrow
Maximillian  in  Mexico.     Benjamin  also  understood  the  importance  of
propaganda  and  of  educating  the  people  of  Europe  to  the  cause  of   the
Confederacy.
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Through  his  historical  insight,  Benjamin  was  more  effective  as
Secretary  of  State  than  Secretary  of  War.     Even  while  he  was  head  of
the  war  department,  he  recognized  the  need  for  the  Confederacy  to  fight
a  united  war,  rather  than  each  state  controlling  its  men.    More  than
other  members  of  the  cabinet,   Benjamin  showed  a  willingness  to  take
drastic  steps  to  win  the  war.     He  even  hinted  at  a  dictatorship,
leaving  to  the  future,  after  the  manner  of  ancient  Rome,   the  responsi-
bility  for  re-establishing  a  constitutional  government.
Due  to  his  vision  of  history,  Benjamin  was  able  to  accept  the
misfortune  of  the  Confederacy.    As  he  stated  to  Varina  Davis,  he
"believed  that  there  was  a  fate  in  the  destiny  of  nations  and  it  was
wrong  and  useless   to  distress  one's  self  and  thus  weaken  one's  energy
to  bear  what  was  foreordained  to  happen."1    This  trust  in  a  higher  law
made  Benjamin  place  most  of  his  emphasis  on  the  present.     Unlike
Stephens,  he  had  little  interest  in  his  own  past  and  unlike  Davis,
little  interest  in  his  own  future.    However,  he  did  enjoy  studying  the
history,   especially  legal  history,  of  other  nations.     Benjamin's  ideas
of  history  played  an  important  part  in  his  own  personal  life  as  well
as  in  his  efforts  and  actions  to  help  the  Confederacy.
In  the  mind  of  Alexander  Stephens  one  can  see  the  importance
he  attached  to  the  study  of  history.     Shortly  af ter  his  graduation  from
Franklin  College,  when  he  was  twenty-two,  he  wrote:     "no  inconsiderable
portion  of  pleasure  which  constitutes  human  happiness  is  derived  from
leisurely  reviewing  the  past,   this  may  be  a  depository  ever  at  hand
tvarina  Davis,I,   p.   277.
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to  which  the  mind  when  unengaged  may  revert  and  draw  stores  of  pure
delight  and  un feigned  enjoyment."2     Stephens  even  hoped  to   learn  from
his  own  past.     In  the  introduction  to  his  diary,   in  1834,  he  stated
that  he  hoped  not  only  to  derive  pleasure  but  also  to  draw  many
lessons  from  the  future  by  comparing  future  events  with  similar
occurrences   in  the  past.3    As   Stephens  matured  during  the  1840's,   his
mind  became  more  conscious  of   the  importance  that  world  history  played
in  his  own  society.
During  this  period,   Stephens  began  to  use  historical  arguments
to  support  his  own  thesis  or  ideas.     He  argued  for  slavery  from  a
strong  historical  slant.     He  saw  slavery  from  Biblical  times  and  the
Greek  and  Roman  periods,   up  to   the  Spanish  and  English  empires,   as
being  a  natural  position  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  Creator.    This  higher
law  doctrine  was  supported  by  lessons  from  history  as  he  viewed  history
as  consisting  of  permanent  truths  and  principles.
During  the  secession  crisis,   Stephens'  historical  mind  again
came  to  the  forefront.     While  he  did  not  desire  secession,  he  was
convinced  that  it  was  an  inalienable  right.     However,  he  also  realized
the  dangers  of  human  passions  in  revolutions  as  having  caused  the
downfall  of  all  republics.     He  studied  the  "unfortunate"  examples  of
the  English  Revolution  in  1640  and  Louis  Napoleon's   takeover  in  the
French  Revolution  in  1848.     Stephens  feared  the  same  horrible  con-
sequences  would  result  if  the  South  seceded,  unless,   like  the  American
2Johaston  and  Brorme,   p.   63,   Nov.   19,   1834.
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Revolution  of  1776,   it  could  become  one  of   those  rare  exceptions   to
the  lessons  which  history  taught.
Stephens  expressed  great  admiration  .for  the  United  States'
government,  and  later,   the  Con.federate  goverrment.     He  felt  that  it
was  not  the  people,  but  rather  their  goverrmental  institutions,  which
made  countries  great.     Stephens  wanted  people  to  compare  the  govern-
ments  of  all  past  countries  before  they  changed  the  goverrmental
institutions  they  then  had.     He  compared  American  institutions  with
the  ancient  Grecian  society.     The  collapse  of  the  Greek  culture  was
due  to  the  destruction  of  their  institutions.    He  warned  that  history
taught,   as  in  Greece,   Italy,   the  South  American  republics  and  other
places,   that  whenever  liberty  was  lost  it  might  never  be  restored.
Without  his  historical-mindedness,   Stephens,   the  constitutionalist,
could  never  have  been  so  effective,  nor  convincing.     The  Con.federate
Vice  President's  devotion  was  directed  toward  a  goverrment,  not  to
the  people.
Stephens'   understanding  of  European  history  convinced  him  that
the  European  nations  would  probably  not  intervene  in  the  Civil  War.
Nevertheless,   like  other  Southerners,  he  hoped  that  Europe's  desire
for  cotton  would  force  it  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Confederacy.
However,  he  was  not  too  worried  as  to  whether  the  Confederacy  gained
recognition  or  not.     Neither  was  Stephens  greatly  concerned  with
strictly  military  matters  although,  unlike  most  Confederate  leaders,
he  realized  through  his  historical  insight  that  the  maintenance  of  a
capital  was  not  so  important.    That  really  concerned  the  Vice  President
was  the  tinfringement  of  the  condition  of -the  personal  liberty  of  the
people  of  the  Confederacy.     Due  to  his  historical  interpretation,
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he  was  horrified  by  Davis'   suppression  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.
He  also  insisted  that  history  taught  that  power  corrupts  and  he  was
very  fearful  of  Davis'   use  of  power,   even  though  it  was  necessary  if
the  Confederacy  was   to  win  the  war.     Stephens  compared  Lincoln  with
Hazael  and  Caesar  in  order  to  show  that  power  was  indeed  a  corruptive
influence.     For  Stephens,   the  preservation  of  liberty  was  more
important  than  the  preservation  of  the  Confederacy.     He  believed  that
all  wars,   especially  civil  wars,  always  menaced  liberty  and  usually
ended  in  the  destruction  of  liberty.     Furthermore,   Stephens  saw  a
historical  necessity  for  leaving  men  at  home  in  order  to  wage  wars
successfully.     In  addition,   conscription  could  never  be  the  means  of
establishing  or  maintaining  free  institutions.
Stephens  considered  himself  to  be  a  very  high-minded  individual.
In  his  own  eyes,  he  was  not  moved  by  ordinary  motives  but  by  great
principles.    When  announcing  for  reelection  in  1866,  he  stated  that
he  would  rather  be  defeated  in  good  cause  then  to  triumph  in  a  bad
one.     He  told  his  audience  that  he  would  always  speak  the  truth,   as
had  Aristedes  when  Thenistocles  conceived  the  proposition  of  burning
all  the  f leets  of  other  Grecian  states  so  that  Athens  might  hold
domain  over  the  seas.    All  the  other  generals  supported  this  plan
except  Aristedes  who  said  to  the  Athenians  that  whafa  Themistocles
proposed  would  be  greatly  to  the  advantage  of  Athens,  but  that  it  would
be  unjust.4    For  Stephens,  Aristedes  was  one  of  those  rare  men  in
history  who  dared  to  speak  the  truth  even  when  it  appeared  to  be  opposed
4C|eveland,   pp.   474-75.
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to  the  best  interest  of  the  people;   the  Vice  President  considered
himself  to  be  of  this  noble  breed.
To  support  his  great  principles,   Stephens  studied  ancient
societies  and  compared  those  societies  with  that  of  the  United  States.
His  objective  was   to  show  the  people  of   the  United  States  and  later
the  Confederacy  what  these  great  history-embodied  principles  were.
Edmund  Wilson  has  stated  that  Stephens  was  not  at  all  historically
minded  in  the  modern  sense  since  Stephens  slaw  the  great  principles
of  history  as  being  unchangeable,   in  accordance  with  eighteenth  century
Enlighterment  thinking.     Indeed,   Stephens  did  believe  that  "Times
change,  and  men  often  change  with  them,  but  principles  never!     These,
like  truths  are  eternal,  unchangeable,  and  immutable."5    Stephens  did
not  study  history  in  order  to  better  ascertain  what  action  should  be
taken  in  a  particular  incident.    For  instance,  he  was  never  interested
in  how  the  Confederacy  could  win  the  war.     To  him,   this  was  just  not
the  most  important  consideration  since  his  great  emphasis  was  on  the
higher  principles.     His  mind  and  his  actions  must  be  understood  in  the
context  of  this  grand  idea.     Stephens  realized  that  most  people  who
studied  history  looked  at  the  events  and  the  changes  which  occurred  in
history.     Unlike  these  people,   Stephens  studied  the  past  in  order  to
reconf irm  the  great  principles  and  truths  of  history.     In  the
introduction  of  his  book,  A
States
Constitutional View  of   the  War Between the
modeled  after  the  writings  of  Plato  and  Cicero,   Stephens  wrote
that  "the  chief  usefulness  of  all  History  consists  in  the  lessons  it
teaches.w6
p.9.
5stephenso   I.  4
6E!¥.,  p.   87.
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In  early  childhood  Jefferson  Davis  was  imf luenced  by  a  wide
variety  of  ideas  and  influences.     As  a  young  man  he  had  a  certain
degree  of  interest  in  the  past  but  it  was  not  until  he  became  Secretary
of  War  that  his  historical  world-mindedness  developed.     His  studies
were  concentrated  primarily  on  the  military  history  of  foreign  nations.
He  tried  to   learn  from  their  examples  and  experiences  how  to  develop
the  United  States  Army.     Af ter  Davis  had  resigned  from  his  cabinet
position,  his  historical  consciousness  developed  further,  however.
By  the  1850's  Davis  had  become  one  of   the  most  outspoken
exponents  of  slavery.     His  argument  .for  slavery  was  from  a  strong
historical-religious  standpoint.     He  studied  the  institutions  of  slavery
in  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  and  looked  at  the  history  of  the  slaves
themselves.     He  concluded  that  slavery  was  the  best  and  proper  condition
for  Negroes.     Davis  also  insisted  that  only  Negroes  could  do  the  work
of  slaves  in  the  South  as  other  nationalities  could  not  stand  the
physical  conditions.     In  his  defense  of  slavery,   Davis'   mind  showed
a  more  cosmopoilitan  approach  than  usual;   generally  he  was  more
concerned  with  the  history  of  the  United  States  than  with  the  history
of   the  European  nations.
During  the  secession  crisis,  Davis  saw  similarities  when  he
compared  the  position  of  the  South  with  that  of  the  American  colonies
before  the  American  Revolution.     He  warned  the  North  not  to  repeat  the
blunders  which  Great  Britain  had  made.     Thus,   Davis  argued  that  people
could  learn  lessons  from  history  and  profit  by  its  examples.     Davis
also  took  great  pride  in  the  United  States'   goverrment  and  was
delighted  to  see  the  goverrment  of  the  Confederacy  modeled  af ter  the
United  States'   goverrment.     However,  Davis  admired  certain  features
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in  Great  Britain's  goverrment.     Not  only  did  he  compare  Great  Britain's
government  with  that  of  the  Conf ederacy  but  also  he  seemed  to  regret
that,   in  some  instances,   the  Confederacy  had  not  followed  the  examples
of  Great  Britain.
Like  Stephens,   Davis'   devotion  was  aimed  primarily  toward
governmental  institutions  rather  than  toward  people,  but  he  did  take
more  of  a    nationalistic  outlook  than  Stephens.    While  serving  as
President  of  the  Confederacy,  he  was  more  interested  in  the  Confederacy
than  in  any  individual  state,  while  Stephens  remained  more  interested
in  his  home  state  of  Georgia.     Unfortunately,  Davis  ignored  the
historical  lesson  of  keeping  the  people  informed  as  he  felt  that  the
people  would  trust  him  to  do  what  was  right.
Like  many  Southerners,   Davis  expected  foreign  recognition  early
in  the  Civil  War.     Davis  thought  that  the  history  of  international  law
would  require  foreign  nations  to  recognize  the  Confederacy.     Similarly,
he  felt  that  Europe  must  react  to  the  United  States'   blockade,   but
again  he  misunderstood  Europe's  antagonism  to  slavery  and  the
ineff ective  coercive  power  of  King  Cotton.     Toward  the  end  of  the
Civil  War,  Davis  entertained  the  idea  of  getting  recognition  from
Spain  or  Brazil.     Unfortunately  for  the  Confederacy,   this  idea  was
never  fully  developed.
Davis  was  also  concerned  with  how  future  historians  would  regard
his  actions  and  realized  that  his  name  was  tied  up  with  the  history  of
the  Confederacy.7    Although  he  stated  that  he  was  convinced  that  the
7jefferson  Davis9  !±± E±±± ±E± E±±± 9± ±±±
Vol.   I  (New  York:     D.  ApplEEo=i=di5.
Conf ederate  Government
1881),   p.    205.
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future  would  prove  the  Confederacy  innocent  of  any  wrong-doing,  he
always  kept  an  eye  Slued  toward  the  future.
In  all  these  Confederate  leaders  historical-mindedness  was
present.     While  their  minds  were  concerned  with  history,   they  were  more
absorbed  with  what  principles  or  truths  history  could  teach  them  than
with  deriving  practical  applications  from  history.     To  understand  the
actions  of  each  man,   it  is  important  to  know what  role  their  historical
mindedness  played.     For  Mallory,   this  historical  awareness  was  of  great
importance  during  the  Civil  War.     With  Davis  and  Benjamin,   this  factor
hindered  their  effectiveness  during  the  Civil  War.    As  for  Stephens,
his  mind  was  so  concerned  with  the  great  truths  in  history  that  he  was
not  at  all  concerned  witht how  the  Confederacy  could  win  the  war.
Indeed,  his  historical-mindedness  hindered  the  Confederate  cause.
Through  an  understanding  of  the  historical  thinking  of  these  Confederate
leaders,  one  can  better  understand  the  Civil  War  itself .
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